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BECOMING COMFORTABLE ON UNSTEADY GROUND:

KNOWLEDGE, PERSPECTIVE, AND THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS

by

Timothy Joseph Duvall

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

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As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Timothy Joseph Duvall

entitled Becoming Comfortable on Unsteady Ground: Knowledge, Perspective, and the Science of Politics

and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Cary J. Nederman	April 16, 1997 Date
V. Spike Peterson	14 Apr 97 Date
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Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.

Dissertation Director Cary J. Nederman	April 16, 1997 Date

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SIGNED: 

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DEDICATION

To my parents, Paul and Nona Duvall. My father is a model of patience and goodness and I wish more people in this world were like him. I got my iconoclasm from my mother and I would like to thank her for that. The topic of this dissertation was, in many ways, inspired by her.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation critically appraises the scientific identity of the discipline of political science. In it, I argue that in spite of the proclamations indicating the death of positivism, the spirit of positivism still reigns in the discipline's construction of science. The positivist state of the discipline carries with it, among other things, a belief in a world "out there" to be studied, understood and known completely. This entails faith that fact and value, subject and object, knower and known can all be reliably separated and that neutral and objective knowledge can build on itself in a progression toward the truth of political affairs. Mainstream political scientists, the bulk of the discipline's members, I contend, still embrace this positivist view of the world, a view that includes ontological and epistemological presuppositions that I find to be untenable. In support of my conviction I appeal to the hermeneutic perspective that Heidegger and Gadamer encourage and connect it to the critical theory approach of Habermas and Fay, to the postmodern approach of Derrida and Foucault, and to various feminist perspectives. My aim is to (re)construct the scientific identity of the discipline in ways that are epistemologically and ontologically more tenable for what I take to be a complicated social and political world. Ultimately, I settle on Donna Haraway's notion of "situated knowledges" as the most useful alternative (re)construction of science for the discipline of political science. Situated knowledges grasp and embrace the complex nature of the

world. They deny the existence of any of the dichotomies that positivism holds dear, they insist on the interpretive and contextual nature of knowledge, and they demand that we understand knowledge to be partial, perspectival and contestable. In these ways, situated knowledges compel us to take responsibility for our knowledge claims and to become accountable for how those claims are used. These are vital issues for a discipline such as political science, a discipline that professes, in these "postbehavioral" days, to be relevant to contemporary political practices and open to various research approaches.

INTRODUCTION

Behavioralism, the movement in political science that brought positivism to the discipline, has not died. It is not the case, in other words, that simply because behavioralism has been discredited, and positivism with it, it has ceased to exist. The behavioralist and positivist approaches persist and a positivist mood prevails in the discipline. Terence Ball (1995) simply overstates himself when he proclaims the death of positivism in the discipline (47). For it is still the case that political scientists tend to think of political *science* as distinguishing between "facts" and "values," as being "empirical" instead of "normative," and as being explanatory according to the dictates of the deductive-nomological model despite the apparent non-existence of "laws" of political behavior (46-47). The scientific identity of the discipline has not somehow "gotten over" its positivist leanings. Scientific members of the discipline continue to think of a world "out there" that is objective, knowable, and therefore controllable. They still believe that a positivist sort of science will allow them to categorize political behavior in such a way as to render it knowable and and thereby enable them to have some effect on political action in campaigns, legislative policy, and so on. And the belief that normative political theory is ultimately irrelevant to this project of knowledge endures. Normative political theory is too much like guesswork, it is too contestable to contribute to the sort of certainty of knowledge sought by political *scientists*.

I argue in this dissertation, however, that normative political theory has very important contributions to make to political inquiry and that the scientific identity of the discipline ought to be (re)formulated to reflect this. In particular, I argue that political scientists need to become more self-conscious about the ontological and epistemological presuppositions of their "science." I urge us to consider the argument that all knowledge is interpretive and is therefore always situated, partial and contestable. This perspective on knowledge mitigates "positivist" claims that there is a world "out there" that we can study separate from ourselves; a world from which we can detach ourselves as we seek its true meaning(s). I contend that such a world does not exist.

I begin in Chapter One with an account of the discipline of political science, spanning the past 100 years, which focuses on the creation of a scientific identity for the study of politics. I contend that the history of the discipline has been characterized by a profound scientific identity crisis. Political scientists have consistently sought to create an identity for themselves that would establish them as legitimate scientists. Accordingly, they have invariably oriented their conceptions of science around the dominant philosophies of science in any given epoch. As such, during the 1950s, they explicitly adopted positivism as the model for their "scientific" inquiry and, during the 1960s and 1970s, they attempted to amend this characterization of science in light of Thomas Kuhn's criticisms (1970) and the "postpositivism" that resulted. I argue, however, that postpositivism does not substantively alter positivism and that, as a result,

the positivist mood remains the dominant perspective on science within the discipline.

In Chapter Two I assess the contribution that Martin Heidegger's and Hans-Georg Gadamer's conception of "hermeneutic consciousness" can make to the discipline's scientific identity. The cultivation of hermeneutic consciousness entails the recognition that all human actions and interactions are interpretive. That is, all human actions and interactions are necessarily situated in a historical and cultural context, which means that any explanation of an experience emanates from a particular perspective. Given this, any science that refuses to recognize the importance of interpretation is inadequate for the human condition. A science which nourishes hermeneutic consciousness, then, is better suited to the human condition. I go on in the ensuing chapters to cultivate the ground that hermeneutic consciousness confers.

In Chapter Three I consider critical theory and critical social science as evinced in the work of Jürgen Habermas and Brian Fay, respectively. There I argue that while Fay and (in particular) Habermas claim to evoke hermeneutic consciousness in their work and, in so doing, thwart the pervasive hierarchy that positivism begets, neither of them is successful. Both Habermas and Fay fail to elude the unity of method (or unity of science) problem. That is, in claiming, as they do, that the critical method can be *the* method for the social sciences, they reproduce the positivist position and thereby replicate its hierarchy. Consequently, I maintain that Habermas and Fay do not adequately manifest hermeneutic consciousness and their approach cannot therefore be a suitable model for an

alternative science of politics.

Chapter Four focuses on the "postmodern" theories of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. With their critique of Enlightenment rationality and the dualisms that it breeds, Derrida and Foucault more completely exhibit hermeneutic consciousness. They recognize that the world is characterized by complexity and that, as such, we cannot exercise final control over the world nor will rudimentary renderings sufficiently depict it. They go on to assert that our simplistic sketches of social and political issues and, in particular, our failure to comprehend the perfidious role of power in the world is dangerous and simply unsuitable for the postmodern condition.

Chapter Five evaluates the impact that feminist perspectives might have on the discipline's scientific identity. It seems to me that an alternative science of politics might be most usefully and appropriately oriented around Donna Haraway's notion of "situated knowledges." Haraway understands knowledge to be partial, contestable and situated in particular contexts, but she also demands that we become responsible for the implications of our knowledge claims. Haraway is extremely sensitive to the desire and need for interpersonal and intercultural connection. Her ideas about knowledge require us not only to seek connections with others, but to do so in such a way (contra positivism) that does not deny our attachment to the world. In recognizing our connectedness with the world in which we live, Haraway allows us to claim responsibility for what we study and for what we claim to know about the world. This is of crucial importance for

political scientists since their knowledge claims can, especially when actually put into political practice, have a detrimental impact on people.[1]

The persistence of positivist training rituals (George 1994: 12), then, makes this dissertation important. Political scientists trained in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s still exercise a powerful force in the departments of political science in colleges and universities around the country. I can see in my peers the effects such training and its accompanying positivist-Realist perspective on the world can have. This way of thinking is outdated, if, indeed, it ever had a date, and my dissertation is a call for change in that realm.

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[1]See Arturo Escobar's (1995) discussion of the "discourse of development" for an example of the practical effects of a particular sort of theorizing about "development" that took hold in the Western academy following World War II.

I.

POSITIVIST POLITICAL SCIENCE:

THE QUEST FOR SCIENTIFIC LEGITIMACY

Introduction

The American science of politics found its naturalist, positivist face in the behavioral revolution of the 1950s. Only then did many members of the discipline accept and become comfortable with the scientific identity of the discipline. Behavioralism established an agreed upon methodology (modeled after the natural sciences) which was (ostensibly) value free and emphasized quantification toward the end of generating covering laws to aid in predicting political behavior. Though this has changed in some respects since the behavioral revolution, the positivist model of science still informs the scientific identity of the discipline. The cost of the scientific identity to the discipline has been the marginalization of normative political theory. In fact, behavioralism called for an end to normative political theory since it did not aid the empirical science of politics. And normative political theory has never recovered. Normative political theorizing has certainly not been abandoned and it surely has a home in "postbehavioral" political science. But, as I will argue in this chapter, normative political theory has a tenuous hold on legitimacy within the discipline as a whole. This flimsy legitimacy results from the fact that the significance of the discipline has come to be based on its identification as a

science; and, with the rise of behavioralism and the positivist philosophy of science that the discipline adopted, normative political theory has been consciously and conspicuously excluded from that scientific identification. In this chapter I undertake a historical discussion of the development of the scientific identity in the discipline of political science to demonstrate the normative-empirical divide resulting from the positivist scientific identity of the discipline.

Much has been written of late about the historical development of the discipline. This research has generally sought to accomplish two goals. It has either attempted to trace the development of the discipline as it relates to the structure and aims of democracy in the United States (Easton, Gunnell and Stein 1995; Gunnell 1993; Farr and Seidelman 1993) or it has aspired to track the development of the various research traditions in the discipline and to critique their effectiveness (Farr, Dryzek and Leonard 1995; Seidelman and Harpham 1985; Ricci 1984). Of these works, only Gunnell (1993) systematically discusses the estrangement of normative political theory from the "legitimate" pursuits of an empirical science of politics. According to Gunnell, by the 1960s normative "political theory was well on its way to becoming an intellectually, if not professionally, autonomous field with tenuous links to political science as well as an increasingly problematical understanding of its relationship to politics" (1993: 8). In this chapter, I construct a history of the discipline which explains the disconnection between normative and empirical political inquiry in terms of disciplinary attempts to establish a

scientific identity. I seek to demonstrate that the pursuit of a scientific identity modeled on the natural sciences has necessarily involved eschewing normative political concerns from the legitimized, scientific approach to the study of politics. Gunnell's argument in *The Descent of Political Theory* complements my account, but it does not take the further step of conceiving of some way for normative political inquiry to be (re)integrated into the study of politics nor does it assess the implications of taking such a step.

My account also differs from Gunnell's in the sense that I explain the "descent of political theory" in terms of the legitimation of political inquiry as science, while he explains it principally in terms of the impact that German émigré scholars had on the science of politics during the 1940s and 1950s (1993: 6, 146-220). Gunnell argues, for example, that the behavioral revolution took place specifically in response to the immigration of German political scholars. He claims that the "insinuation of the ideas of the European Right and Left" into the discipline ultimately "gave form and meaning to behavioralism" (7). In particular, Gunnell contends that the construction of a "more self-conscious scientific identity" in the form of behavioralism was "fundamentally a function of the belief that there was a need to defend the traditional vision of social *science* against the emerging antiscientific philosophies" at the hands of German émigré scholars (223, emphasis mine).

This perspective, while interesting and provocative, neglects to take into account the historical development of the scientific identity in the discipline. My argument in this

chapter differs from Gunnell's in this respect. I argue that the discipline of political science had been casting about for a coherent scientific identity at least forty years prior to the behavioral revolution. Thus, while German émigré scholars may have played a role in the codification of behavioralism, the seeds for the behavioral revolution were planted long before its inception. This interpretation is significant since it deepens the "form and meaning" of behavioralism. The behavioral revolution, on my account, was not merely a response to the influx of German scholars following World War II. Rather, behavioralism was primarily the fulfillment of the yearning within the discipline for a legitimate scientific status, and the pure science of politics that behavioralism fostered was perceived by those involved to provide that legitimacy. The implication of this scientific legitimation for normative political theory was the systematic exclusion of normative inquiry from the legitimated pursuits of the discipline.[1] The task of the chapters following this one will be to discuss the various attempts by philosophers of science to (re)integrate normative political inquiry into the study of politics and to address the implications, benefits and shortcomings of such attempts.[2]

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[1]Indeed, some have explicitly voiced this exclusionary sentiment. Brunk, Secrest and Tamashiro indicate that we "know" precious little about morality and war because "academic inquiries...have tended to be legalistic, philosophical, or religious, and very narrow, issue-centered treatments of topics such as the Vietnam War" (1990: 83).

[2]I should comment on the fact that I insist, in this chapter, that the science of politics is a positivist science, even today. This may seem odd in light of Thomas Kuhn's claim that the progress of science is not rational or linear. It may seem to be even stranger given the "postpositivist" movement that Kuhn's work spawned (Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1977). I contend that postpositivism did not significantly alter the goals of positivist

The Science of Politics

We can date the beginning of American political science as an organized discipline to December 30, 1903, when John Burgess, Frank Goodnow, Westel W. Willoughby and others founded the American Political Science Association (APSA) (Haddow 1969: 262; Ricci 1984: 63-64; Somit and Tanenhaus 1968: 23). The Association's journal, the *American Political Science Review* (*APSR*), followed in 1906. Even though most schools still lacked separate political science departments, the appearance of the APSA, and thereafter its journal, legitimated professional commitment to political science as a coherent area of study. The APSA gave political scientists, in and out of the university, a sense of common purpose, and the *APSR* offered an outlet for original research and scholarly exposure.

The discipline of political science was not initially focused in the university. In fact, in 1912 only 20% of the APSA membership was composed of "professors and teachers" (Somit and Tanenhaus 1968: 55). The academic contingent of the APSA was extremely effective, though, at consistently dominating offices of the APSA and the editorial board of the *APSR*. Over time, "the presidency [of the Association] was increasingly reserved for de facto professors, with non-academicians rarely advancing beyond the rank of second vice-president" (55-56). Eventually, the Association became

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science. Indeed, the main goal of postpositivist social science is to salvage rationality in science as well as to guarantee the rational progress of social scientific knowledge. See pp. 48-53 below.

increasingly populated by academicians, moving the discipline's focus to the university.

As the discipline was established, political scientists increasingly incorporated political knowledge as their peculiar domain. Political scientists, after "authorizing" themselves through the creation of a discipline, began cordoning off political research as their area of study. They defined themselves as holders and keepers of political knowledge. The study of politics started to become a professional pursuit, sanctioned by a professional association. This trend toward professionalism in the field of political research became more clear during the behavioral revolution's move to "pure" science. With behavioralism, the discipline settled on a scientific identity, an identity that has changed little since its inception. Behavioralism, though, has its roots in the "science of politics movement" which began in the 1920s.

Political scientists believed that a scientific, disciplinary and professional identity (i.e., acceptance as "legitimate" producers of knowledge) depended on a common and useful methodology to separate trained "political scientists" from the methodologically untrained amateurs (Ricci 1984: 36-40). Experts in political studies would then use the correct methods of research to engage "in a communal endeavor *deserving recognition and respect* for its original and valuable contributions to American society" (39, emphasis added). Scientific method would allow political scientists to arrive at objective, value-free truth (or truths) about a certain aspect of (usually) American politics in order to aid a modernizing polity in a purely technical way. There could be no normative goals in a

value-free science.

In the early 1900s, Arthur F. Bentley offered a tool for empirical, value-free social research in his work *The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures.* Although Bentley was not an academic by trade, he did maintain a sustained interest in the "epistemological problem of American pragmatism, and particularly with the idea of 'process' and its relationship to the social and natural sciences" (Seidelman and Harpham 1985: 67). Seidelman and Harpham report that Bentley "was the Progressive scholar most concerned with developing rigorous methods of social scientific investigation for the analysis of an American society in transformation" (67). He also influenced subsequent generations of political scientists, especially those within the behavioralist tradition. In *The Process of Government* Bentley wanted to move away from the traditional notions of scientific explanation in society as displayed in the work of Small, von Jhering and Weber (Ward 1984: 59). He saw political science, with its nineteenth century reliance on formalist studies of institutions, as dead (Bentley 1949: 162). The "barren formalism" of political science needed to be touched up with the "glow of humanity" by studying social actors themselves "for what they are" and "for what they represent" (163-164).[3] Social *scientists*

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[3]From the perspective of political theory, Bentley's sentiment is quite ironic, for two reasons. First, by talking only about "facts," not ideas, he seems to be removing the "glow of humanity" rather than embellishing it. Levers can be made to rise or fall mechanically, and their rising or falling can be recorded factually. A human can also make levers rise or fall in the same fashion. But what gives this action a "*human* glow" is not simply the operation of the lever (which the machine does also) but the ideas inside

> must deal with felt *things*, not with feelings, with intelligent *life*, not with idea ghosts. We must deal with felt *facts* and with thought *facts*, but not with feeling as reality or with thought as truth. We must find the only *reality* and the only *truth* in the proper functioning of the felt *facts* and the thought *facts* in the system to which they belong (172, emphasis added).

This is the sort of social science which Bentley wanted to "found"; and he located its focus in the activities of groups, rather than individuals.

According to Bentley, the "raw material" for the *scientific* study of government cannot be found in one person. It must always be located in "something doing," in the activity of groups, in "the dispersal of one grouping of forces by another grouping" (175-176). And while these groups *do* consist of thinking and feeling persons, the social scientist knows "nothing of 'ideas' and 'feelings' except through the medium of actions." Government is a process which is forever in flux, and, as such, it can never be described by lawbooks, law, essays, addresses or constitutional conventions. The "governmental process" can be found only "in the actually performed legislating-administrating-adjudicating activities of the nation and in the streams and currents of activity that gather among the people and rush into these spheres" (179-180). Language, too, must refer directly to activities. In order to be scientific, language must be defined, specific and operational. The "spooks" and "soul stuff" of popular psychological terminology did not offer scientific explanation of social and governmental processes. Social scientists "shall

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the human brain which govern the human operation of the lever. Second, "postbehavioralists" 45 years later will attempt to re-inject the "glow of humanity" into the discipline by advocating tolerance for diverse approaches to studying politics.

find that the forces and pressures at work are great masses, groups, of" people (197).

Bentley claimed that the only possible way to treat the raw material of government scientifically is to submit it to measurement. Measurement defeats chaos (200).

> If a statement of social facts which lends itself better to measurement is offered, that characteristic entitles it to attention. Providing the statement does not otherwise distort the social facts, the capability of measurement will be decisive in its favor. The statement that takes us farthest along the road toward quantification estimates will inevitably be the best statement (201).

But, in order to reach quantitative measurement, Bentley first found it necessary to determine what can be measured. For Bentley, group activity was (of course) measurable, but required definition. First, "group and group activity are equivalent terms with just a little difference of emphasis" (211). And second, the "group" and its "interest" are interchangeable. "There is no group without its interest" (211). Interest, in the Bentleyan sense, is not solely economic. Rather, it is multi-formed and combines economic, social and political interest, allowing people to be members of many different groups, all of which relate to one another in the social and governmental process and all of which can be expressed (or measured) in relation to one another.[4]

Bentley argued that social science, then, should be empirical, measurable, progressive, and concerned with the interaction and activity of a complex and

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[4]It is in this conceptual area, incidentally, where Bentley criticizes Marx's "group concept." Marx and Engels' class struggle theory places people in one group only, which Bentley considers arbitrary and abstract, not to mention unmeasurable.

overlapping system of social, political and economic groupings. Such a social science could, in Bentley's view, be objective and, as such, achieve "knowledge." We see most of these aspects again, in the science of politics movement of the 1920s and 1930s and in the behavioral political science that conquered the discipline by the late 1950s. The empirical, measurable, "progressive," and quantified behavioralist tradition gave political science the "*scientific*" identity it had sought since Bentley's era.

Bentley, though, was never clear about how his science of politics would be implemented. Like many early practitioners of social science, he neglected to explicate clearly what a science of society or politics would entail. Instead his discussion spirals into abstraction with talk of objectivity in research without denying the more "human" and subjective aspects. In other words, "hard objectivity" is not an "excuse for setting up arbitrary, unreal subjective factors at the upper end of the interpretation" (Bentley 1949: 135). With the group interpretation Bentley hoped to "absorb" the "conditions" of social action into "action" and through this develop a social science (171-172; Ward 1984: 74-75). What, exactly, does such a social science necessitate? Bentley never does say and, consequently, his social science becomes difficult (if not impossible) to actualize.

Nevertheless, Bentley's *Process of Government* influenced subsequent generations of political scientists even though, as James F. Ward reports, most political scientists probably misinterpreted Bentley's "tool." His attempt to devise an objective, value-free social science ignited a long process of scientific "identity-seeking" for later political

scientists, especially those of the behavioral persuasion. Charles Merriam continued this process and was one of the first influential political scientists to focus explicitly on behavior in politics.

The new era in political science which followed World War I, like most new eras in the discipline, repudiated the previous era of political science. Progressive political science was condemned as invalid and partisan, not scientific enough. The new era sought more detached, scientific, methodical, and therapeutic reforms for what was perceived to be a democracy in crisis.

According to post-World War I political scientists, the United States' "liberal democracy" emerged badly shaken from the war. Political scientists had supported the war "for the usual reasons--it was supposed to end European autocracy and thus end war" (Seidelman and Harpham 1985: 102). Instead, emboldened and effective fascist and communist governments in Europe strengthened their abilities to motivate their populaces to act in accordance with government interests. Post-war political scientists in America noticed a peculiar lack of any such motivational ability in the United States, and their wrath fell on their immediate predecessors. On their account, reform-minded progressive political scientists had not adequately and systematically located receptive reform publics, and their superficial and hasty analyses and proposals had consequently failed to be effective (101-103). In light of this, political scientists of the new era saw the need for scholarly renovation. They renewed their dedication to establishing scientific inquiry in

the hope that "scientific knowledge would emerge and contribute to improving the quality of public life in America" (Ricci 1984: 77). The professional identity of the political scientist became that of political "healer" and political knowledge was to be constructed toward this end. Political knowledge was to be implemented in the governmental system. Political scientists such as Merriam and Harold Lasswell saw themselves as social engineers whose purpose was the "rational" supervision of political actors to order and control a logical, brave new political society.

Progressive political scientists had considered citizens to be "eager consumers of social science messages," whereas the "new" political scientists saw citizens as "objects of study and observation to be 'educated' and controlled" (Seidelman and Harpham 1985: 103). The ultimate question for the new political scientists became how to motivate public opinion to support the liberal democratic state. They operated on the presupposition that humankind was perfectible and thus that a reliance on "scientific" political knowledge would help to cure societal and political ills permanently (Merriam 1934: 184). The "scientific" political scientist constructed political knowledge that could be applied in a technical way to governmental functions.[5]

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[5]See Luke 1978: 1, 45. Luke argues that there is a difference between this applied "scientific politics" and political science. At the time, though, the practical application of such political knowledge to public affairs *was* political science. That is, this is how political scientists (especially those influenced by Merriam) identified themselves. They saw themselves as political therapists, political healers, whose professional identity revolved around the construction (they might say "discovery") of political knowledge that is applicable, useful and efficacious.

Francis Lieber and John Burgess had helped to establish political science as an academic discipline, but Merriam was instrumental in molding it into a social *science* (Crick 1959: 135). Like his contemporary "Progressive" colleagues, Merriam was directly involved in electoral politics, and like his contemporary "scientists" after World War I he withdrew from direct involvement in electoral politics to cultivate a valid science of politics. He played a prominent role in the APSA's National Conferences on the Science of Politics in 1923, 1924 and 1925, and he presided over the Social Science Research Council that was founded in 1923 (Crick 1959: 137; Ricci 1984: 77).

In his scholarly work he consistently demanded that political science become more rigorously scientific, but with an applied as opposed to a pure approach. He saw the development of a scientific technique and methodology for political science as a necessity to avoid "speculation and guesswork" (quoted in Crick 1959: 138). Merriam viewed the physical sciences as attempts to benefit, preserve and perfect civilization, and he reserved a place for political science in this process. He consciously sought to control the "evolution of intelligence" and human behavior, through civic education, to instill democratic values in citizens in the move towards the perfection of society and humankind (Crick 1959: 136-143).

Merriam was always very vague about the nature of such control and about the implementation and ramifications of such a science in his own work. Even so, Merriam was extraordinarily influential as he broke the ground for later political, scientific

excavation. He also helped to propel political science from obscurity into tentative legitimacy, at least in terms of federal funding and acceptance (which is what the discipline had been after for years). This legitimacy was enhanced by the behavioral revolution of the 1950s.[6]

Despite Merriam's post-war disgust with Progressive scholarship, his views on social science did not clash with Arthur Bentley's. In fact, Merriam praised Bentley's theoretical contributions to social science (Kress 1970: 82). Like Bentley, Merriam detested the formalism of previous social and political study, where "government was thought to be a mechanism whose essential features were frozen in time, its workings distant from the 'real' lives of citizens" (Seidelman and Harpham 1985: 122). Merriam sought to systematize the study of politics and to focus it on the level of human behavior (Merriam 1966: 367-374; Merriam 1934: 13, 129-130). Bentley also seemed to favor such a disposition in social science, but he was never as explicit about it as Merriam.

Merriam believed that Progressive reform had been misdirected. Reform could

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[6]It is interesting to note that the emphasis placed upon science by Merriam and others belies an apparent political agenda. Merriam, in particular, insisted that he was interested in using science to support the liberal democratic state. To do this, however, would require that scholars seek to control citizens, to somehow "make" citizens. This need to control certainly seems to contradict the liberal notions that Merriam repeatedly claimed to support. How can such a contradiction be explained? One particularly interesting plausible explanation is that perhaps Merriam, and others of his ilk, wanted to hide behind science. With science they could claim to be neutral; they could claim to have the answers to the problem of instituting liberal political ideals. As such, only they could know what it takes to institute the liberal state and thus they ought to be allowed to control citizens for their own good. In this way, Merriam and other "progressive" political scientists appear to be "liberal" in their minds only.

not begin with the institutions of government or with the middle class as a group. Rather, reform must begin at the individual level, at the level of citizen support and citizen action. As such, Merriam's science of politics rested upon the systematic, scientific study of human behavior. Such a science could be used to control the behavior of citizens "democratically," through civic education, to fall in line with liberal, democratic interests.

In *Civic Education in the United States* (1934), Merriam's call for a more coherent science of politics based on human behavior became explicit. He began by restating his view in *The Making of Citizens* (1966) that technology is advancing while society lags behind. Merriam argued that "the spirit of science holds the key to education and social advancement" (Merriam 1934: 13). Intelligence and science would replace force, fear and magic as guides of social conduct.

The "new orientation" in civic education would utilize social science to destroy traditional government and usher in a controlled, designed, planned government in its place. This new orientation around the spirit of science "will look to the utilization of experience for remolding the future and the present" (Merriam 1934: 32).[7] Merriam specifically championed a "science of human behavior" as a key to "unlocking many possibilities of human control and human emancipation" (Merriam 1934: 129).[8] And the

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[7]How one *re*molds the future, though, is not clear.

[8]Although it is unclear how control *and* emancipation can work together without contradiction. Perhaps Merriam meant something akin to Rousseau's idea of forcing people to be free (Rousseau 1987: 162)?

social scene is sufficiently complex as to necessitate an integration of all social studies (politics, history, geography, sociology, etc.). According to Merriam, such a joint, cross-disciplinary endeavor can offer a more complete, and thus more useful, synthesis of political and social behavior (86-87, 98).

Merriam also believed that the use of science and the scientific method in civic education would engender optimism about the benefits and possibilities of democratic government (170). He concluded with an astounding display of his own optimism about the fruits of a "science" of society and politics. Merriam believed that the civic instruction which he condoned "may point to astounding possibilities that lie in the emerging control of man over his environment and over himself, in the democratic transition from passivity to creation and construction that characterizes modern life" (Merriam 1934: 170).[9] Such possibilities, according to Merriam, may place the world in a "fairyland of human achievement" free from disease, hunger, toil and fear (184). The angel of science, it seems, "will bring life and light and healing on its wings" (184).

Unfortunately, though, like Bentley, Merriam never explicated how his science of politics would be implemented. The accompanying methodology is also not explained. In fact, it is not apparent that Merriam himself clearly understood what he meant by his science of politics; he knew only that it was desirable. But Merriam's early insistence on a science of politics opened doors for federal and philanthropic funding which eventually

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[9]Also see pp. 185-186 for more talk of *man's* mastery over nature for specifically human purposes.

helped to "legitimate" the identity of the political scientist during the behavioral era.[10]

Harold Lasswell is probably considered Merriam's greatest student, at least in terms of his prolific scholarly production. It is certainly clear that Lasswell was heavily influenced by Merriam's work. Lasswell, too, emphasized the *science* of politics and its methodology. He was often more clear and precise than Merriam in explicating his conception of a science of politics, and he eventually placed significant emphasis on quantification. Technological frameworks for data collection and statistical manipulation were just being developed, though, and consequently Lasswell could not adequately pursue his quantitative goals early in his career (this, of course, had changed by the 1950s).

Lasswell held a primary interest in political behavior and its control through "conceptual frameworks" of institutional and societal power (Crick 1959: 177). He was among the first of Merriam's students to argue that society consisted of irrational voters *and* leaders whose behavior must be scientifically studied in order to make it rational (i.e., to control it). Obviously, Lasswell strode a fine conceptual line between democratic and coercive politics. In fact, he often appears to tumble over to the coercive side. His belief in popular irrationality immediately calls into question the possibility of "popular rule" that democracy purports to require. This clash between the scientific pursuit of human/societal perfection and democratic values illuminated a methodological

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[10]Merriam questioned the science of politics by the end of his life, though, when he realized that it was not bringing the results he had anticipated (Merriam 1945).

contradiction that the discipline feared might subvert its commitment to democracy (Ricci 1984: 94-96).

In *Psychopathology and Politics*, Lasswell makes an argument, based on certain aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis, that politics needs to be studied with an emphasis on psychology and its relation to the personal and political behavior of individuals. Lasswell was not as vehemently opposed to formalism as Merriam and Bentley, but he did argue that institutional analysts frequently overlook "the 'personal' influences which modify the expected behavior of 'legislatures,' 'executives,' and 'judiciaries'" (Lasswell 1977: 2).

According to Lasswell, politics was the realm of the irrational (184). The irrational displacement of affects was brought into the open in the arena of politics. As such, political solutions are frequently not the best *rational* decisions, but the best *emotional* ones (185). And irrelevancy accumulates in political symbols due to their emotional appeal (193; Lasswell 1938; Lasswell 1950: 38-51, 64-75). Consequently, Lasswell sees little use in democratic discussion as a means of dealing with political problems. If the individual is shown to be a poor judge of *his* needs and interests, how effective can discussion be in resolving issues of conflict?[11] In response, Lasswell does not condone the resolution of conflicts. Rather, he sanctions their prevention.

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[11]I retain Lasswell's gendered language. In doing so, I hope to highlight the fact that women played virtually no role in the establishment of the scientific identity in the discipline nor, for that matter, were they instrumental in the development of the scientific approach to understanding the world more generally. This will become very important when, in Chapters Four and Five, I discuss the postmodern and feminist attacks on Enlightenment rationality and the science that accompanied it.

Lasswell argued that certain "objective investigators," schooled in the fields of psychology, psychopathology, physiology, medicine and social science, will be able to "deal objectively" with themselves and with others in order to discover the "truth" of harmonious human relations and thereby to obviate political conflicts (Lasswell 1977: 193, 196-197, 200-203). The interdisciplinary political scientist, then, will be able to discern the cultural patterns of individual/social conflict and function as therapist to prepare people to manage their emotional conflict "objectively" and thus make them and society more rational and purposive. Lasswell envisions a utopia, one where radical political action is not necessary or desired. Rather, the education and research of rational social scientists is offered as the cure for the irrational bases of society. In this way, a utopian society will emerge and flourish (Crick 1959: 199).

Lasswell, like Merriam, had noble and admirable goals in his pre-World War II work. He was also a talented and innovative social theorist. Moreover, it is difficult to argue with his or with Merriam's desire to find the perfect society, free from conflict and irrationality. Merriam and Lasswell simply wanted to install a professional identity for political scientists based on a science that was organized to aid the liberal democratic state. As such, political knowledge was to be organized for the same purpose. And this is part of the reason why such a formulation of science caught on in the discipline. It was constructed to correspond to the technical needs of society and therefore it became the accepted (funded and legitimated) identity for political scientists (Luke 1978: 3-4). But

after World War II, this identity began to crumble. Behavioralists wanted to purify scientific political knowledge.

The Behavioral Persuasion

Numerous factors emerged to help establish behavioralism as a force in political science: political scientists perceived that they were not considered legitimate scientists and consequently had problems securing research grants; they believed that the other social sciences (particularly psychology) were making broad advances while political science lagged behind; the reformist, normative nature of the discipline was generally considered speculative and unscientific; research technology (survey techniques, statistical computations, computers) became much more refined and available; and they pursued a "pure" science which operated on the presupposition that democracy is *the* best system of government due to its open and scientific qualities (Somit and Tanenhaus 1968: 184-185). In short, post-World War II political scientists sought to define the science of politics from the standpoint that science should be pure. The science of politics should be interested only in *explaining* the workings of American democracy in order to understand the American system better.

Post-war political scientists believed that political crises remained because pre-World War II political scientists had allowed their reformist aims to occlude their understanding of politics. Many post-war political scientists wanted to embark on the pure scientific project of analyzing the workings of the American system without tainting the analysis with speculative notions of reform. Here we see the first self-conscious attempts to push normative political theory to the margins of the discipline. The

assumption that American democracy is *the* best political system in the world expels the normative determination of value from the discipline's activities. A pure science, after all, cannot consider such a claim. Rather, it must presuppose its end as it determines how best to reach or enhance it.

Although it did ultimately become a driving force in political science, behavioralism did not begin as a coherent movement in the discipline. Rather, post-World War II political scientists began rejecting formalist, reformist, normative inquiry and relying more upon explaining the workings of the American political system. This phenomenon is exemplified by David Truman's revival of Bentley's *The Process of Government*. And behavioralists like Heinz Eulau and David Easton furthered what ultimately became a movement by explicitly championing behavioral research. Still though, behavioralism assumed many faces. It was a broad enough phenomenon to allow several different pursuits.[12]

Somit and Tanenhaus have been able to combine these numerous strands into what they term the "behavioral creed": (1) Political science should search rigorously for regularities in political behavior in order to facilitate prediction and explanation; (2) Political science should concern itself with empirical political phenomena, that is, with the behavior of individuals and political groups; (3) Data should be quantifiable in order

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[12]The study of American politics was not the only subfield of political science to be affected by behavioralism. Behavioralist tendencies cropped up in numerous subfields and helped to create several research approaches from systems analysis to decision theory, action theory, and so on.

to aid predictive capabilities; (4) Research should be theory driven, in other words, research should begin with a theory that yields empirically testable hypotheses; (5) Political scientists should avoid applied (reform-minded) research in favor of pure scientific research; (6) Values such as democracy, equality and freedom cannot be scientifically established and should thus be avoided unless they can somehow be made empirically testable; (7) Political science should become more interdisciplinary, at least at the behavioral level; (8) Political science should place more emphasis on methodology and make better use of multivariate analysis, sample surveys, mathematical models and simulation (Somit and Tanenhaus 1968: 177-179).

The tenets of this "creed" did not necessarily delineate behavioralist methodology. Often, it seems, the practice of behavioralism reified these trends. Furthermore, many goals of the behavioral era were organizational. For instance, behavioralists were intent on building a scientific community which was centered around behavioral inquiry. They could do this by further institutionalizing political knowledge. Therefore, the research skills that behavioral inquiry required served to exclude those who did not possess the proper training and to solidify the scientific identity of political scientists, leaving normative political theory behind as a casualty.

One example can be found in the work of David Truman. Truman is probably best known for his book *The Governmental Process*, which revived Bentley's group process theory of government (Truman 1971 [1951]). Truman's argument, although less

polemical, closely resembles Bentley's and is offered in response to the expanding role of interest groups in American politics and the public's growing fear of their influence. *The Governmental Process*, by Truman's own account, contributed to the "political behavior movement" in political science by increasing "the analytical strength and usefulness of the discipline" (xix-xx). It also triggered the growth of the study of interest groups in the United States and abroad (xxviii). Like Bentley's work, *The Governmental Process* offers a tool for analysis, a theory to drive systematic behavioral research. It contains many "testable hypotheses" ranging from the political orientations of groups to the internal politics of the group process to the influence of groups on the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and elections. Research into these areas, with the group emphasis, has increased tremendously since the publication of *The Governmental Process* in 1951.

Truman's basic argument revolves around the notion that since every individual attempts to become an accepted participant in a group or a set of groups, it makes sense to study political behavior in terms of groups and group interactions (18). He argues that "the patterns of action and attitude among individuals will differ from one another in large measure according to the clusters of group affiliations that the individuals have" (16). Individuals define themselves based on the opportunities that groups afford. In Truman's words, "It appears...that the group experiences and affiliations of an individual are the primary, though not the exclusive, means by which the individual knows,

interprets, and reacts to the society in which he [sic] exists" (21). Like Merriam, Truman believed that society had become sufficiently complex to necessitate an interdependent approach to the analysis of political behavior and government (11). In other words, any social or political action involves a complicated series of interactions, particularly at the group level, which affect individuals and the government (45-52). With this in mind, the purpose of Truman's book, he argued, was to analyze rigorously both the operations of representative government in the United States and the character of the groups' relationships with the governing process. Truman's behavioral tendencies are clearly present in his emphasis on political behavior *and* in his purpose. He does not intend to offer any normative prescriptions for reform. Rather, he seeks to offer an empirical and conceptual analysis of the group process in government in order to develop and provide an understanding of the operations of American representative democracy (12). He does not desire progressive reform. His research seeks "pure" explanation.

The Governmental Process was Truman's most influential and noteworthy work. His commitment to a "pure" science of political behavior that sought to examine and explain the uniformities and regularities of politics helped touch off the broad emphasis on political behavior that distinguished the post-World War II research of political science. In his theories we can see expressions of four of the first five tenets of the "behavioral creed." The emphasis on quantified, value-free and methodologically sound research became clear later. Another behavioralist, Heinz Eulau, openly criticized the

reformist ("utopian") political science of the pre-World War II era (Eulau 1969a: 372). He argued that science can only function "in an environment that permits freedom of inquiry and freedom of speech" (Eulau 1969b: 12). American liberal democracy allows such freedoms and thus is most suitable for scientific work. Political *science* can never undermine liberal democracy, as Ricci reported that pre-World War II political scientists feared (Ricci 1984: 74-75). Political *scientists* assumed, then, that American democracy must be alive and well as they pursued the new, non-reformist, scientific goal of analyzing and explaining the ways that the American political system functioned.

Based on his experiences with Harold Lasswell at the "Experimental Division for the Study of War Time Communications," Eulau claimed that the task of science is to convert "belief" into "knowledge" (Eulau 1969c: 359).[13] Belief thrives on ignorance and the goal of systematic science was to remove as much ignorance as possible in order to expose knowledge. Ultimately, the goal of this science is causal explanation. In other words, tentative, "functional," "probabilistic" knowledge should eventually give way to causal knowledge. Causal knowledge, Eulau argues, is never attainable but scientific endeavors will invariably bring us closer to the goal of perfect, universal, causal explanation (Eulau 1969a: 388-389). Such theoretical descriptions of science do not help much with implementation so Eulau, again following Lasswell, made a practical argument based on "micro-macro political analysis."

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[13]Interestingly enough, David Truman also spent the war years at this institution.

From Eulau's view, the traditional separation between the "micro" and "macro" levels of political analysis represented a problem that needed resolution. Macro level analysis aimed at institutions, while micro analysis focused on individuals. Typically, these two approaches operated dualistically; they were kept separate because political theorists had not built a conceptual link between them. But Lasswell, in *Psychopathology and Politics*, attempted to combine the micro and macro levels of analysis to explain political action. Eulau saw this conceptual connection as vital to the science of politics (Eulau 1969d: 122-137). He argued that these two levels of analysis can be merged through studying political behavior. The study of political behavior focuses on individuals' attitudes, actions and psyches *and* on the political institutions which frame, affect and are affected by individuals' personal and political dispositions. Eulau located the science of politics in the study of political behavior that collapsed micro and macro level distinctions. Such a science would ideally be empirical and focused on finding uniformities and regularities in political behavior. The careful documentation of regular and uniform behavior would help explain and eventually predict institutional influences on behavior, and vice versa (Eulau 1969c: 358; 1969b: 15; 1964: 33, 44, 64). Empirical methods which were theory-driven (that is, based upon testable hypotheses) give *knowledge*; they strip ignorance from belief and produce political *knowledge* (Eulau 1969a: 390; 1969b: 8-9, 15-17; 1963: 9, 26, 34, 69).

Political knowledge, according to Eulau, is necessarily "probabilistic." That is,

political *scientists* are *certain* that their knowledge is *probably* correct. But they seek to be *certain* that their knowledge is *definitely* correct. They seek *certainty*, "*universal validity*," for political knowledge. Eulau claims that this quest for certainty is implicit in empirical, behavioral methods. But, for now, political scientists must settle for probability until political knowledge progresses enough to allow for universal validity (Eulau 1969e: 366-367; 1969a: 15-16, 19; 1963: 10, 35).

Accompanying the quest for certainty and the self-conscious employment of methodology is the separation of fact from value. In other words, political scientists must eschew values in their detached, scientific work. As such, political scientists seek "neutrality" toward their research. This neutrality can be guaranteed through the researcher's openness about his biases and by treating "latent" biases as "errors" which can be "isolated and discounted" (Eulau 1969e: 366-369; 1963: 95, 137).

Confessed and discounted biases contribute to the quest for certainty and so does quantification. According to Eulau, political scientists should seek to quantify their data and their results. Quantification, using the most advanced research technology, empirical methods and testable hypotheses, introduces exactitude and reliability to political knowledge (Eulau 1969c: 361-362; 1963: 122).[14] Eulau argued that quantification allows political scientists to be more certain about the legitimacy of political knowledge. "Political knowledge," realized through behavioral methods, emphasizes reason. It

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[14]This point has been echoed by many, including Evron M. Kirkpatrick (1962: 13, 23, 29).

represents the belief that employing rational, rigorous methods of inquiry can help us discover the underlying, uniform and cosmic order of political things. For Eulau, political knowledge represents truth in a probabilistic sense, but its quest for certainty makes it valid and authoritative.

By 1968, Eulau was very optimistic about the success of behavioralism in political science. The use of computers and statistics was becoming more widespread, and political science departments were introducing courses in statistics and research methods to train graduate and undergraduate students (Somit and Tanenhaus 1968: 190-191). Also, the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) had been founded. Eulau viewed the founding of the ICPSR as particularly favorable to ensuring the success of the behavioral study of politics. He referred to the ICPSR as the "main stimulator of behavioral research" and "the single most important institutional vehicle for the study of political behavior" (Eulau 1969a: 385; also Eulau 1989). Eulau was optimistic enough to claim, in 1968, that behavioralism occupied "the central place in political science as a whole" (Eulau 1969a: 387). But he noted that not all members of the discipline celebrated behavioralism's central place. In an era of social and political upheaval, political science was suffering a crisis of its own. And this crisis was ultimately addressed in the work of David Easton.

David Easton explained the study of political behavior as a poorly defined movement that is easier to describe by "reference to its intellectual content than to its

membership" (Easton 1967: 15). In an effort to describe the behavioral movement, then, Easton devised a "behavioral credo" (16-17). His expression of the "behavioral credo" looks remarkably similar to Somit and Tanenhaus'. In fact, the only part of Somit and Tanenhaus' creed which varies from Easton's is the notion that political science should depend exclusively on empirical data.[15]

Easton viewed behavioralism as part of a linear movement toward scientific maturity for the social sciences (Easton 1967: 18, 21). In other words, he believed that social *science* inevitably progressed from states of relative immaturity to states of relative maturity through the orderly, scientific progression of knowledge. The behavioral era in political science marked an increased understanding of human involvement in politics. The science of politics was progressing in the sense that behavioralism was bringing political scientists closer to the truth about human political behavior. Within the political science discipline itself, behavioralism represented a "change in mood in favor of scientific methodology, methods and techniques" (19).

At the same time, behavioralism reflected "the inception in our discipline of a theoretical search for stable units for understanding human behavior in its political aspects" (26). Behavioralism in political science not only ushered in an emphasis on scientific method and techniques, it also constructed a new political theory. This, at least, was Easton's view, and most of his work revolved around his view that constructing a

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[15]Although the importance of empirical data is obviously implicit.

new political theory which supported the new emphasis on rigorous, empirical research was vitally important. In fact, he devoted an entire book, *The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science*, to formulating a critique of "old" political theory and establishing a "new" political theory.

In *The Political System*, Easton focused the discussion on the sixth tenet of his "behavioral credo" (or the fourth principle of Somit and Tanenhaus' "behavioral creed"), namely, that political research should be systematically directed by theory. Published in 1953, *The Political System* argued that the political theory of that time was anachronistic. That is, Easton argued that in its approach to moral problems, political theory still operated on nineteenth-century assumptions (Easton 1971: 264). As such, political theory used a historical method. It simply interpreted the present in light of the past without building a theory that might explain the present and predict the future. Easton argued that political theory should adopt a more "constructive approach," an approach that built upon the present by assessing uniformities and regularities in political behavior to construct testable theories for empirical research (265). This constructive theory would work together with the science of politics, which Easton also viewed as deficient.

The science of politics in the 1950s, Easton claimed, was caught in a social mood of hostility toward the use of scientific method in social and political analysis (21-24). Those in this mood argued that scientific reasoning could not solve social and political problems because it could not be emotionally attached to spiritual ideals (21). Moreover,

the conception of science in previous political research had deflected "attention from theory" (65). In short, Easton argued that political science lacked reliable knowledge, a deficiency that flowed directly from the neglect of general theory as a directing force for political research (47).

Easton maintained that political science has always lacked a general theory based on a "set of generalizations that orders all kinds of facts we call political" (4). In other words, political scientists had never clearly established the proper relationship between political theory and facts in their research. Easton continued by arguing that the failure of American political science to "identify the role that theory plays in the attainment of reliable knowledge has helped to imperil its attempts to understand the major problems of political life," problems which he claimed had reached a crisis level (3, 5). The state of the discipline in 1953, then, was hindering political progress due to the lack of a properly conceived notion of political *science* and its relation to political theory.

Easton claimed that the main problem with previous political research was its lack of a guiding theory. This theory would define the significant political variables for research and explain the interactions between them. Easton hoped that this theory would act as a "critical enabling instrument" that would propel the discipline to a higher level of scientific maturity. He believed that the use of a guiding theory would introduce deductive and empirical rigor to political research and thus to political knowledge; political knowledge would continually "progress" (through building upon itself) as a

result. But this formulation of knowledge left little room for normative political theory. In fact, in many ways normative political theory was consciously excluded from the normal practice of political scientists (Gunnell 1993: 223-225), and the postbehavioral era under which the discipline now operates has not necessarily altered this situation.

Philosophy of Social Science Interlude: Positivism

If we hope to understand the philosophical underpinnings of the science of politics that behavioralism established for the discipline, I must interrupt my historical account with a discussion of the philosophy of social science. This is, indeed, crucial since the philosophy of science at the time of the behavioral revolution was clearly oriented toward positivism. Consonant with this is the claim that any normative or interpretive understanding of "meaning" (*Verstehen*) has no legitimate place in the logic of scientific inquiry. *Verstehen*'s only role is as a useful heuristic aimed at generating hypotheses for scientific study based on some formulation of the object of study's sense of the meaning of his actions (Dallmayr and McCarthy 1977: 78-79). With this interlude, I want to trace the development of the positivist philosophy of science and relate it to the emergence of the behavioral identity in the discipline of political science.

The origin of the modern scientific mood has usually been located in the seventeenth century with the rise of the "Rationalists" and the "Empiricists." Rationalism, often exemplified in the work of René Descartes (1947), Baruch Spinoza (1985) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1965, 1949), argues that knowledge emanates from the mind/reason and *not* from experience. Knowledge, in other words, is somehow *a priori*. Descartes, for example, believed that through reason alone, certain universal truths could be discovered through which the substance of the sciences and of philosophy could be deduced. Empiricists, such as Francis Bacon (1901), John Locke (1979) and

Auguste Comte (1969), claim that knowledge comes from experience/observation and thus deny the possibility of *a priori* thought. Empiricism is, then, opposed to Rationalism. Bacon, in fact, is often considered to be the progenitor of modern scientific method with his notion of "ampliative inference" involving induction by analogy rather than by enumeration. He also called, in *Novum Organum* (1901), for the elimination of preconceived ideas from the logic of scientific inquiry.

With the possible exception of David Hume, Immanuel Kant probably contributed the most toward the development of modern science. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1966: 68-116), Kant struck a metaphysical compromise between Empiricism and Rationalism. Kant restricts knowledge to the domain of experience but attributes to the mind a function in incorporating sensations into the structure of experience (via "categories"). This structure can be known *a priori* without necessarily resorting to empirical methods. For example, through experiencing the fact that dogs bark we can place dogs into a category of animals that bark. We then know, *a priori*, that dogs bark without having to experience a barking dog. As such, Kant agrees with Rationalists *and* Empiricists. That is, there is a synthesis between experience and mind which ultimately allows for the possibility of transcendental, synthetic *a priori* knowledge. And this is precisely what modern science seeks to do. It utilizes experience to generate covering laws in an effort to explain reality.

Modern science has incorporated elements of Rationalism and Empiricism, but it

clearly has emphasized the latter. The mind plays a critical categorizing role in scientific practice while scientific method is openly empirical. Formally speaking, scientific method entails both an objective approach and acceptable results. Scientific method is objective insofar as it demands that observations take place without some reference to a preconceived world view and its results are acceptable when they can be reproduced. It also seeks to integrate inductive reasoning with deductive reasoning. That is, through science we seek to generate covering laws to explain the observable world. The integration of inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning is precisely what Kant conceives of as synthetic *a priori* thought. Indeed, Empiricists, such as Bacon, tended to emphasize inductive reasoning (a large number of observations initiates the development of theories accounting for those observations) while Rationalists, such as Descartes, utilized deductive reasoning (theories precede and account for observed phenomena). Scientific method combines these. A scientist begins with a hypothesis that she thinks will explain the phenomena she plans to study (deductive reasoning), records her observations, and determines if they satisfy the demands of the hypothesis. If they do not, she generates a new hypothesis to account for the observed phenomena (inductive reasoning). In this way, science constructs a knowledge that progresses toward truth.

This formal understanding of scientific method, though, betrays a host of assumptions regarding the relationship between the internal world of mind, perception, reason, intuition and the external world of experience, observation, reality. The formal

version of the scientific method sketched above, in other words, simply assumes that the "knowable" can be accessed by the "knower" through systematic observation, but it fails to explain exactly how this access takes place. This opened the door for the emergence of Edmund Husserl's notion of phenomenology (1931). Husserl claims that there is a difference between how things appear to be and what one thinks they actually are. In the phenomenological account of knowledge, in other words, the actual existence of any particular object is "bracketed" while the consciousness of that object (the mind's understanding of what that object is) is emphasized. In this way, we come to "know."

Husserl's investigation of the relationship between the object known and the act of knowing touched off an important debate regarding the possibilities of knowledge. Indeed, the plausibility of objective knowledge (in terms of understanding the actual reality of a given object) has come under intense scrutiny during the twentieth century in the work of Heidegger (1962) and Sartre (1956) and extending to Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1968) and Gadamer (1975). Though this line of critique has recently become more influential in philosophical discourse with the emergence of poststructural and feminist critiques of science, it was marginalized early on by the logical positivists.

Logical positivism was spawned by the Vienna Circle during the 1920s and 1930s. The Vienna Circle, under the intellectual leadership of Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap, sought to elevate scientific method and mathematical logic to preeminent status as generators of knowledge. Indeed, logical positivism "stigmatized metaphysical,

theological, and ethical pronouncements as devoid of cognitive meaning and advocated a radical reconstruction of philosophical thinking which should give pride of place to the methods of physical science and mathematical logic" (Achinstein and Barker 1969: v). Logical positivism claimed to be the "philosophy to end all philosophies" (Feigl 1969: 4), and it thereby obviated Husserl's phenomenology as well as all other metaphysical attempts to investigate the production of knowledge from the relationship between knower and known. Logical positivists simply emphasized empirical tests. The dictates of scientific method indicate that a theory only has meaning when it can be verified by observation. Thus, theology, ethics and metaphysical expressions in general are cognitively meaningless since they cannot be empirically verified and therefore cannot be part of any scientific inquiry. The formal expulsion of metaphysical expressions from scientific inquiry renders science pragmatically inept. The purification of knowledge that logical positivism wrought means that knowledge must be sought for its own sake (or, perhaps, for the sake of truth) rather than for the sake of something else (such as for the sake of human good).

This is precisely the notion of knowledge that behavioralists in the discipline of political science adopted during the 1940s and 1950s. This should come as no surprise, though, since we know that the scientific identity of the discipline had historically followed developments in natural science and that logical positivism was an important philosophical perspective throughout the world by the 1930s (Blalock 1982: 12;

Achinstein and Barker 1969: v). The positivist[16] version of knowledge clearly informs the tenets of the "Behavioral Credo" and it is quite clear that behavioralists were focused upon pure knowledge and the expulsion of metaphysical "guesswork" from the practice of political science. This focus came under some scrutiny, though, during the "Postbehavioral Movement" of the 1960s and 1970s, and "postpositivist" science followed. Postpositivism, though, as I will discuss in the next interlude, did not change the essential principles of scientific knowledge and therefore did not change the primary characteristics of the scientific identity of the discipline.

[16]This shortened version of logical positivism is the popular moniker. It is understood to connote the same conceptions expressed by logical positivism.

Postbehavioralism

In 1967, the Caucus for a New Political Science was organized as a response to behavioral hegemony. Behavioral discourse, pro and con, dominated the discipline's mainstream by the mid-1960s in terms of method, language and research focus. Members of the Caucus lamented the limited scope of behavioral inquiry. Behavioralism, they argued, neglected too many possible points of view; it was too "parochial." The Caucus desired a more open and expansive discipline. In 1969, David Easton responded to the aims of the Caucus in his presidential address to the APSA. Easton coined the term "postbehavioralism" and made "relevance" and "action" its watchwords. Postbehavioralists, Easton argued, wanted to make political science more relevant to and active in society.[17]

Ultimately, new areas of research were opened up within the discipline (for instance, the Vietnam War, race relations, poverty, women's rights), and the well-populated, university-centered discipline became specialized.[18] Political scientists increasingly carved up special areas of the discipline for themselves, each area with a

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[17]So, political scientists were now saying that the discipline need *not* be singular in its "scientific" study of politics, but for the same reason that Merriam had argued that it must; namely, that the socio-political problems evident in society arose because political scientists had not studied, predicted, and "educated" the populace in the maintenance of stable liberal democracy, and a refocusing of the discipline was necessary to accomplish this.

[18]Such specialization, of course, was not confined to the discipline. Specialization is clearly a social phenomenon that reflects a growing population seeking to maintain its existence.

special language and technique that made intercommunication difficult and often without purpose. These subfields rapidly grew into self-contained entities within the field of political science, which was itself a special field in the field of knowledge.

During this era of fragmentation, anti-behavioral forces found new voices. Research that was distinctly anti- or non-behavioral found legitimacy as the discipline's professional identity evolved away from its behavioral parochialism (Carey 1972: 37-53). The discipline became more tolerant of various perspectives on politics and political science during the post-behavioral era. For example, John Wahlke argued in 1978 that behavioral research was "pre-behavioral" because it neglected important bio-behavioral research and thus limited its validity. But in the process of making his argument, Wahlke explicitly denied any indications that behavioral research should dominate the discipline (Wahlke 1979: 9-31). Rather, he was interested only in one part of the discipline, the study of political behavior (10). Wahlke wanted to add to his own field of behavioral research and for the discipline's benefit. Additionally, Charles Lindblom refused to label one commonly accepted approach to the study of politics "superior" to a more radical approach.[19] He was able to see benefits to both approaches, and there are many other examples of similar sentiments that were expressed during the postbehavioral era (see Meehan 1972: 54-70; Bay 1972: 88-99; Sandoz 1972: 285-305; Ball 1987: 13-38).

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[19]See Lindblom 1982: 9-21. Lindblom focuses his discussion on two approaches to the study of politics: a conventional approach (behavioral/positivistic), and a radical approach (critical/neo-Marxist).

Essentially, as the discipline fragmented into its myriad subfields, members of the discipline became more open to, although frequently untrained in, other approaches to studying politics.

The intellectual "community" that behavioralism constructed in the discipline of political science collapsed during the 1970s, the decade which witnessed the fragmentation of the discipline's research agenda. This transpired for at least three reasons: (1) the Caucus for a New Political Science's effectiveness at forcing the field to open up to more research interests; (2) the population explosion that occurred in the discipline following the Second World War, which increased the competition for recognition among political scientists; (3) a related mood of openness which prevailed in the discipline following the closed and parochial behavioral era.

A major effect of the Caucus' efforts was the opening of the discipline to other points of view, to other approaches in the study of politics. In 1968 (one year after the Caucus organized) 86 panels convened at the APSA national convention. Only two years later, in 1970, 156 panel sessions were scheduled (Ricci 1984: 188). Similarly, the number of subfields more than doubled between the years 1968 and 1973, from 27 in 1968 to more than sixty in 1973 (222). The Caucus' call for openness certainly contributed to this extraordinary increase in the range of topics considered appropriate for political inquiry by the APSA.

In addition, though, the number of scholars involved with the discipline had

greatly increased since World War II.[20] And since the structure of knowledge in the university required that scholars publish original research in an attempt to aid the "progression" of knowledge, competition necessarily increased in the discipline. This increased competition was a major contributor to the specialization that took place during the postbehavioral era.

Since political scholars were generally required to publish in order to advance the accumulation of knowledge that "scientific communities" necessitate, and since the range of suitable research topics was limited during the behavioral era while the population of the discipline was rapidly increasing, the discipline was quickly saturated.[21] Political scientists sought new areas of expertise and the discipline opened up, allowing for the creation of many new subfields. The topics covered by these new subfields were so diverse by 1977 that Nelson Polsby, the managing editor of the *APSR* at the time, "conceded that no editor could 'judge the quality of manuscripts over the full range of concerns that political scientists write about'" (quoted in Ricci 1984: 222-223).

The discipline has become so complicated that even political scientists are unable to comprehend completely or become comfortable with its entire range of research. So much material is published in increasingly narrow fields that political scholars find it

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[20]According to Ricci, APSA membership almost tripled between 1950 and 1970. The APSA numbered 5,126 in 1950 and more than 13,500 by 1970 (1984: 133).

[21]Perhaps the drive to postbehavioralism was as much about legitimating claims to jobs in academia as it was about becoming "re-connected" to politics.

difficult to keep up with their own subfields, much less understand and integrate other subfields. Specialties and sub-specialties continually emerge, and a broader base of expertise results. Each subfield churns out vast quantities of literature, and the literature from each subfield, taken together, is more than any one researcher can master. However, one researcher can become an "expert" in the work of one subfield. Therefore, the discipline does not consist of "experts" in political knowledge (as invested in the APSA), it consists of "experts" in *certain aspects* of political knowledge. But while political scientists from different subfields find communication difficult, the notion of a common purpose (the construction of a body of political knowledge) remains.

Finally, a general mood of openness prevails in the discipline. With postbehavioralism, political scientists began to accept the fact that there were different ways of approaching the study of politics. The new professional identity for political scientists, then, was founded on the perceived need to make the work of political scientists (political knowledge as they defined it) more relevant and applicable to society. This new identity was also based upon openness and acceptance of new and various approaches to political inquiry. The discipline had fragmented and political scientists generally embraced this fragmentation; but, at the same time, they were united in the belief that they had the "collective task" of building a broad, but effective, "stock of knowledge" (Wahlke 1979: 10).

Like each era in political science, postbehavioralism emerged in response to

changing social and political phenomena. Behavioralism had rooted itself in the discipline during an era of national affluence and political complacency. The United States emerged from World War II in splendid economic shape. As a result, the United States became *the* international economic power and the economic benefits reaped were tremendous. Additionally, the United States' political structure was celebrated. Americans after World War II were generally loyal to American politics and political leaders. These were glory days, and behavioralism had emerged in this era of extraordinary economic and political optimism. The situation had changed, though, by the mid-1960s and the backlash was formidable.

The 1960s witnessed the most impressive and widespread pessimism regarding American politics and society since perhaps the Civil War. The Vietnam War, student rebellions, the civil rights movement, feminism, urban riots, inflation, unemployment, and a host of other factors combined to raise serious doubts and questions in the minds of many people concerning American democracy (Ricci 1984: 176). People were becoming more critical of the government and society, and political scientists were not exceptions. Political scientists wanted to question and criticize American democracy, too, and behavioralism provided no means to do so. As such, many members of the discipline began explicitly to denounce and move away from behavioral research. In the wake of these events, postbehavioralism was born.

Postbehavioralism differs from behavioralism in several ways. If behavioralism

was difficult to define, postbehavioralism entirely defies definition. No creed (or credo) can be accurately attached to post-behavioral research. Postbehavioralism was also never a research program. Those who endorsed "it" sought relevance, action, and openness in the discipline, but there certainly was no postbehavioral method to be followed nor was there any organized postbehavioral identity. Rather, the discipline fragmented into specialties, which employed their own (often behavioral) methods. The discipline's research agenda (and political knowledge) expanded as more viewpoints and research areas were included. And, as the number of political scientists grew, the work of political scientists was increasingly divided formally.

The expansion of the division of labor in the discipline affected the professional identity of political scientists and the formation and content of political knowledge. Part of the logic behind the division of labor is to allow space for more and unique work. As such, the division of labor engenders expansion, but also contraction. Political knowledge was expanded as the pursuit of it was divided. That is, more viewpoints were represented and more areas of interest were pursued as political knowledge. Concomitantly, though, the breadth of any one researcher's work contracted as political scientists specialized. The content of political knowledge, then, expanded while its formation fragmented. Professional agendas affected by the expanding division of labor combined with predominant social and political occurrences to alter the structure of political knowledge as postbehavioral interests surfaced in the discipline.

Philosophy of Social Science Interlude: Postpositivism

The main problem with discussing postbehavioralism is that it cannot be described as a coherent movement within the discipline. Aside from some oblique references to it (Easton 1969; Graham and Carey 1972), we cannot say with any certainty that any distinct movement known as postbehavioralism has ever existed in the discipline. Rather, postbehavioralism can only be said to exist insofar as the behavioral era has been followed by an era in which political scientists undertake research in a markedly different way (as described above), and a slightly altered methodology has accompanied this new approach. It has been during the postbehavioral era that "postpositivism" has taken hold in the discipline of political science. The opening of the discipline to new approaches to studying politics also extended the discipline's tolerance to some of the emerging critiques of social scientific practice. The main attack on positivist doctrine originated with Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1970 [1962]).

Kuhn argues that science does not progress by the piecemeal accumulation of knowledge. Instead, scientific development and change occurs through revolution (1970: 111-173). Kuhn postulates three phases in the development of a science. The first is "pre-paradigmatic" in which various "schools" compete to attain the status of "paradigm." A paradigm is a particular world-view. It provides a model from which "particular coherent traditions of scientific research" spring (1970: 10). Ptolemaic astronomy, for example, was a paradigm and it operated from the perspective that the

earth was the center of the universe. The Ptolemaic paradigm was replaced via scientific revolution by the Copernican system which contended that the earth and the planets revolve around the sun. Revolution is the second phase of scientific development. The third phase is the paradigmatic phase. Kuhn calls this "normal science," indicating that a given science has matured, that it has progressed from its pre-paradigmatic immaturity (1970: 11). This perspective clearly undermined the positivist notion of scientific development portrayed by Heinz Eulau who claimed that the "discipline is built by the slow, modest, and piecemeal accumulation of relevant theories and data" (1963: 9). The "building-block" theory of the behavioralists certainly was subject to Kuhn's critique, but so was the idea of a social science itself, since Kuhn indicated that social science does not yet appear to have developed any paradigms at all (1970: 15). Political science, then, must be an immature science (or prescientific) by Kuhn's account.

Kuhn's oblique dismissal of the social sciences from his account of "normal science" touched off furious attempts by political scientists to locate paradigms within the discipline.[22] Otherwise it might once again be subject to the arguments (which certainly exist to this day) that political science cannot be thought of as a science in any "real" sense, arguments which might scare away sources of funding. The field of international relations seems to have been particularly affected by this possibility insofar as it has been characterized by its desperate (and apparently fruitless) search for a paradigm (Ferguson

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[22]See, for example, Jones 1984.

and Mansbach 1993: 14-31; Rosenau 1971; Ashley 1977: 150). Political scientists of all stripes jumped on the Kuhnian bandwagon of science for fear of being left behind among the rabble of non-scientists. In so doing, the discipline informally oriented itself around a new "postpositivist" or "postempiricist" science.[23]

Postpositivism developed in response to the critiques of Kuhn which followed the publication of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. In particular, Kuhn has been taken to task over his "contention that there can be no methodological demarcation criterion" for distinguishing science from nonscience (Ball 1987: 20). Instead, the only demarcation criterion is a political one in the sense that "only the powers-that-be in a given scientific community can decide what is science and what is not, and that their extra-scientific and historically variable standards of judgment are a matter of taste and fashion only and are therefore beyond rational criticism" (Ball 1987: 20). This has led to the cultivation of different demarcation criteria. Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos have been instrumental toward this end.

Popper argues that the methods of the natural and the social sciences are fundamentally the same (1965: 32-33). For him, all of the sciences utilize the deductive nomological (or "covering law") method of scientific inquiry. Scientists, utilizing the deductive nomological approach, begin their inquiries with "facts." Adequate

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[23]Richard Bernstein refers to the Kuhnian revolution as "postempiricist philosophy" (1983: 20ff.), but he means the same thing I do with "postpositivism" which is the term of choice among political scientists (Ball 1987; Fischer 1982; Vasquez 1995).

explanation of these facts, the goal of any scientist, entails incorporating them into a generalized class of things. Explaining any fact "is to exhibit it as a special case of what is known in general" (Kaplan 1964: 339). Explanation, in other words, involves deduction. It tells "us why new cases *must* conform to observed regularities" (Schwartz 1984:1123). This is an exceedingly powerful model of explanation since "deduction from covering laws *logically necessitates* that which is deduced" (Almond and Genco 1977: 500). Popper's major contribution to the philosophy of social science, though, was his introduction of "falsification" as the foundation for the deductive nomological approach.

The problem with the deductive nomological model of explanation is that it works best for closed, deterministic systems (Hempel 1965: 367; Almond and Genco 1977: 500). Popper argues that, as such, the deductive nomological approach is not well suited to the explanation of human behavior. What we need to explain

> rational human behavior--and indeed animal behavior--is something *intermediate* in character, between perfect chance and perfect determinism--something intermediate between perfect clouds and perfect clocks...For obviously what we want is to understand how such non-physical things as *purposes, deliberations, plans, decisions, theories, intentions,* and *values*, can play a part in bringing about physical changes in the physical world (Popper 1972: 229).

Popper offers a view in which the physical world is conceived as an open system which "is compatible with the view of the evolution of life as a process of trial- and-error elimination" (Popper 1972: 255). In social science, then, we must seek explanation by

proceeding from hypothesis to "prognosis."

> We then confront this prognosis, whenever possible, with the results of experimental or other observations. Agreement with them is taken as corroboration of the hypothesis, though not as final proof; clear disagreement is considered as refutation or falsification (Popper 1965: 34).

Since exceptions to covering laws are always possible, particularly in the social world, we must always seek to falsify our hypotheses. When we fail to falsify, on Popper's view, we find support for our explanation, though we must recognize that our support is never final. The act of falsification, then, separates science from nonscience in an indeterminate world, allowing political science to retain its legitimacy.

Lakatos' notion of the "research program" takes its cue from both Kuhn and Popper. Against Kuhn, Lakatos wants to argue that the development of scientific knowledge can take place in a rational way through "sophisticated methodological falsificationism." Against Popper, Lakatos insists that falsificationism is not merely involved with determining science from nonscience, it is also about constructing a model for the development of scientific progress from one theory to another more inclusive theory (Lakatos 1970: 117). In particular,

> [t]he sophisticated falsificationist regards a scientific theory T as falsified if and only if another theory T' has been proposed with the following characteristics: (1) T' has excess empirical content of T: that is, it predicts *novel* facts, that is, facts improbable in the light of, or even forbidden by, T; (2) T' explains the previous success of T, that is, all the unrefuted content of T is contained (within the limits of observational error) in the content of T'; and (3) some of the excess content of T' is corroborated (Lakatos 1970: 116).

This sophisticated process of theoretical adjustment constitutes a research program consisting of a "core" and its "protective belt." The protective belt must "bear the brunt of tests and get adjusted and readjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the core" (Lakatos 1970: 133). Falsification, then, properly occurs in the protective belt with the emergence of better theories in order for scientific progress to exist (Lakatos 1970: 119-120). As such, the existence of a series of anomalies is not necessarily enough to alter the course of a research program. It cannot be the case, if rationality and leniency are to prevail, that the whim of some charismatic scientist can bring about the falsification of a research program. Instead, falsification must be a long and frustrating process, oriented around the protective belt of theories which protect a research program's core.

Lakatos' conception of the research program has profound implications for positivist political science. In particular, Lakatos problematizes the distinction between fact and theory which has characterized the discipline (Dahl 1963: 8; Polsby 1980: 5). That is, Lakatos highlights "the mistake of supposing that there is a 'real world' completely independent of, yet comparable with, our theories and the logical mistake of believing that facts can 'disprove' propositions" (Ball 1987: 27). The Lakatosian perspective also characterizes the sort of tolerance and openness of approach which the postbehavioral era in political science ostensibly hoped to realize. However, Lakatos' ideal of the research program does not differ from positivist methodology in a fundamental sense. Lakatos does not undermine the verifiability theory of meaning that

grounds positivism. Nor does he call for the importation of metaphysical expressions (for example) into scientific inquiry. Fact and value are still clearly separated for Lakatos, and the guiding force for his notion of science remains the will to truth. Knowledge is sought purely for its own sake (or for the sake of truth, which is "pure," of course) and it therefore cannot involve normative elements. The fact that the postpositivism engendered by Lakatos emerged during the postbehavioral era probably helps to explain why, as both Terence Ball and Kathy Ferguson note, behavioralism/positivism continues to haunt the discipline of political science (Ball 1987: 3; Ferguson 1987: 213). Still, the Lakatosian perspective certainly renders Popperian falsificationism more methodologically sophisticated and tolerant. The postpositivist, nevertheless, appears simply to be a positivist in disguise. Indeed, postbehavioralism can best be understood as a revolution of the discipline's approach(es) to political study, but *not* a revolution of its method.

Conclusion

In light of these developments, the assessment of the role of normative political theory in the discipline becomes difficult indeed. Normative political theory is certainly tolerated by the discipline. All we need to do is notice the vast number of panels at the APSA conference concerned with normative political issues to recognize that normative political theory has been "accepted" in the discipline. The question, though, is whether or not normative political theory has a *legitimate* role in the discipline. The answer to this must surely be a resounding "no" since the legitimation of the discipline has been based, *even before* the behavioral revolution, on a naturalistic sense of science which necessarily leaves no legitimate ground for normative issues in political knowledge (Gunnell 1993).

Indeed, while the pursuit of political knowledge has clearly expanded in the postbehavioral era, the positivist underpinnings of that knowledge have not been systematically challenged. Thomas Kuhn (1970), Imre Lakatos (1970), Paul Feyerabend (1975), and many others have doubted the rationality of positivist science and positivist social science, but their reservations have generally been used by political scientists as a means to salvage and to clarify the methods of the science of politics (Ball 1987; Dryzek 1990). In spite of Ball's and Dryzek's compelling insights into the progress of social scientific knowledge, positivist epistemology has yet to face any serious challenges as it pertains to political knowledge in the discipline of political science. And this is an epistemology which promises profound ramifications for normative political theorizing.

The results of normative political theorizing, to be more precise, can have no legitimate claim to political *knowledge* as it is positivistically construed.

In Chapter Two, I draw upon one critique (that of language theory) of the positivist/postpositivist conception of social science and discuss the benefits and the drawbacks of its application to the discipline of political science. I am primarily interested in finding a legitimate place for normative political theorizing in the science of politics without forsaking the discipline's pursuit of reliable political knowledge. Language theory is one of the critiques of positivist science which modifies that pursuit by problematizing the fact-value distinction of positivist science and suggesting the establishment of an interpretive social science.

II.

POSTPOSITIVIST PROTESTATIONS AND HERMENEUTIC CONSCIOUSNESS

Introduction

Postpositivism, particularly in the social sciences, is a much broader philosophical perspective than the version sketched by Popper and Lakatos. Indeed, many prominent theorists believe that hermeneutical social science (Ball 1987), critical social science (Fischer 1982), postmodern social science (Vasquez 1995), and feminist critiques of science (Peterson 1992) can contribute to postpositivism. Only the Popperian version of postpositivism, though, has been explicitly adopted by the discipline of political science as a whole. A quick survey of the discipline's main mouthpiece, the *American Political Science Review*, demonstrates that the mainstream of political *science* has not even incorporated a hermeneutic awareness. The bulk of the empirical studies reported in the *APSR* consists of quantitative studies and mathematical models that remain wedded to the postpositivist version of the deductive-nomological model of explanation (i.e., methodological falsificationism) as described by Karl Popper. This is also the version of political science taught in graduate methods seminars. The emphasis in these courses remains on teaching the quantitative skills necessary for the practicing political scientist.

This does not mean that other perspectives that are classified as postpositivist do

not exist among members of the discipline. Some political theorists, for example, have recently been arguing that the discipline must shift its focus away from methodological falsificationism and toward a more hermeneutic perspective (Taylor 1977; Hekman 1986; Habermas 1988; Fay 1975, 1987). Terence Ball (1987) claims that Larry Laudan (1977) provides us with a model for doing so. Laudan finds Lakatos' conception of the "research programme" to be very important for introducing a historical and rational component to the discussion of research programs. Indeed, Lakatos extends Kuhn's conceptions by allowing for the existence of more than one paradigm, or research program, at any one time (Laudan 1977: 76). The problem, though, for Laudan, is that Lakatos' conception of the research program is far too stringent. It is "exclusively empirical" and therefore does not allow for the inclusion of conceptual innovations (77). The Lakatosian research program, in other words, can have no normative or interpretive content. Laudan wants to introduce the possibility of including conceptual change in the methods of inquiry, and he does so by proposing the notion of the "research tradition."

A research tradition is "*a set of ontological and methodological 'do's' and 'don't's*" (80). Research traditions are exemplified and constituted by specific theories and exhibit "certain *metaphysical* and *methodological* commitments which, as an ensemble, individuate the research tradition and distinguish it from others" (79). Theories last a relatively short time, while research traditions develop and change over a long period of time and represent a particular way of conceiving of the world and of the

issues that are important for understanding that world (79). Research traditions, then, are profoundly historical and interpretive in nature. From the perspective of a research tradition, such as Marxism, we can interpret the world in terms of entities which "can only interact by virtue of the economic forces influencing them" (79).[1] There is, then, at least an interpretive aspect to every scientific research tradition insofar as each one necessarily entails certain ontological commitments through which the issues in question are understood. For Laudan, then, science is necessarily an interpretive activity. Every scientific theory must be grounded in both history and culture. In this way, the task of the scientist becomes the interpretation of meaning. The scientist becomes "a historian of ideas whose task is to reconstruct the past by constructing an interpretation that is intelligible without being anachronistic" (Ball 1987: 28).

As numerous scholars have noted, this notion of the scientist as historian of ideas is particularly well-suited to the social sciences where the "objects" of study have their own ontological commitments (Hekman 1986; Gadamer 1975; Heidegger 1962; Mannheim 1936, 1952). Postpositivists such as Lakatos, as Susan Hekman notes, remain wedded to the Enlightenment version of a-historical and a-cultural truth, wholly detached from human existence (Hekman 1986: 8-9). By contrast, interpretive or hermeneutic philosophers of social science are anti-foundational insofar as they recognize that any

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[1]Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry are also research traditions which allow us to explain the world, or cosmos, only in certain ways, based on our commitment to their axioms and laws.

search for "truth" must entail examining "the relationship between human thought and human existence" (9). Truth, then, must be historically and culturally bound, and this means that any notion of an objective truth, an Archimedean point grounding all of existence, is impossible.[2] A hermeneutic social science, then, will clearly be an anti-positivist social science.

An emphasis on the interpretation of cultural and historical meaning arose during the Renaissance, at roughly the same time that empirical scientific inquiry emerged (Dallmayr and McCarthy 1977: 2). Science and interpretive understanding, then, are both distinctively modern enterprises. During the Enlightenment, though, with its accent on logic and empirical analysis, empirical science achieved hegemony (2). Since then, interpretive or hermeneutic understanding has existed only on the margins of science with no legitimate claim on knowledge. The idea that only empirical scientific inquiry leads to "true" knowledge, though, has come under intense scrutiny lately. Ludwig Wittgenstein deserves some credit for initiating the attack on the scientific hegemony of knowledge.

Wittgenstein, apparently inadvertently, launched the siege on scientific knowledge with his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1961). Wittgenstein is known for his contention that the key to understanding lies with language. In the *Tractatus*, he argues that we can arrive at a common language through applying formal logic to our inquiries.

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[2]While this may lead some scholars to ask, "What is the point of generating knowledge, then?" a deeper understanding of the hermeneutic process offers the promise of reliable, though not transcendent, knowledge.

In this way we can come to a completely accepted, objective, and final understanding of reality. Wittgenstein's argument led, more or less directly, to the development of the Vienna Circle and logical positivism. With his *Philosophical Investigations* (1958), though, he renounced his position in the *Tractatus*, arguing that our attempts to understand one another and "reality" were oriented around "language games." Here he conceived of languages as "forms of life" and as necessarily imbued with ontological presuppositions that color one's view of the world or "reality." Numerous language games take place simultaneously and thus a common understanding of "reality" is difficult to establish. On this view, there can be no final knowledge of the world. Instead, what we claim to know must always be historically and culturally contextualized since reality cannot be grasped independently of history and culture.

The application of this sort of thinking to the social sciences began long before Wittgenstein wrote his *Philosophical Investigations*, in the work of Wilhelm Dilthey (1988) and Martin Heidegger (1962).[3] It was Peter Winch, though, who decisively turned Wittgenstein's conception of language games into a tool for social analysis with his *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy* (1958). There Winch withdraws "social inquiry from the realm of science and [locates] it in the immediate vicinity of philosophy" (Dallmayr and McCarthy 1977: 138). In particular, Winch located Wittgenstein's language games in the realm of hermeneutics. The rules of any language

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[3]For an excellent treatment of these theorists and more, see Richard E. Palmer 1969.

game "arise in the course of conduct and are intelligible only in relation to the conduct out of which they arise" (1958: 63). As such, observation and explanation necessarily include interpretation right from the beginning. Explanation of human activity, in other words, must be understood in light of the historical and cultural context out of which the activity emerges. This means that the understanding which the agent (or "object" of study) carries with him as he performs an action must be considered by the analyst. The analyst must seek to understand the rules of the language game which gave rise to the activity (89). Scientific generalizations operating from a strict separation of subject (analyst) from object (of study) and the theories accompanying these generalizations, then, are necessarily inept since the point of social study must be *understanding* conceived as "tracing the internal relations" of an experience (133).

There are three important and distinct differences between the method offered by Winch (via Wittgenstein) and that practiced by positivists/postpositivists[4] (such as Popper and Lakatos). First, the goal of social science must not be *to explain* but *to understand.* To explain is to stand outside of and apart from what one studies, it is to separate subject from object in a way that, from the hermeneutical perspective, is simply not possible. For hermeneutics, the world is not tethered to human subjectivity and language, history and

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[4]I connect these terms in an effort to distinguish the postpositivism offered by Popper and Lakatos from the postpositivism offered by hermeneuticists, critical theorists, postmodernists and some feminists. Popperian and Lakatosian postpositivism, as I argue in Chapter 1, are essentially positivist and so, I link them with the ideas associated with that term.

the world are not shaped by individually acting subjects.[5] Instead, we are participants in language, history and the world. Second, hermeneutical understanding is consciously historical. It recognizes that all knowledge is finite insofar as it must be historically and culturally contextualized. It is simply impossible, on this account, for there to be any timeless knowledge separate from the history of the experience being studied or the history of the person undertaking the study. Hermeneutical understanding is reflexive and is thus a much different enterprise than positivist/postpositivist explanation. Third, hermeneutics redefines truth. The aim of both the hermeneutical social scientist and the positivist/postpositivist scientist is truth, but while the positivist/postpositivist understands truth as the conformity between knower and known (i.e., a value-free and factual "correspondence"), the hermeneuticist understands truth as unmasking (Palmer 1969: 142-147). The hermeneuticist is not so much interested in the event she studies as in the dynamics which led to that event. She seeks to locate the event in the history of its emergence, in its language game, and at the same time to understand its significance (or meaning) for her own language game. One's version of truth is never final and it is always ambiguous. Truth is neither conceptual nor factual, it simply happens (245).

This radical complication of the goals of science does not come without problems,

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[5]Do not believe, in other words, that this is Emmitt Smith's (or anyone else's) planet as the Reebok commercial would have us believe. We probably also should not believe the Volkswagen advertisement that would have us believe that the world is made up of passengers and drivers. Volkswagen, of course, seeks drivers. From the hermeneutical perspective we must question this dichotomy.

as I will discuss in this chapter. But before I discuss the complications hermeneutics poses for science, I will provide an account of the hermeneutic enterprise. To do this, I will address Hans-Georg Gadamer's detailed conception of hermeneutics offered in his *Truth and Method.* I will then apply the ensuing notion of interpretive social science to the discipline of political science and discuss the implications of this application for the discipline. My aim here is to argue that we can conceive of an interesting and useful "method" for the discipline *other* than the positivist/postpositivist one which has gained such a favorable position. And while, from the positivist perspective, the hermeneutical approach certainly threatens to be relativistic, it is abundantly clear from the hermeneutic perspective that any understanding we hope to arrive at concerning social and political phenomena *must* be hermeneutic, since the sort of knowledge that the deductive nomological method aims at is impossible for human beings to attain.

Truth and Method

Hans-Georg Gadamer's *Truth and Method* (1975) highlights the three distinct differences between hermeneutics and positivist science mentioned above. Gadamer, though, refuses to admit that he offers a method for the social sciences in *Truth and Method.* Indeed, he claims that he is not interested at all in supplying a method for any sort of social scientific inquiry. Instead, he seeks "to understand what the human sciences truly are, beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them with the totality of our experience of the world" (1975: xiii). He does not, in other words, intend "to make prescriptions for the sciences or the conduct of life, but to try to correct false thinking *about what they are*" (xiii; emphasis mine). For Gadamer the sciences are, not surprisingly, based upon the notion that understanding can only be examined through language. The fact that language grounds all human experience leads him to seek a new sort of truth in the human sciences and he enlists Heidegger's help in doing so.

In *Being and Time* (1962), Heidegger shifts the focus of philosophy away from epistemology and toward metaphysics (Guignon 1983: 64). For Heidegger, every human experience is oriented around our attempts to understand "Being-in-the-world." We always seek, in other words, to locate the existential *meaning* of our experiences. The human condition itself, then, is necessarily hermeneutical. Hermeneutics conceives of truth in human, rather than transcendental, terms. It claims that truth is actually found in the "everydayness" of our lives. The unfolding of events in history and culture, mediated

by language is truth. It is, in fact, all that we have. Our seeking after truth is actually an ontological pursuit rather than an epistemological pursuit. It is, for Heidegger, about seeking the meaning of our "Being-in-the-world" rather than about knowledge. It is practical rather than ideal. It is about the things that we do in the everyday world rather than the ideas we generate. It is situated in historical and cultural context rather than in objective, transcendental and over-arching Ideas. In this sense, we find truth in everything we do if we always seek the underlying meaning of everyday events in terms of history/culture, language and our being-in-the-world. It is possible, then, for everyday life to be imbued with the deepest of meaning even to those who do not believe in God, or our existence may be nihilistic to those who have not come to terms with their atheism. God may provide meaning to those who have faith, and some may "believe" in God simply as a failsafe because they cannot imagine that when they die that is the end of the road. In any case, from the hermeneutic perspective all of these attempts to understand our being-in-the-world represent truth. They are all firmly rooted in our Western historical heritage and they are all represented by language (necessarily, since all of human experience is mediated by language).

But how do we come to these understandings? To explain, Heidegger discusses the hermeneutical circle. In any given attempt to understand our Being-in-the-world, there is a starting point. History/culture, language and personal perspective provide this point. We all begin with a common-sense view of our Being-in-the-world provided for

us by history/culture, language and personal viewpoints. As we attempt to understand the *meaning* of our Being-in-the-world, which is what every human experience is oriented around, we begin with a question: "What is Being?" (Heidegger 1962: 26). Our interpretation of that question brings us to a deeper sphere of understanding. Upon reaching this sphere, we repeat the process "on a higher and authentically ontological basis" (17). This, however, provides us with yet another "text" to interpret and the process continues, *ad infinitum*. At every stage of the process we attain truth, but there clearly is no final truth (except, *perhaps*, at the hour of death) since the hermeneutical circle has a beginning but no end. In this sense, the hermeneutical circle is probably best characterized as a "spiral," since at each level of understanding we become able to reach another higher level (Guignon 1983: 73).

The hermeneutical conception obliterates both the subject-object distinction and the fact-value distinction which emanate from the Enlightenment and ground positivist/postpositivist science. From the hermeneutical perspective we cannot separate ourselves from the world. Our consciousness is not the center of the universe. We cannot simply manipulate the things in the world and attempt to master them. To do so is actually to manipulate ourselves since we, too, are in the world. Instead, we *participate* in the world. We *experience* the world, and in every experience we attempt to understand our Being-in-the-world. In this sense, history/culture and language are not tools to aid in discovering the Truth, they are phenomena through which we participate. It follows that

there can be no brute facts about the world.[6] Since every human experience is mediated by language, and language is inextricably linked to history/culture, every fact is necessarily "tainted" by value. A "presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us" cannot exist (Heidegger 1962: 150). We always find that "facts" are dependent on "nothing other than the obvious undiscussed assumption of the person who does the interpreting" (1962: 150). The hermeneutical approach to knowledge and truth, then, clearly differs from that approach offered by positivism/postpositivism. Gadamer's *Truth and Method* is based in exactly the Heideggerian approach to knowledge and helps to clarify how hermeneutics can be applied to the social sciences.

Gadamer attributes the equation of legitimate knowledge with independent, transcendent validity criteria to Kant (1975: 38). Kant's synthetic *a priori* knowledge is in fact the goal of the natural sciences as well as of the human sciences to the extent that they are dominated by the model of the natural sciences. The sciences are concerned with "establishing similarities, regularities and conformities to a law which would make it possible to predict individual phenomena and processes" (5). However, this goal can almost always *not* be reached. The standard response to scientific failure revolves around

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[6]One might object, by giving the example that a gunshot to the head will "kill" a human. A person thus shot is pronounced "dead." However, a gunshot to the CPU of a computer will certainly cause it to cease functioning also. And in this case, we do not use the terms "kill" and "dead" when we describe the computer, we merely say that it no longer works. Though the actions are analagous, our linguistic portrayal of them is different. Why is it that we do not say of a gunshot victim that they, "ceased to function?" Because, through the language we use, we describe the "fact" with our value system underpinning the choice of each word.

the argument that it is simply not possible to accumulate the data in sufficient quantity to enable such prediction. The method of the human sciences is often thought to be the same as that of the natural sciences, then, but the predictions generated by the human sciences are weaker only because the data are weaker. So, the human sciences cannot possibly be concerned with the discovery of causes. Instead, they simply seek to establish regularities and to deduce covering laws on the basis of those regularities.

Gadamer takes issue with this approach, arguing that "one has not properly grasped the nature of the human sciences if one measures them by the yardstick of an increasing knowledge of regularity" (6). Instead, the ideal is

> to understand the phenomenon itself in its unique and historical concreteness. However much general experience is involved, the aim is not to confirm and expand these general experiences in order to attain knowledge of a law, eg [sic] how men, peoples and states evolve, but to understand how this man, this people or this state is what it has become--more generally, how has it happened that it is so (6).

An "object" of study cannot be *understood* in terms of sense-experience. We cannot merely observe some phenomenon and then claim to understand it. Instead, we need to think about it in terms of its history, our history, and so on (xxii). The proper mode of inquiry for the human sciences, in other words, is hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is *not* a method, but it is concerned with knowledge and truth (xi). In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer seeks to delve into "that experience of truth that transcends the control of scientific method" (xii).

He begins with a critique of "aesthetic consciousness." Specifically, he wants "to

defend that experience of truth that comes to us through the work of art [itself] against the aesthetic theory that lets itself be restricted to a scientific concept of truth" (xiii). He begins with aesthetic consciousness because he wants to argue that taste validates knowledge while independent, transcendent criteria do not. He does so through a discussion of the notion of experience (*Erlebnis*). Like virtually everything else, the idea of experience has become caught up in the scientific mood, where intellectual creations of the past, human actions, and so on, are merely data for research. They are considered to be externalized objects of study which can be *explained* (though not understood) by an independent, transcendental subject (58). In this way, it is believed that the object can be completely explained and transcendentally known in spite of any historical or cultural context in which it might be situated. Through the rigorous, methodical use of sense-experience we can come to *Know* virtually any object.

Science presupposes the existence of transcendental consciousness and the idea that we can express external *objects* in terms of "ideas" and not in terms of their concrete reality, their situatedness in historical and cultural context. In fact, we can truly *Know* these objects when we cultivate transcendental consciousness. Gadamer likens this to formalistic explanations of art where a work of art is *reduced* to its form and the reasons behind the creation of a given work of art never are discussed and are assumed to be unimportant. Through studying *form*, we can *Know* the work. This sort of knowledge, which emanates from a scientific rendering of experience based on reduction, is weak for

Gadamer because it does not help to *understand* the work. As such, he offers a different conception of experience that is not privy to the scientific mood.

For Gadamer, there is an element of "adventure" in every experience. An adventure

> interrupts the customary course of events, but is positively and significantly related to the context which it interrupts. Thus an adventure lets life become felt as a whole, in its breadth and in its strength. Here lies the fascination of an adventure. It removes the conditions and obligations of everyday life. It ventures out into the uncertain...But at the same time it knows that, as an adventure, it has an exceptional character and thus remains related to the return of the everyday, into which the adventure cannot be taken. Thus the adventure is 'passed through', like a test, from which one emerges enriched and more mature (62).

As such, the aesthetic experience (the experience of art) must not be seen as merely one experience among many. It is the essence of experience since it is an adventure. It "suddenly takes the person experiencing it out of the context of his life...and yet relates him back to the whole of his existence" (63). Indeed, this is what all new experiences (adventures) do. In this Gadamer follows Heidegger in the sense that all human inquiry revolves around our attempts to understand our Being-in-the-world. In our attempts to reach such understanding, we *participate* in the world rather than dispassionately *study* it. The analysis of aesthetic consciousness highlights the fact that "the concept of aesthetic consciousness confronted with an object does not correspond to the real situation" (91). The "work of art is not an object that stands over against a subject for itself. Instead the work of art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an *experience* changing the

person experiencing it" (92; emphasis added). In this way the work of art is both subject *and* object, and so are we. We can have some effect on it since we must interpret it to understand it, but it also affects us since we are changed through our experience with it. For Gadamer this notion of participation is exemplified in the concept of play. When we play games, they also play us (95). We like to think that we can master the games that we play in the same way that we like to think we can master the "objects" that we scientifically study. And we can to a point, but ultimately our experiences change us and thus we too are mastered.[7]

From this perspective, Gadamer eradicates the subject-object distinction that has gained such favor in modern science. We are not separated from the world in which we live. We are not separated from other people, other animals, works of art, literature, and so on. This means that we cannot possibly study an externalized object because such

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[7] For example, I trained very hard for the 1994 Arizona State Championship Bicycle Race and was very fit entering the race. I came in a close second. I cannot claim all the credit for my success though. You see, as the final sprint was "winding up" I was trapped in the pack and had given up my aspirations to win. Just then, a gap "opened up" and I was able to sprint through it and challenge for the win. The *race* provided me with an opportunity which I took. I had nothing to do with the opening of that gap, it simply happened. The fact that I was able to benefit from my opportunity is a testament to my experience as a bicycle racer as well as to my fitness, but I never would have been able to utilize that fitness and experience had the race not provided me with the opportunity. In the following year's race I was also very fit and finished a disappointing ninth. Why? A wreck *happened* in front of me with ten kilometers to go. This meant that I had to expend a tremendous amount of energy to catch back up to the pack which tired me for the final sprint. There was nothing I could have done to prevent the wreck. We cannot master every situation and we are, in fact, often mastered by the situation in which we find ourselves.

objects do not exist. When we poke a lab animal with a stick to see how it behaves, it behaves as if it were poked with a stick. Everything impacts us, and we impact it. This conception of the world is not far off from Nietzsche's notion of eternal return. Nietzsche entreats us, with his notion of eternal return, to "*remain true to the earth*" and to "not believe those who speak...of superterrestrial hopes!" (1978: Prologue, 3). To believe that transcendental truth is a condition of life is to misunderstand life. According to eternal return all things return, even those we despise, so affirming this life in every moment presents us with a dilemma: we can face these recurrences with despair and fatalistic nihilism, or escapism and other-worldly paradises; or, we can "say yes to life even in its strangest and hardest problems" (1956: 273). Saying "yes" to life is Nietzsche's answer: "I want more and more to perceive the necessary character in things as the beautiful...*Amor Fati*: let that henceforth be my love!...I wish to be at anytime hereafter only a yea-sayer" (1974: 276). In other words, I want always to come to grips with and affirm the idea that I am a part of all that happens around me--it is me and I am it. I am tied to this world and cannot "know" it from a detached, "God's eye view," for the God's eye view is the product of a mis*understanding* of the world and my place in it.

According to Gadamer, what we need

> is not only a persistent asking of ultimate questions, but the sense of what is feasible, what is possible, what is correct, here and now. The philosopher, of all people, must, I think, be aware of the tension between what he claims to achieve and the reality in which he finds himself...The hermeneutic consciousness, which must be awakened and kept awake, recognises [sic] that in the age of science the claim of superiority made by

> philosophic thought has something vague and unreal about it (1975: xxv-xxvi).

The emphasis on experience with connections to life that hermeneutic consciousness breeds means that our attempts to gather pure knowledge, which will ultimately lead us to an Archimedean point grounding all of existence, must inevitably fail. By detaching our experience from all of its connections to life in the way that scientific method requires, "we frame it like a picture and hang it up" (120). In other words, we objectify our experience. We separate ourselves from experience so as to systematize it and categorize it according to "laws" which we use to "explain" our actions, from outside ourselves, as "things," rather than understand them from inside our perspective as "(con)texts." The scientific method carries out the "methodical self-purification of the mind" and seeks to perfect experience through a steady climb from the particular to the universal (312-313). Gadamer, though, wants to conceive of the perfection of experience not as consisting

> in the fact that someone already knows everything and knows better than anyone else. Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from them is particularly well equipped to have new experiences and to learn from them. The dialectic of experience has its own fulfilment not in definitive knowledge, but in that openness to experience that is encouraged by experience itself (319).

Experience, then, "is experience of human finitude. The truly experienced man is one who is aware of this, who knows that he is master neither of time nor the future. The experienced man knows the limitedness of all prediction and the uncertainty of all plans"

(320). With hermeneutic consciousness we recognize that we can never be certain about anything. This means that the goal of science, transcendental knowledge, can never be reached. It is, in fact, doomed from the start. Furthermore, because language (and culture) represents "the middle ground in which understanding and agreement concerning the object takes place between two people," we can never be free of prejudices as science would require us to believe (345). Indeed, a "person who believes that he is free of prejudices, basing his knowledge on the objectivity of his procedures and denying that he is himself influenced by historical circumstances, experiences the power of the prejudices that unconsciously dominate him" (324). In this way, Gadamer destroys not only the subject-object distinction, but also the fact-value distinction that accompanies scientific method.

Gadamer's hermeneutic consciousness is anti-foundational and as such it has much to offer the social sciences in general. It offers a powerful critique of the scientific approach to studying humans, society and politics. In particular, it emphasizes our connectedness to the world we study. As such, we cannot possibly step outside the world we hope to study and come to *Know* that world in a complete and transcendental way. Instead, our knowledge must develop in accordance with an historical account of experience that knows itself to be intimately connected to everyday life. Social scientific knowledge must, in other words, always and forever be historically, linguistically, and culturally situated. Our knowledge is necessarily finite. It stops where history, language

and culture (or tradition) stop. We simply have no way of stepping outside the boundaries which history, language and tradition place on us and on our pursuits. An anti-foundational, Gadamerian social science, then, would "rest on the presupposition that all human thought and action is preformed by language and tradition" (Hekman 1986: 159). And it would recognize that the knowledge it generates can never be transcendentally true. Instead, it can only be conditionally true and always subject to the next spiral in the ongoing hermeneutical circle of experience. To see how this version of social science might be transmitted to political science, let us consider several recent attempts to adapt hermeneutics to the science of politics.

Hermeneutics and the Discipline

In the philosophy of science, methodological discourses have typically been concerned with knowledge, with how it is that we come to know certain things. According to Habermas (1971), the rise of positivism in science during the nineteenth century collapsed the distinction between methodology and epistemology. Notions of knowledge and how we come to know (epistemology) have become implicit in positivistic discussions of methodology. Science (as method) is *the* epistemological generator, method *is* knowledge--not a path toward knowledge. Discourses on method in political science tend to adhere to this broad understanding of methodology. Methodology, as typically understood by political scientists, is not concerned with the deeper issue of knowledge. Rather, it is concerned with research traditions, with different ways of studying politics. As such, methodology is considered to be connected with fields and subfields of study in the discipline such as: behavioralism, rational choice, political culture, state autonomy, class analysis, etc. These fields and subfields of study are thought of as *methods* of research. Clearly, though, they are merely approaches to studying politics with no stake in epistemological discourses. Indeed, as Charles Taylor notes, these approaches to the study of politics are "theoretical frameworks" that seek to classify the data of politics into various explanatory categories (1973: 142-143). We must make a distinction, then, between the methods of research and the theoretical frameworks at work in the discipline of political science. Methods of research are

intimately bound up with *questions* of knowledge, while the theoretical framework of (post)positivism employed by political scientists is *assumed* to produce knowledge. Methodology is not primarily concerned with how to look at a given topic. Rather, it seeks to explain how forms of inquiry provide us with knowledge about a topic. In other words, because methodology is linked to epistemology, it is concerned with how it is that we come to *know*. This is precisely the issue which hermeneuticists such as Gadamer address. In particular, Gadamer argues that an emphasis on positivist methodology seeking transcendental knowledge is not a suitable orientation for the human sciences. Numerous political theorists agree, maintaining that the discipline's mode of inquiry ought to be hermeneutic.

Some political scientists have been very open about what a "true" science of politics entails. In 1930, George Catlin claimed that a true science of politics cannot exist where no political uniformities or constants of behavior are discovered that allow for the formulation of laws (1930: 39). If possible, these laws are "as timeless as the laws of mechanics, holding for the human race wherever and whenever it is found. And men in so far as they obey these laws will act in as timeless a fashion as...atoms act in their chemical combinations according to formula" (39). The goal of the science of politics is, in other words, the discovery of the timeless truths of political existence. Theorists such as Terence Ball (1983), Joel D. Schwartz (1984), Charles Taylor (1977; 1973), and James Farr (1982) have contested this orientation. All of these theorists contend, in varying

degrees, that the discipline of political science must cultivate a hermeneutic consciousness. They believe that the knowledge generated through the study of politics is necessarily limited since all human inquiry must begin with a particular perspective which colors one's interpretation of the "facts." As such, they are principally concerned with undermining the fact-value distinction.

Charles Taylor (1973) discusses the knowledge generated by "political science" and "political philosophy." Political science is that element in the discipline that seeks to explain political *facts* while political philosophy looks for the dimensions that can be used to judge the *value* of policies and polities (1973: 142-145). In Chapter One we saw that the rift between political scientists and political theorists occurred, at least in part, as a result of a desire in the discipline to guarantee a scientific identity for itself. This desire has led to the development of a naturalistic science that seeks to explain the facts of politics dispassionately (Luke 1978). Since political theorists are caught up in the judgement of value, it is perceived that they can offer little, if anything, to the science of politics (Taylor 1973: 139). Taylor wants to fault this perception by problematizing the fact-value distinction.

Taylor's critique of the social sciences focuses on the interpretation of meaning (1973, 1977). He argues that mere explanation of social phenomena is inadequate without interpretation (1977: 106). As such, Taylor has been concerned with the fact-value distinction in political science (1973). The fact-value distinction originated, in part,

with the break from political philosophy. The "belief was that political science had freed itself from philosophy in becoming value free and in adopting the scientific method" (1973: 139). But the deductive-nomological model of explanation in the social sciences also contributed to the fact-value distinction (Hempel 1965: 343). The emphasis in the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation falls on the systematic collection of facts. Systematicity emerges in three stages that proceed from fact to law to theory (Schwartz 1984: 1123). On this view, to understand why an actor behaves in a certain way, we must subsume the act under a law that explains why the actor *had* to act (1123). Finally, these laws must be explained by theory. Theory is a deductive proposition that tells "us why new cases *must* conform to observed regularities" (1123).

The same process of explanation occurs in political science. To explain why someone votes, for instance, the political scientist appeals to a law that explains why the voter *had* to vote. People, for example, "with intense preferences for candidates or issues," *ceteris paribus*, will be "active in politics" (Milbrath 1965: 53). Finally, the laws to which the political scientist appeals must be explained by theory. Why do laws explain why a voter had to vote? For this, we need a theory of human nature that explains why "individuals *will* become political participants when they feel intensely toward a candidate or issue" (Schwartz 1984: 1123). Problems arise, though, for the deductive-nomological model with the inclusion of theory. While political scientists using the deductive-nomological approach begin their inquiry with facts, their

explanation of those facts is ultimately guided by theory. And theories of human nature, to use the above example, can differ. If we adopt a liberal-Hobbesian theory of human nature, then we will be unlikely to understand what participation means to a Muslim living in an Islamic state (Schwartz 1984: 1128-1129). Similarly, if we study political phenomena from the perspective of rational choice, we will be unable to explain "new social movements" because they do not tend to adopt an instrumentally rational approach to politics (White 1987: 114, 132n).

Along these lines, Taylor argues that understanding social reality involves interpretation of social action (or "texts"). As such, Taylor wants to defend social science as a "hermeneutical science" (1977: 103). The criteria of judgement are very important in a hermeneutical science. Successful interpretation must render a confused, fragmentary, cloudy text clear (103). One knows that her interpretation is correct when she makes sense of the original text. The problem arises when one attempts to make one's understanding acceptable to someone else.[8] To do this, we have to take that person on a historical journey. That is, we must appeal to the problem itself. We need to demonstrate that the problem is puzzling in the way we have interpreted it to be, so that we are both looking for a solution to the same problem (103). If we cannot agree on this understanding, then we must appeal to those understandings that compelled us to view the problem in the way we did. But then we have to support those previous

[8]Which must be done if a teacher is actually going to teach, or if "knowledge" is to be aggregated.

understandings so we must appeal to still other understandings, and so on, potentially *ad infinitum*. This is the "hermeneutical circle."

> The circle can also be put in terms of part-whole relations: we are trying to establish a reading of the whole text, and for this we appeal to readings of its partial expressions; and yet because we are dealing with meaning, with making sense, where expressions only make sense or not in relation to others, the readings of partial expressions depend on those of others, and ultimately of the whole (103).

But "we can only convince our interlocutor if at some point he shares our understanding of the language concerned" (103-104). The circle closes when we realize that if we are unable to make our point clear to someone else, then perhaps we are disillusioned about our own view. In this way, we trap ourselves inside the hermeneutical circle. Thus, to ensure any amount of certainty in social inquiry, we need to break out of the circle.

One of the approaches to breaking out of the hermeneutical circle has been "empiricism," by which Taylor obviously means positivism (104). Empiricism attempts to get beyond subjectivity by emphasizing sense data. As such, empiricists rely on "brute data"--facts separated from subjective judgement or valuation (105). Empiricists, then, are necessarily hostile toward inquiry based upon interpretation. Interpretation is subjective and thus its verification is arbitrary. And non-arbitrary verification is essential to empiricist science (106). This carries with it the ontological presupposition that social reality is structured in such a way as to make empiricist understanding possible (106; Ball 1983: 31-32).

Taylor, though, disputes this approach to breaking out of the hermeneutical circle.

He claims that important dimensions of human life cannot be understood within the boundaries established by this epistemological orientation (1977: 106). There are meanings encapsulated in political acts that an empiricist science of politics cannot explain. Brute data descriptions are simply unable to exhaust the possibilities of meaning. For example, when I vote for a particular motion, "I am also saving the honor of my party, or defending the value of free speech, or vindicating public morality, or saving civilization from breakdown" (113). Empiricist political scientists typically deal with these meanings as brute data. But here the scholar attaches her own interpretation to the meanings; that is the only way she can categorize them as brute data. Thus, the meanings that social reality has for actors are filtered through the scholar's theoretical stance. And this does not allow for intersubjective meaning. Instead, we find ourselves back inside the hermeneutical circle.

Taylor argues that this is as it should be. In a hermeneutical science, insight or intuition will inevitably play a role. This insight cannot be formalized, it "cannot be communicated by the gathering of brute data" (126). We simply have to live with the reality that fact and value cannot be separated in the social sciences. Taylor, then, advises political scientists to make a significant break with their scientific tradition. Hermeneutics may not generate (the illusion of) certainty, but it *can* lead to broader interpretive understanding. Such understanding cannot be overlooked in political science precisely because we are not dealing with brute data, we are dealing with sentient beings

who attach meaning to their actions (and have meaning attached to their actions). This suggestion would probably not be well accepted by most political scientists. But we must recognize that Taylor does not want to undermine the discipline itself. Empirical research would still be possible in Taylor's political science, but the epistemological and ontological presuppositions of that science would be fundamentally altered. In short, Taylor sees no useful way of breaking the interpretive circle. Hegel's "rationalism" fails because it pretends to be absolute (1977: 104). And empiricism fails because it is unable to explain numerous and significant potential meanings. As such, Taylor believes that political science must become an interpretive science, a science that sacrifices some degree of certainty in order to reach broader understandings of meaning. We must, in other words, become comfortable *within* the hermeneutical circle since we can never really break out of it.

It is abundantly clear, though, that the discipline has not adopted such a hermeneutical understanding of science. The traditional notion of science still holds sway in the discipline, with scholars repeatedly attempting to force their subfields to ever more "scientific" perspectives. In fact, the scientific impulse is easily as strong now as it has ever been. Lest we forget this, allow me to sketch a particularly recent example of a subfield of political science succumbing to the scientific impulse. I want to suggest that recent research on congressional party leadership has done precisely this. Since the 1970s, party leadership research has shifted from an emphasis on personality factors to an

emphasis on institutional factors. This shift can certainly be explained, in part, by the 1970s reforms of Congress.[9] But, I think that, given the historical context of the discipline and the nature of the recent research, the scientific impulse has played a major role in affecting this shift.

Early research on congressional party leadership (generally occurring before the 1980s) emphasized personality and political skills and abilities to explain congressional leadership change (Peabody 1976), the effects of inside and outside influences on the choice of House majority leaders (Polsby 1977), good leadership (Polsby 1971), and Senate party leadership (Peabody 1981). Polsby (1971) accentuated reputation and political skills and abilities as leading factors in good leadership. He claimed that factors such as the leader's energy level, bargaining skills, and bank of good will for favors done contribute to one's leadership ability (65-66, 84). In many ways, this argument is representative of the early research on party leadership in Congress. The tendency was to stress such unwieldy and contentious variables as bargaining skills, energy level, and so on. Such "political skills," though, do not lend themselves to easy operationalization and systematic study.

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[9]During the 1970s, numerous institutional and procedural reforms were introduced in Congress. People were concerned that the Southern Democrats exercised disproportionate power due to their senior positions and their dominance in committees. One of the goals of the reforms involved dispersing the power of these senior positions. Basically, members of Congress attempted to undermine the hierarchical structure of Congress by making committees (for example) more accessible to more members. This mainly involved the proliferation of subcommittees, which allowed more members to become involved in the nuts and bolts of legislation.

We can begin to see some scientific insecurity emerging within this research in the work of Peabody (1976). Peabody is very careful to point out that his study is empirical (based upon observation and interviews) and inductive (builds toward generalizations from a series of case studies) (xi). He deals with the effects of congressional leadership change on legislative and party machinery. Specifically, he argues that congressional party structure, political outlooks, strategies of legislative implementation, and relationships with the executive tend to change slowly. But these hinge on the personalities, political backgrounds, seniority, and ideology of the principal party leaders in Congress. When leadership changes, then, so do party fortunes and public policies (19). Peabody's work very thoroughly explains the workings of Congress (27-60, 321-354), but his approach still only allows him to describe the qualities of a Speaker in such general and contentious terms as moderateness, popularity, and seniority. Peabody's focus has changed, though, in recent years. He has dealt with the skills and personalities of leaders as well as the internal operations and external constraints that "condition their effectiveness over time" (Peabody 1981: 52).

In 1980, a conference on congressional leadership was convened in Washington, D.C. The participants argued that understanding congressional leadership requires more than knowledge about the leaders themselves, it also requires understanding institutional and environmental factors such as the organizational structure of Congress and the condition of the political environment beyond Capitol Hill (Mackaman 1981: vi).

However, although these researchers suggested that some sort of balance be struck between institutional and personal factors, the research does not reflect such a balance. Rather, there appears to be a wholesale avoidance of personal factors and a definitive focus on institutional factors.

Congressional leadership research focusing on institutional factors has addressed the use of unanimous consent agreements in the Senate (Smith and Flathman 1989), changes in leadership institutions (Canon 1989), the strength and exercise of leadership (Sinclair 1981, 1992), and shifts in leadership style (Cooper and Brady 1981). Sinclair (1981) argues that the reforms of the 1970s have made the exercise of leadership problematic. She cites changes in rules and norms, high membership turnover, and changes in important issues as having altered the environment in which leadership operates (181-182). These have combined to make leadership more difficult. Still, Sinclair (1992) has argued that current House majority party leadership is stronger than other post-World War II leadership in the sense that it is more active and decisive in organizing the party and the chamber, in setting the House agenda, and in affecting legislative outcomes. Sinclair then seeks to explain this development. Specifically, since it has usually been assumed that congressional party leadership strength is a function of the strength of political parties, and contemporary American political parties are relatively weak, how can one explain the emergence of strong congressional leadership (657-658)? Sinclair argues that the emergence of strong leadership can be explained

through a cost/benefit analysis. She claims that the costs and benefits of strong leadership to majority party House members have changed as a result of the 1970s reforms, "which increased the vulnerability of legislation from attack on the floor," and the constrained political climate of the 1980s (split control, a conservative confrontational president, etc.) (658). In such a climate, the majority party leadership possesses "critical resources," such as control of the Rules Committee, that can increase the probability of legislative success. As a result, the benefits of strong leadership were higher in the 1980s. And costs were reduced by the ideological homogeneity of Democratic membership.

Cooper and Brady (1981) address the shift in leadership style from Cannon (hierarchical) to Rayburn (bargaining). They argue that the institutional context of the House determines leadership power and style. And they find an important link to party strength that differs from Sinclair's. They claim that when party strength is high, power is more concentrated, which allows leaders to be goal-oriented. However, when party strength is low, power tends to be dispersed, which orients leaders toward bargaining and relationship maintenance. Basically, Cooper and Brady argue that institutional context actually limits the skills necessary to lead. The skills required of leaders vary in relation to the "parameters and needs imposed by the character of the House as a political institution" (423). As such, Rayburn could not be as powerful as Cannon because his sources of leverage were not as powerful in the formal and party systems. Thus, personal

traits do not primarily determine leadership style in the House on Cooper and Brady's view, institutional context does.

Canon (1989) and Smith and Flathman (1989) explicitly address what they perceive to be the shift from a communitarian to an individualistic climate in Congress. Smith and Flathman argue that the shift to an individualistic Senate has increased demands on floor leaders to accommodate more members and has produced innovations in the use and content of unanimous consent agreements. They claim that the "changing context of floor politics is the foundation for the evolution of leadership uses of unanimous consent agreements" (370). The foundation for consent to limits on debate is no longer confined to interpersonal relations between Senators, it now involves political relations with "outsiders" such as constituencies, organized groups, and the media. This has compelled leaders to alter their use of unanimous consent agreements during the past three decades.

Canon (1989) is concerned with how and why leadership institutions change. He argues that the institutionalization of leadership tends to be hostile to effective leadership. However, due to the modern context of "individualism" in Congress and a weak party system, the institutionalization of leadership reveals its adaptive capabilities. That is, individual leaders may not be as dominant in an institutional system, but "the leadership team gains capacity to lead" (434). Canon goes on to develop a theory of leadership institutionalization. His theory assesses the tension between collective and individual

goals. He theorizes that if a balance is struck between representatives who pursue individual goals without a strong party system (and thus seek service-oriented, weak leadership), and the ability of the leadership to play an integrative role, then institutional stability is possible. This theory, then, seems to admit some speculation on the role of personal abilities in congressional leadership. The emphasis, though, remains on institutional factors.

One of the reasons for the shift to institutional factors in congressional leadership research is hinted at in the work of Canon (1989) and Smith and Flathman (1989). They are concerned with the individualistic climate of Congress that emerged following the 1970s reforms. In many ways, this has been a boon for congressional leadership research. Theories of leadership have developed significantly in the past two decades. And this can probably be attributed, in part, to the 1970s reforms; they have made institutional approaches to congressional leadership research more fruitful. The reforms, however, do not explain the wholesale avoidance of personal factors, and this is a potential drawback to congressional leadership research.

Smith and Flathman do recognize the importance of personal attitudes and style of leaders, but they refuse to accord them any weight and they neglect to give a good reason why they came to this decision. They realize that including personal factors in their study would complicate their scientific research. Personal attitudes and styles of leadership are notoriously difficult to operationalize and to measure. Including them might sabotage the

legitimacy of the scientific endeavor. And, since a scientific identity tends to legitimate inquiry in the discipline, including unmeasurable and contentious variables might de-legitimate congressional leadership research. Thus, if I am right to argue that the shift to institutional research in congressional leadership studies was brought about and maintained by a scientific impulse, then I think that congressional leadership scholars are in a difficult position.

As a sensitivity to hermeneutic consciousness makes clear, it is important that political scientists study politics in all its complexity. Any political action comes about in the context of many variables. Thus, in order to explain a political action accurately, one must take account of as many relevant variables as possible. Personal factors, then, because they are relevant to congressional leadership, need to be considered in the research on this area. The fact that the institutional research I have surveyed does not take personal factors into account certainly undermines it. How far, for example, can we take Smith and Flathman's generalizations concerning unanimous consent agreements? Have they accurately portrayed the dynamics of unanimous consent agreements? The answer is probably negative.[10] At the same time, however, it is difficult to fault Smith

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[10]Indeed, in gathering the data for this article Smith and Flathman were interested not in *why* unanimous consent agreements were used, but in how many were used each session, and on which bills. The fact that they were originally used only on appropriations bills and later came to be used on any bills was mentioned only briefly in this work, and was never really analyzed. Thanks go to Paul Dotson, who helped with the data collection for the Smith and Flathman study, for this insider information.

and Flathman for their neglect. They must answer to a higher power--science. Their research will not be considered legitimate without science, and will thus not get the consideration it deserves. Unfortunately, it will also never be able to explain fully the dynamics of unanimous consent agreements. The scientific identity in the discipline of political science is still too restrictive to allow for the development of contentious and difficult to measure variables. It seeks to simplify and this winds up thwarting research.

Conclusion

In spite of the suggestions by numerous political theorists that the discipline re-think its positivist scientific perspective and orient itself around a more hermeneutic approach, there is little evidence to suggest that the mainstream view on science in the discipline has invalidated the positivist/postpositivist vista. In light of the hermeneutical critique of science, we cannot possibly continue with the positivist/postpositivist position that fact and value are distinct, that subject can be detached from object, and that knowledge descends from some transcendental, Archimedean point. Gadamer's hermeneutical consciousness compels us to redefine the presuppositions that guide our research. Indeed, not only does it seem to be impossible for us to conceive of a world that is independent of us, of our history and of our language, but our claims to knowledge must also be suspect since we cannot possibly attain the level of certainty that the positivist/postpositivist position demands. Going along with this is a significant paucity of meaning for our "knowledge." How much can we really claim to know about congressional party leadership, for example, if we must neglect important variables because they complicate our research? And how much meaning can we attach to that knowledge?

Joel D. Schwartz (1984) has argued that political scientists have been "impressed" with hermeneutical critiques of positivism (1984: 1120). The problem is that

> they have been unable to resolve the gap between their methodological training and their doubts concerning the positivist epistemology and

> correspondence theory of truth that support this methodology. As a result, they either bracket epistemology altogether as an embarrassment and go on with behavioral science as usual, or they find their research itself paralyzed, much like a carpenter who arrives at a building site only to find that he has brought the wrong tools for the job (1120).

It is imperative, then, that those who propose that the science of politics develop a hermeneutical consciousness provide an approach that resolves the tension between epistemology and approach. This is especially important if, as Schwartz seems to believe, there are political scientists "out there" who are seeking such a resolution. It is also important for my purposes in this dissertation that we consider what a hermeneutical approach might entail, since the hermeneutical perspective is clearly the starting point for the other alternative approaches to social science which the ensuing chapters will address. Schwartz provides us with a particularly good account of how the hermeneutical approach might apply to the discipline of political science.

Schwartz wants to introduce his notion of "multisubjective understanding" to the study of participation. Although he is never exactly clear as to why he chose the study of participation as the focus of his account, he does seem to think that the study of participation exemplifies the deductive-nomological approach to explanation (1984: 1118-1122). In the scientific study of participation, participation is understood to be "a fact, not a value, an object not a subject" (1118). We might disagree as to whether or not participation is desirable, but "there can be no disagreement over what participation as a behavioral phenomenon is: citizens either participate or they do not; institutions and

political cultures either encourage participation or they discourage it; and so on" (1118). Schwartz, though, wants to say that understanding participation is never this easy. Because language and human action are "context dependent," we can never conceive of anything as a brute fact. This means that it cannot simply be the case that people either participate or they do not participate. Understanding can never come about simply as a result of observation of behavioral phenomena. To see why, consider the following:

> When I roast a leg of lamb over a fire until it is a charred pile of ashes, I may be conducting an unsuccessful barbecue, but when Odysseus does the same thing he may be conducting a successful sacrifice. Indeed, Odysseus is not 'roasting' at all, since 'roasting' [in the context of cooking a leg of lamb] only has meaning internal to the activity of food preparation. Nor are we in fact 'doing the same thing,' although behavioral descriptions or pictures of the movements of our bodies may be identical (1118-1119).

Likewise, participation is a word and not an object. As such, the determination of whether or not "a particular observed activity counts as an act of participation depends on the point of view, the conceptual template, from which we interpret that activity" (1119). So, as Schwartz points out, participation means something quite a bit different to an American than it does to a Muslim fundamentalist. For the American, participation simply *is* the rational attempt to articulate private interests in the public sector while for the Muslim fundamentalist, participation simply *is* obeying Allah's laws (1128-1130). The danger of the scientific study of participation is that political *scientists* believe that their understanding of participation is objective. In doing so,

> they have not only limited themselves to one account of the 'facts,' but they have also...limited themselves to one account of what is rational and

> what is justified. When they do this, as scientific students of participation clearly do, they cease to be political *scientists* and become political *actors* themselves (1138; emphasis added).

Every fact, in other words, necessarily secretes value. As such, the argument that any given fact is objective lends itself to a normative prescription that this is how it *should* be.

Schwartz's recommendation that the discipline ought to cultivate multisubjective understanding circumvents this problem. Schwartz discusses two meanings of "explanation." The first is oriented around causation such as when "I point to a dented automobile and ask for an explanation [and hear the reply] 'a tree fell on the hood'" (1138). The second is oriented around a thing's meaning such as when "I point to an item in French on a menu and ask for an explanation [and hear the reply] 'that is chicken with herbs'" (1138). According to Schwartz, scientific students of participation only understand explanation in the first sense. As a result, "they focus considerable attention on the systematic search for independent variables that cause participation and relatively little attention on the conceptualization of 'participation' itself" (1138). In a world where brute facts cannot exist and where the meaning of participation is not universally agreed upon, a focus on explanation as causation is simply not acceptable. Instead, Schwartz urges political scientists to begin with the second understanding of explanation. This will allow them to determine what the meaning of participation, for example, is in a particular context and for particular actors. From here they can give an account of participation, but it will have to be a tremendously complex and tendentious account that provides the

analyst with knowledge that is necessarily finite.

Here we can see a problem with the adoption of hermeneutical consciousness by the discipline. To those who refuse to accept that all understanding is necessarily hermeneutical, an interpretive political science will appear to be relativistic. We could imagine that such an individual might wonder how we determine who has the right conception of participation, for example, if language and human action are context dependent. How do we communicate with one another about participation? Will our attempts at communication not simply spiral into confusion? Indeed, if we all are encapsulated by our own hermeneutical circles of understanding, how can we communicate at all? One problem with attempting to provide answers to these questions is that such questions are asked because the person asking has different ontological (and epistemological) commitments than the hermeneuticist who might provide answers. And what we will get from this exchange will thus be confusion and an inability to communicate. For a hermeneutic consciousness to take hold in the discipline, then, a significant number of political scientists would have to alter their ontological presuppositions to accept the idea that language and human action are necessarily context dependent.[11] There is clearly some indication that this may be underway, but it will

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[11]I think, by the way, that the reasons for accepting such a shift are strong, especially since a powerful claim can be made that all human actions and inquiries have always already been context dependent. In other words, as Terence Ball has noted, the point here is that political *scientists* are not doing the wrong thing, rather, "they are given to misdescribing what they are, in fact, already doing" (Ball 1987: 96). Also see my discussion of Haraway in Chapter Five.

probably take quite some time for it to be complete. Until it is, it is not likely that mainstream political inquiry will openly and consciously adopt a hermeneutical perspective and normative political inquiry is liable to remain on the margins of the discipline. However, as a propadeutic in preparation for the emergence of a hermeneutic perspective in the discipline of political science, I want to explore the potential application of hermeneutic consciousness to the discipline. I begin, in Chapter Three, with "critical social science."

III.

STRANDED BETWEEN MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNITY: THE JANUS FACE OF A CRITICAL POLITICAL SCIENCE

Introduction

As we saw in Chapter Two, thinkers such as Martin Heidegger (1962), Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975), Peter Winch (1965), and Charles Taylor (1977; 1973) urge social science to shift its emphasis away from positivist explanation and toward the interpretation of meaning. Because these hermeneuticists argue that value and fact cannot be distinct, they contend that pure, empirical explanation is impossible and thus inaccurate. They insist that the social sciences must seek to *understand* social phenomena rather than merely to *explain* them. One problem with this perspective is that in so doing they fail to develop the empirical aspect of social inquiry. Indeed, they appear to call for a wholesale shift away from positivism and toward hermeneutics. This inevitably subjects hermeneuticists to the accusation that their approach is subjective and their knowledge is non-verifiable. In fact, these scholars invite such charges since they cannot adequately address the concerns that empirical social scientists have about certain and verifiable knowledge.

Positivists and hermeneuticists, as Chapter Two indicates, operate from different ontological perspectives. For positivists, the world and its actors are eminently knowable

while for hermeneuticists the world and its actors are merely understandable and then only in a limited sense. As such, it is not surprising that these two groups tend to talk past one another. Indeed, there seems to be little that anyone can do about this situation. If we hope for a hermeneutic position to take hold in the social sciences, we must first fight what amounts to a Gramscian "war of position" before embarking on a "war of maneuver" and this is likely to take a long time to develop. It will take some work, in other words, for positivist hegemony to be overcome. This chapter contributes to that project for the discipline of political science with its discussion of critical theory and critical social science.

Critical theory contends that, like positivism, the interpretive social science that hermeneutics spawns suffers from its inability to generate any sort of critical stance concerning social and political practice (Keat 1981: 3-4). Critical theorists, then, hope to engender a critical stance toward social and political practice. Their approach aims at criticism of accepted practice and they hope that the outcome of their inquiries will help people overcome the domination resulting from advanced capitalism and positivist science. Toward this end, critical theory asks: What happens to a social science that is modeled after the natural sciences? Does it necessarily entail control over and domination of the objects of its study? Are humans, in other words, faced with the possibility of being controlled and dominated by social scientific knowledge? Critical theorists such as Jürgen Habermas and Brian Fay give affirmative answers to these

questions. They argue that the positivistic social science which exists today operates within the realm of instrumental action. They contend that positivist social science necessarily seeks to control its *objects* of study rather than to enlighten, empower and emancipate them. In other words, while the stated goal of practicing positivists is emancipation, their research method *ipso facto* entails domination. Habermas and Fay urge us to construct and to condone a critical social science which seeks as its final end the emancipation of humans from the one-sidedness of technical rationalization and the domination it necessarily entails. In this chapter, I assess their arguments and consider their application to the discipline of political science. It seems to me that a critical political science might benefit the discipline in terms of bringing empirical and normative political theory onto common ground, and in terms of motivating political scholars to ensure that their theoretical stances have practical importance for the lives of humans. However, there are also reasons to believe that a critical political science may not be all that different from a positivist political science. Indeed, while a critical political science openly aims at the emancipation of humans, it is not entirely clear that this would not come as a result of their domination.

Critical Theory

The critical theory of the Frankfurt School is grounded in Marx's historical materialist method. Critical theorists have made some notable and important changes to this method,[1] but the idea that the capitalist mode of production conditions the socio-political world in such a way as to assure class domination remains a crucial aspect of critical social theory. The guiding principle of critical social theory also aligns with that of Marx. Critical social theorists seek to provide a theoretical foundation for interpreting the world in order to change it. And this necessitates establishing a form of knowledge that accentuates the "realities of history" and indicates the areas where political action could be most effective. Critical theory, in other words, involves shifting the lens through which we view reality away from that of capitalists to that of the wage-laborer; or, more specifically, from that of the dominator to that of the dominated. However, while critical theorists do seek the institution of a new social and political system based upon a humanist vision of society, they are far more skeptical about the possibility of instituting that system than Marx was. This skepticism led them to criticize the positivist conception of knowledge and science, and their critiques often have taken reason as a starting point (see Wellmer 1971).

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[1]Here I have in mind Lukács' contention that the material impact of history is felt in the bureaucracy as well as in the economy and Marcuse's claim that the proletariat no longer can be expected to play a primary role in affecting the restructuring social revolution, that role falls on students, the "third world" and ghettoized minorities. See Lukács (1971) and Marcuse (1969; 1964).

In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, for example, Horkheimer and Adorno conceive of a dual history of reason, as freedom and as domination. Reason had been touted by the Enlightenment as having the ability to set us free, to liberate us from external constraints and contingencies. Reason is instrumental, then, not only for self-preservation, but also for the advancement of human pursuits. What has actually happened, though, as a result of bourgeois civilization and morality, has been the development of reason as domination, *not* as liberation. This is particularly prevalent for Horkheimer and Adorno in mass culture where technical reason is used to suppress individuality and to put an end to self-consciousness. Ultimately, Horkheimer and Adorno are not very confident that reason can be turned around to affect our liberation. Habermas, though, is quite optimistic.[2] For him, utilizing reason for emancipation necessitates reconceiving knowledge to accord with universal human interests. And since, on his view, positivist social science does not seek this sort of knowledge, positivist social science must give way to the critical theory of society.

Methodology

According to Habermas, two methodologies are in operation in the social sciences: the empirical-analytic method and the normative-analytic method (1988). He sees both the empirical-analytic and the normative-analytic approaches to social science as inadequate. The empirical-analytic approach focuses its aims on the "objective" world

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[2]See Habermas 1984 and 1987 for clear presentations of this optimism.

of facts. It fashions itself after the natural sciences and seeks to explain social phenomena with lawlike precision.[3] According to Habermas, the empirical-analytic method's shortcoming lies in the notion that the social realm is symbolically structured by language. Gaining access to this realm calls for the *interpretive* procedures of the humanities rather than the *explanatory* procedures of the natural sciences. The normative-analytic approach uses these interpretive procedures. It seeks to explicate the meanings that lie behind social actions. But this method tends to be subjective and thus, like the empirical-analytic method, is one-sided. The empirical-analytic method is one-sided because it neglects the interpretive aspect of the normative-analytic method (meaning, value), and the normative-analytic method is one-sided because it neglects the explanatory aspect of the empirical-analytic method (social reality, facts).

In *On the Logic of the Social Sciences*, Habermas wants to bring the relevant useful aspects of both methods together to create a median (intersubjective) method. This method, he claims, can preserve the systematic, scientific intent of social science without positivism's avoidance of the full explication of intersubjective meanings. Intersubjective meanings are not subjectively derived (in or by an autonomous individual) or objectively derived (*a priori*), but are meanings that can only be derived and understood in reference to a particular context of communicative experience. These are, thus, *social* meanings. They can only occur and be understood in relation to the interaction between two or more

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[3]Obviously, Habermas is describing the deductive-nomological method of positivist social science.

people.

Political *scientists* utilize the empirical-analytic method that Habermas describes. For example, behavioralists, intent on guaranteeing the "objective" and scientific status of the discipline, emphasize the rigorous use of facts (which are "value-free") to explain political phenomena. Since the behavioral era, the discipline has opened up to myriad other approaches that rigorously seek to explain the political phenomena they deem important. For behavioralists, the behavior of individual political actors is the important political phenomenon; for the political systems approach, action by the system or by its parts is important; and for pluralism, the activity of groups is important. These approaches, and others like them, represent the empirical-analytic or deductive-nomological method of studying politics. Each approach seeks to explain political phenomena with lawlike precision. The normative-analytic method of studying politics is interested primarily in interpreting political phenomena rather than explaining them. It emphasizes the explication of the meanings of political actions, norms and traditions. Normative analysts seek to question and/or explicate the values that lie behind political phenomena and thus operate according to the presuppositions of hermeneutic consciousness.[4]

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[4]This formulation, by the way, omits a third group--traditional political theorists. It is painfully obvious that Plato's *Republic*, Aristotle's *Politics*, Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, Marx's *Capital* and Connolly's *Identity\Difference*, to name only a few, do not recognize the finite status of their inquiries as Gadamer's hermeneutics (i.e., the normative-analytic approach) requires. Thus, we can lump traditional political theorists with positivists in the sense that they all seek some final (or utopian) answer to our political problems. The

At least two problems follow from the diametrical opposition of the empirical-analytic method and the normative-analytic method within the discipline of political science. First, due to the different presuppositions of the two groups, normative analysts frequently cannot understand the importance of empirical-analytic research, and empirical analysts frequently cannot understand the importance of normative-analytic research. As such, discussions seldom arise between the two methods and the rift between scientist and theorist remains. Second, the scholars within each method often do not realize that they share similar interests with their colleagues. In other words, empirical analysts (for example) seek "objective" scientific laws for political phenomena. But since each subfield within the empirical-analytic approach seeks to explain different aspects of political phenomena *and* since each subfield thinks it utilizes a distinct methodology (when, in fact, they all use the empirical-analytic method), discourses seldom open up between the different fields using the same method. Habermas' argument in *On the Logic of the Social Sciences* offers a potential solution to the problem of non-communication among political scientists. Briefly, the implementation of this solution would involve explicit identification of the empirical-analytic and the normative-analytic methods in the discipline, as well as an understanding that a middle ground can be cultivated between the two methods.

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problem with this categorization, though, is that traditional political theorists follow none of the other positivist dictates. Still, the hermeneuticist might hope that traditional political theorists will begin to keep the finite status of their inquiries in mind.

Weber's Influence

Habermas' position on methodology owes a debt to Weber's sense of methodology in the social sciences (Weber 1946). Habermas claims that Weber understood the social sciences as "cultural sciences with a systematic intent" (Habermas 1988: 10). That is, "the social sciences have the task of bringing the heterogenous methods, aims, and presuppositions of the natural and cultural sciences into balance" (10). Weber, then, advocated the *combination* of explanation and understanding. The social sciences utilize general theories "to derive assumptions about empirical regularities in the form of hypotheses that serve the purpose of explanation" (11). This is the empirical-analytic method. Additionally, "regularities of social action have the property of being understandable" (11). Social action is conscious or rational action (in the sense that social action is carried out by people who are rational, or have reason as a distinctly human capacity) and can thus be grasped by explicating its meaning. Or in other words, "social facts can be understood in terms of motivations" (11). Social scientists can grasp social facts by determining what it is that motivated an actor or group of actors to carry out a given action. By contrast, natural scientists cannot utilize this method because they do not deal with rational actors. Such attempts to understand the meaning of social action are carried out in the normative-analytic method.

Unfortunately, according to Habermas, although Weber understood the need for explanation *and* understanding, he was unable to combine and balance them

methodologically. Weber fails in this respect because his methodological statements involve two opposing intentions. First, he relegates the "hermeneutic intention of understanding meaning" (the normative-analytic method) to a methodologically subordinate position by emphasizing "the empirical-analytic task of using proven lawlike hypotheses to explain social action and make conditional predictions" (13, 12). On this view, social science yields "technical recommendations for the rational choice" of social actions (12). In other words, social science conceives a causal knowledge that can be put into use to guide social actors toward certain actions that yield predictable outcomes. As such, "a social-scientific knowledge guided by this interest would have to develop and apply its instruments with the sole purpose of discovering reliable general rules of social behavior" (13). Consequently, the normative-analytic task of understanding meaning takes on a subordinate role.

Second, Weber also relegates the empirical-analytic method to a subordinate role by arguing that social-scientific knowledge should terminate "in the explication of a meaning that has practical significance for life, thus in 'making something understandable'" (13). In this way, the interpretive understanding of meaning (the normative-analytic method) plays a primary role, while the empirical-analytic method is relegated to a subordinate methodological status. This, of course, opposes Weber's first intention that social science yield technical recommendations for social behavior. Weber never expressly links his conflicting intentions (13). Still, Habermas sees much of value

in Weber's methodological musings. In fact, as I have already intimated, Habermas hopes to make the link between explanation and understanding in his own methodology. To do this, he proceeds to review, critique, and filter the relevant methodologies of phenomenology, language theory, hermeneutics, and psychoanalysis.

Phenomenology

Edmund Husserl was perhaps the most influential of the phenomenologists. Husserl claimed that all consciousness is consciousness of something and is therefore intentional, rather than reflective. Because of this, it is difficult to be conscious of being conscious because we are always conscious of something else outside of consciousness. Husserl argued that in order to self-reflect (or become aware of being conscious), we must bracket out intentionality (in some unspecified way) in order to be able to specify various structures of consciousness (Husserl 1967; 1931; 1970). Authors such as Alfred Schutz (1967) and Harold Garfinkel (1952) expanded Husserl's "pure theory of consciousness" to try to embrace intersubjective structures of consciousness based on shared meanings. In other words, with our actions in the world (where we encounter others) we arrive at shared meanings (through communication and thus intersubjectively) that in turn structure, and thus help us understand the structures of, consciousness. The intersubjective notion of consciousness understands social reality as "the totality of events that take place on the level of intersubjectivity" (Habermas 1988: 108). In other words, social facts cannot be considered objective as empirical analysts typically

conceive of them, and they cannot be considered subjective as normative analysts typically conceive of them (108-109). The phenomenological approach falls between the normative-analytic and the empirical-analytic approaches to social science with its notion of intersubjective social reality (what Habermas calls the "lifeworld") (116). As such, phenomenology provides the base for Habermas' "bridging" methodology of explanation and understanding.

Phenomenology is not, however, by itself an adequate approach to social science because it neglects language (116). Intersubjective social reality is mediated by (or takes place through) language. The shared meanings of the lifeworld must be arrived at through language because they are, by definition, arrived at socially, and thus through communication. Habermas finds phenomenology to be useful because it conceives of the lifeworld, or intersubjective social reality, and in so doing falls between empirical analysis and normative analysis; yet it is also inadequate insofar as it neglects the role of language. Habermas, then, wants to add linguistic analysis to the phenomenological approach and to do so he draws on Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory of language (1963) and Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics (1975).

Language and Hermeneutics

The foundation of Wittgenstein's theory of language theory lies in "language games." In Wittgenstein's words, "I shall call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the 'language-game'" (Wittgenstein 1963: 7). This

complex of language and practice can be understood in two ways. First, language and practice merge in the sense that one person calls out words while another acts accordingly; i.e., "the children are brought up to perform *these* actions, to use *these* words as they do so, and to react in *this* way to the words of others" (Habermas 1988: 130). The language game, then, conjures up behavioral expectations (actions and reactions) that result from the use of language. Second, language and practice merge in the form of understanding. To understand a language we must have some command of it. This implies skill in the sense of being able to do or having a command of something that one has practiced and learned (131). Thus, "understanding a language and being able to speak indicate that one has gained skills, has learned how to perform certain activities" (131). This, too, represents the language game where language and practice merge. The language game, then, reflects language in use and is thus concerned with understanding meaning because "to understand means to have learned to be skilled at something in [the] practical terms" mentioned above (131). Wittgenstein's theory of language is important for Habermas because social action involves language and arriving at an understanding of social action involves language. However, to understand how one arrives at an understanding of social action, according to Habermas, a recognition of Gadamer's hermeneutics becomes important.

From Gadamer's hermeneutic perspective, as Chapter Two demonstrates, social actions and attempts to understand social actions are historical processes. Social actions

are historical in the sense that something motivated (in the past) the actor to act in certain ways. As such, to look only at the act itself without considering possible motivations for the act is to misunderstand the act at some fundamental level (Gadamer 1975: 357-363). Attempts to understand social actions are historical in the sense that those who seek to understand social actions (social theorists, for example) work from the context of their own life histories. The social theorist carries with her certain specialties, understandings, beliefs, opinions, values, etc. as she attempts to interpret or understand social actions.

Habermas is primarily interested in Gadamer's account that coming to understand social actions is historical. Specifically, Habermas comments on the type of knowledge that hermeneutic understanding generates. According to Habermas, hermeneutic understanding generates "practical knowledge" (Habermas 1988: 163). Practical knowledge is juxtaposed to technical knowledge. The empirical-analytic method generates technical knowledge while the normative-analytic method (through hermeneutics or interpretation) generates practical knowledge. Practical knowledge has three aspects. First, it is reflexive. In other words, practical knowledge is also self-knowledge. As such, "we experience errors in areas of practical knowledge personally, on our own person" (163). Thus, false opinions are manifested as false consciousness (163). Second, it follows from the first aspect that "practical knowledge is internalized. It has the power to determine drives and shape passions" (163). In contrast, technical knowledge is external: "we forget technical rules as soon as we are out of practice" (163).

When we master practical rules, on the other hand, they become part of our personality structure. Practical knowledge, then, is linked to a process of socialization. Finally, "practical knowledge is global" (163). It orients one to the rules of interaction (164). Practical knowledge cannot be realized independently of a social life form that is developed communicatively, hence the need for an understanding of language games. When one seeks to understand social action, one enters into a discourse with one's own life history and with the social actor's life history. In the hermeneutic process, then, the social theorist reflects on her or his own past which takes place in a certain cultural context (and its past) to understand a social action through reflecting on the actor's past (motivations) which also takes place in a cultural context (and its past) (171). In this way, according to Habermas, Gadamer's hermeneutics brings us from the past to understand the present.[5]

Deep Hermeneutics

A shortcoming of the hermeneutic approach, though, is that it cannot bring us

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[5]For an example of how this process might work, see Allen Whiting's *China Crosses the Yalu*. There, Whiting attempted to understand the Chinese intervention into the Korean War by reading Chinese news reports. Chinese news reports, however, were notoriously misleading. Thus, Whiting could not have come to a reliable understanding of the Chinese intervention if he had interpreted the news reports solely on the basis of the texts of the reports. Whiting was able to assess the use of certain key terms and phrases meant to mislead. Because his life history contained this capacity, he was able to come to the understanding that China intervened in the Korean War because it feared that the United States would continue into China if successful in Korea. And he was able to come to this conclusion even though the news reports by no means clearly expressed such a view. It is in this sense, at least in part, that attempting to understand social actions involves a historical process.

from the present to understand (or predict) what might happen in the future (170). A further problem with hermeneutics involves its treatment of the concept of motivation. The hermeneutic approach "explains social action in terms of motives that are identical with the actor's own interpretations of" her or his motives (177). However, if the actor has misinterpreted her or his own motives, then the social theorist will also misinterpret the actor's motives and thus will misunderstand the social action in question. Habermas notes this problem of reliance on the subjective understanding of meaning (the hermeneutical circle) in the hermeneutic approach as well as its inability to deal adequately with the future, and offers Freudian psychoanalysis as a solution. So while others have used empirical "science" to attempt to break out of the hermeneutical circle, Habermas chooses Freud for this task.

According to Habermas, Freud's recognition of the unconscious rectifies the hermeneutic reliance on subjective meaning in determining motivation. In recognizing the unconscious, Freud's psychoanalytic approach understands that an actor's conscious rendering of motivations for action may be incorrect. Certain motivations for action, manifested by dreams, hysterical symptoms, compulsive behavior, etc. may not be apparent in the consciousness of the actor. In other words, certain motivations for action "are excluded from consciousness through repression" (180). In psychoanalysis the patient needs the doctor to help bring unconscious motives to consciousness. As such, "when the interpretations, which at first exist only for the doctor, are acknowledged as

correct by the patient as well, the unconscious motive can be dissolved" (180). Habermas conceives of this process as the "social transformation of meaning." The psychoanalyst communicates with the patient in order to arrive at the underlying motives for a given action and thus to transform the meaning of that action based on the new understanding of the patient's motives. This is a social or communicative process where the psychoanalyst's interpretations of unconscious motivations are not considered to be correct unless they can ultimately be acknowledged by the patient as correct. In the psychoanalytic setting, then, constitution of meaning involves a transformative process where meaning is transformed from subjective meaning to intersubjective meaning based upon the communication of psychoanalyst and patient.

Habermas sees this therapeutic process as a good model for a critical social theory that can provide us with a better version of truth. This truth would be intersubjective and, as such, would recognize the social or communicative nature of social knowledge. Additionally, this therapeutic critical social theory would not aim at the "technologically exploitable" knowledge that Habermas claims the empirical-analytic approach does, nor would it aim at the subjective understanding that he claims the normative-analytic approach does. Rather, it would seek communicative interaction between the social theorist and the social actor that would aim at reflection about social action and its conscious and unconscious motivations in order to construct a transformative, intersubjective rendering of knowledge. In assessing the underlying motives of social

action, this therapeutic process uncovers a false consciousness in the social actor. This process is critical since it seeks to highlight false consciousness and to emphasize a more complete communicative rationality to replace one-sided technical rationality. Habermas is attempting to construct a *deep* hermeneutics, deep in the sense that it seeks to uncover false consciousness and to do away with it.

Habermas links his Freudian deep hermeneutics to Marx's historical materialism in order to explain his method further (1971). Here Habermas argues that positivistic hegemony in the social sciences has resulted in a narrowed understanding of reason or rationality. According to Habermas, positivism claims that hypothetical-deductive knowledge is the only genuine form of knowledge, that this knowledge is value-free, and that values and norms fall outside the bounds of rational discourse (White 1988: 26). These notions necessarily limit the scope of knowledge, reason, and the moral-practical dimensions of social science because they deny any normative commitment on the part of the scientist. Habermas wants to say that the limitation of these concepts seriously impinges on the ability of the social sciences to develop any social theory that explains social action. This is the case because social scientists are *not* released from normative bonds when they attempt to explain social action. Rather, their inquiry is guided by certain "knowledge-constitutive interests" which are universal.

One of these interests is the "technical interest" in dominating nature so that the species can be materially reproduced. The second interest is the "practical interest" in

guaranteeing a level of intersubjectivity through communication in order to ensure the socio-cultural reproduction of the species. And the third interest is the "emancipatory interest" in providing more enabling socio-cultural structures that avoid the domination and the exploitation of humans by humans. The inability of positivism to conceive of these universal interests means that it misconstrues knowledge and reason. The hegemony of positivism in the social sciences, then, means that the understanding of reason and knowledge accepted by social science is necessarily limited. In misunderstanding these matters as it does, positivist social science is unable to criticize social and political life and to offer a guide to socio-political change because this falls outside the scope of rational discussion. Habermas, then, highlights the need for a new method in social science and offers Freudian psychoanalysis as its model.

According to Habermas, Marx's historical materialism is reductionist. Specifically, it reduces "the self-generative act of the human species to labor" (1971: 42). In other words, Marx lumps interaction and work together. He restricts the methodological presuppositions of social theory to "the categorial framework of production" (62). This reduces reflection to the level of instrumental action in that it involves means-ends reasoning where humans simply seek to further their own self-interests (44). The reduction to the level of instrumental action neglects the relation of instrumental action to communicative action. Thus, Marx's materialist bias conceals "the difference between rigorous empirical science and critique" in the same way that

positivism does by neglecting the "practical interests" that communicative action addresses (62). As a result, Marx was unable to see that power and ideology are actually distorted communication (282). He "made the assumption that [humans] distinguished themselves from animals when they began to produce their means of subsistence" (282).[6] Because Marx was interested in the physical organization of the species, he focused on labor. In other words, Marx emphasized productive knowledge (and instrumental action) at the expense of reflective knowledge (and communicative action). Freud is important in this respect because he adds reflective knowledge to Marx's productive knowledge and thereby aids in developing a more accurate critique of power and ideology.

Ultimately, hermeneutics fuses empiricism and interpretation in the sense that it "has the status of a hypothesis" and requires corroboration and also that it is rooted in ordinary language and thus in the need for understanding (173). In addition, hermeneutics is connected to knowledge-constitutive interests "insofar as the survival of societal individuals is linked to the existence of a reliable intersubjectivity of mutual understanding" (173). However, Habermas does not believe that the hermeneutic form of reflective knowledge is complete because it misconstrues motivations and therefore is not connected with the third knowledge-constitutive interest--emancipation. Freudian psychoanalysis, though, does make this connection.

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[6]Of course it is probably not fair of Habermas to label this an "assumption" of Marx's. Marx *argues* extensively, after all, in support of this position in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and *The German Ideology*. See Tucker 1972: 72-76, 155-159.

Habermas uses Freud to deepen hermeneutics by unifying "linguistic analysis with psychological causal connections" (217). Incomplete or distorted meanings do not result from faulty transmission. Rather, "the meaning of a biographical connection...[becomes] inaccessible to the subject itself," which creates internal disturbances (217). These internal disturbances then interrupt the texts of ordinary language games with incomprehensible symbols. And "these symbols cannot be understood because they do not obey the grammatical rules of ordinary language, norms of action, and culturally learned patterns of expression" (226). But deep hermeneutics does not aim at understanding symbolic structures. Rather, it aims at self-reflection (228).

Given the discussion in *On the Logic of the Social Sciences*, this argument is not new. What *is* new for Habermas is his juxtaposition of Freud's deep hermeneutics to Marxian historical materialism. Freud assumed that humans "distinguished themselves from animals when they succeeded in inventing an agency of socialization for their biologically endangered offspring subject to extended childhood dependency" (282). Whereas Marx emphasized the "tool-making animal," Freud emphasized "the drive-inhibited and at the same time fantasizing animal" (282-283). This means that humanity's basic problem is "not the organization of labor but the evolution of institutions that permanently solve the conflict between surplus impulses and the constraint of reality" (283).

Freud is thus interested in both instrumental action (in terms of ego functions) and communicative action (in terms of the origin of motivational foundation). The fact that, on this view, institutions emerge from structures of distorted communication means that self-reflection can be directed against power and ideology in an emancipatory way (283). For if through self-reflection we can see that power and ideology result from distorted communication, then we can understand that obedience to civilization is distorted, or affective. Thus, Habermas claims, we can also replace affective obedience with rational obedience if social relations are organized "according to the principle that the validity of every norm of political consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in communication free from domination" (284).[7]

Communicative Action

In his recent work, Habermas shifts his ground. In particular, he ceases his attempt to prove the usefulness of critical theory from an epistemological and methodological standpoint and begins to put it into practice. He turns, in other words, away from the theory of knowledge and toward the theory of communication (Habermas 1988: xiv). His *The Theory of Communicative Action* highlights this turn particularly well. Here he attempts to explain how distorted communication practices actually lead to the control and domination that characterize modern life.

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[7]Of course, it is difficult to conceive of the existence of "communication free from domination" since communication cannot be value-neutral given the existence of language games. This brings us into contact with the notion of discourse, which is necessarily imbued with power. More in Chapter Four.

In *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas contends that early critical theory (that of Lukács, Horkheimer and Adorno, for example) was steeped in Max Weber's critique of capitalist rationalization (1984: 141). He argues that, like Marx before him and Horkheimer and Adorno after him, Weber's notion of societal rationalization is "guided by the restricted idea of purposive rationality" (143-144). Weber feared that bureaucratization would lead to the reification of social relationships in terms of instrumental rationality. As such, "the rationality of mastering nature merges with the irrationality of class domination" (144).

Horkheimer and Adorno, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, carry on with this Weberian perspective on Marx and argue that science and technology, emancipatory processes for Marx, become the medium for social repression. Thus, a rationalized society leads to inescapable domination. Capitalist modernization, in other words, constructs an "iron cage" of domination. Horkheimer and Adorno lament this development and yet can see no way out of it. Habermas disagrees with this assessment because he claims that it is grounded in the "philosophy of consciousness." In the philosophy of consciousness emanating from Kant, Hegel and Marx, a subject is conceived "that represents objects and toils with them" (390). This objectivating thought combines with purposive-rational action "to reproduce a 'life' that is characterized by the knowing and acting subject's devotion to a blind, self-directed, intransitive self-preservation as his only 'end'" (388).

The problem with such technological rationality is that it assumes that only an objective and a subjective world can exist (392). It is no wonder, then, that Horkheimer and Adorno could provide such an excellent critique of capitalist modernization and then see no way to improve it, for in neglecting the possibility of an intersubjective world they deny the emancipatory role of communicative rationality (390). With communicative rationality, the symbolic reproduction of society is possible. Communicative action is the medium for reproducing the lifeworld. That is, communication free from domination and oriented toward understanding leads to intersubjectively recognized validity claims (14). It follows from this that with communicative action validity can be transferred "across social space and time" (White 1988: 99). And this means that social actors who are sensitive to communicative rationality have the power to alter their lifeworlds in response to system level repression. Thus, Habermas argues that critical theory must shift paradigms, from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of linguistics, which is precisely what he does in Volume Two of *The Theory of Communicative Action.*

In Volume Two, Habermas criticizes "functionalist reason." Lukács argued, in *History and Class Consciousness*, that the production of exchange value and the commodification of labor power typical of capitalism leads to the coordination of interactions through the medium of exchange value rather than through the medium of values and norms. As such, the "wage laborer becomes dependent on the market for his entire existence," which destroys "the ethical order of communicatively established

intersubjectivity by turning social relations into purely instrumental relations" (Habermas 1984: 358). Such systemically induced deformation of the lifeworld is an example of functionalist reason (White 1988: 104). Functionalist reason, in other words, involves an interaction between system and lifeworld where the system has a detrimental effect on the rationalization of the lifeworld. Habermas calls this the "colonization of the lifeworld" (1987: 196). Given the important relationship between system and lifeworld, Habermas wants to urge critical theory to analyze society by joining the system framework with the lifeworld without submerging lifeworld in the system, as Talcott Parsons did. Such a submersion makes it impossible to conceptualize the pathologies of modernization since there is no way to conceive of the lifeworld as having structural characteristics which resist systemic imperatives (White 1988: 106).

With this in mind, Habermas argues that the colonization of the lifeworld generates the pathologies of advanced capitalism by displacing communicative action and replacing it with the systemic media of money and power. This forces people to act in a strategically rational rather than a communicatively rational fashion, thus undermining the rationalization of the lifeworld. People learn to submit to power and ideology believing all the while that they act without constraint. This is precisely what Habermas' notion of critical theory hopes to help people overcome, and critical theorists can only do so through helping people understand and agree to the fact that they are being controlled and dominated. In so doing, critical theory pushes social science to step outside of its

role as dominator and emerge as emancipator.

Critical Social Science

With his notion of "critical social *science,*" Brian Fay wants to dissociate himself from the critical *theory* of the Frankfurt School. He does so not because he disagrees with the tenets of the critical theory emanating from the Frankfurt School. He is, in fact, largely sympathetic with the claims of critical theory and borrows heavily, both terminologically and conceptually, from the Frankfurt School. Fay, though, believes that strict adherence to the tenets of critical theory necessarily limits the range of critical theorizing. He contends that equating his critical social science with critical theory would necessarily omit many projects which, by his definition, should be considered critical *and not* positivistic (1987: 5-6). Also, he wants to point out that his model of critical social *science* is *scientific* in a way that critical theory is not. It is scientific in the sense that it seeks "to account for a wide range of phenomena on the basis of a few theoretical principles, and which do so in a way which is responsive to public, empirical evidence" (37). Critical *theory*, Fay points out, has been aptly criticized as non-scientific since it is "inherently unresponsive to empirical evidence," it "starts with the *a priori* assumption that it has 'the answer' to which it necessarily holds no matter what occurs," "it is inherently subjectivistic because it irreducibly contains a moral element," and the "goal of transforming society is incompatible with the objectivity required to study it with scientific rigor" (5). Putting aside, for the time being, what clearly are troubling and misleading objections to critical theory, let us discuss Fay's conception of critical social

science.

Fay is primarily concerned with the relationship between social theory and political practice. He wants "to develop a critical stance towards these ideas, with the hope of providing a new and more satisfactory account of this relationship" (1975: 11). His argument revolves around the idea that any form of social scientific inquiry necessarily involves a relationship between social theory and political practice. Positivist social science is no exception, but it cannot explicitly recognize this relationship. As such, it allows for an instrumentalist conception of knowledge where ends are assumed and means are tinkered with in order to discover the most efficient way to approach the ends. This instrumentalism, in turn, allows social scientific knowledge to dominate and control social actors. In opposition to this approach, Fay proposes a critical social science which openly admits to, and in fact seeks, a relationship between social theory and a political practice that is critical, practical, and emancipatory.

Positivist social science is modeled after the natural sciences and thus contains the idea that "the knowledge gained from social science will enable [humans] to control their social environment, thereby making it more harmonious and congruent with the needs and wants of its members" (19). This presupposes the notion that modern industrial society requires scientific control, since its dynamic, divisive, impersonal and unstable nature renders it ungovernable by traditional political methods. The result of this is that

> politics comes to be thought of as an activity primarily directed toward supporting the smooth development of the production processes among

> various sectors, eliminating dysfunctions which appear in the system as a whole, and enlisting mass support for the system by ensuring a minimum of goods and services for large numbers of the population. In other words, politics comes to be thought of as synonymous with the administration of the industrial system; it becomes itself a form of technical activity, in which political questions are interpreted as essentially technical questions which demand instrumentalist decisions (46).

Such an instrumentalist notion of politics, Fay argues, supports the emergence of the "policy scientist." In policy science it is understood that "the ends of politics are more or less universally accepted and more or less determined by the nature of industrial society anyway, and that it is therefore the means to these accepted ends which are the prime source of disagreement and disruption in technological society" (24). But this clearly presupposes a relationship between theory and practice. Indeed, the existence of such a relationship is intuitively obvious. What is the purpose, after all, of social theory? Do social scientists simply seek to inform themselves and a few others of how the social and political world functions? Do they seek knowledge for its own sake? Perhaps some do, but this is an unsuitable basis for support and legitimacy. Just as natural scientists seek to alter the conditions of the natural world for human interests, so must social scientists seek to alter the conditions of the social world for human interests. However, in the case of positivist social science this amounts to social engineering, since there can be no discussion of ends. In this way, politics becomes sublimated (27).

Because scientific explanations entail prediction and thereby "enable one to manipulate certain variables in order to bring about a state of affairs or prevent its

occurrence," the possibility of technical control is part of the structure of scientific activity (37, 39). Indeed, the development of science took place in the context of the growing rationalization of modern life *because* science is linked to the promise of technical control (44). But the decision to turn one's political problems over to a policy scientist entails closing off "a type of political life which is rooted in a different conception of human needs and purposes, so that to accept the idea of a policy science is to accept a certain set of values and to reject others" (55). The ends, after all, are assumed, which means that the policy scientist necessarily directs her consideration of means to an accepted set of values. She cannot actually discuss these values, though, since positivist social science cannot approach questions of value. But she clearly presupposes them which is tantamount to acceptance of these values, even if only implicitly.

Policy science, then, entails the view that only a scientific approach to political life can guarantee a rational solution to political problems and that only instrumental questions are solvable by science. Questions not subject to technical analysis are therefore irrational and cannot be discussed (61). It follows from this that issues of value (or ends) cannot be suitably addressed by science. They are, after all, merely subjective. This situation severely limits the options of social actors. They must defer to policy scientists if they hope to act on the legitimate bases of reason and knowledge (61). And this "discredits a fundamental questioning of the basic arrangements of society as

irrational" and forces social actors "to accept a situation which they need not accept" (64). Policy science, then, clearly is *not* politically neutral, as its proponents claim it to be. Instead, it is "one of the deep, important, and enduring ideologies of our own time, one which is all the stronger in that it claims to be 'objective' and 'scientific'" (64).

Now, because values and conceptual schemes inform the actual practice of social science and the articulation of values and conceptual schemes has always been regarded as a philosophical activity, philosophy must play a crucial role in social and political analysis (78). Social science, then, must be interpretive.

> An interpretive social science is one which attempts to uncover the sense of a given action, practice or constitutive meaning; it does this by discovering the intentions and desires of particular actors, by uncovering the set of rules which give point to these sets of rules or practices, and by elucidating the basic conceptual scheme which orders experience in ways that the practices, actions, and experiences which the social scientist observes are made intelligible, by seeing how they fit into a whole structure which defines the nature and purpose of human life. In each of these types of explanation, the social scientist is redescribing an act or experience by setting it into progressively larger contexts of purpose and intelligibility (79).

In so doing, the social scientist "reveals *what* the agents are doing by seeing what they are up to and how and why they would be up to that" (79). This leads the social scientist to focus upon notions of self-understanding. And this social science, "which is explicitly founded on an awareness of the ways in which certain conditions can cause certain beliefs, will also be aware that ideas and self-understandings may be illusions which are necessary in order to sustain a particular form of living" (99). The idea here is that

critical social science must counteract the effects of industrial society on the self. In other words, we need to understand that industrial, technical society and science place us in a subjugated position, not allowing us to question the tenets of that society and science. To a certain extent, then, we function under false consciousness. Critical social science seeks to counteract that consciousness and replace it with a truer one (101). And this means that social actors themselves must be actively involved in this process. The theories of critical social science, in other words, "can only be validated in the self-understandings of the actors themselves" (102). A critical social science, then, "is one which discloses to the actors it studies how an aspect of their social life, which they did not know was a determining element of their social experience, had been an element of that life all along, and it thereby provides the means by which these actors can become clear to themselves" (104). The self-understandings of social actors, though, must concur with the theories proposed by the critical social scientist.

In this way, critical social science is more democratic than positivist social science. The hierarchy existing in the relationship between positivist social scientist and the objects of her study disappears in Fay's account of critical social science. Critical social science "requires that there be a free flow of natural and uncoerced expressions from the actors to the experts and vice versa, and this kind of discourse can only occur when the population is free from domination or threat" (107). A critical social science, then, involves education and enlightenment, but also empowerment and emancipation.

Social actors need to recognize that they have been misunderstanding their selves and their social situations; in so doing they become empowered to change the conditions of their existence for the better. A critical theory, in other words, "arises out of the problems of everyday life, and is constructed with an eye towards solving them" (109).

Fay's argument in *Social Theory and Political Practice* (1975) at times seems to be internally contradictory. He calls for the development of a critical social science, yet at the same time he appears to be extremely critical of the whole notion of a science of society. After all, scientific explanations entail prediction and thereby provide the promise of technical control. And technical control involves domination and manipulation of the objects of study. Since Fay abhors this state of affairs, he is critical of a science of society. As such, he seems to want to move away from science. Yet he seeks, nevertheless, to found a critical social *science*. This apparent contradiction never becomes manifest, though, because Fay does not make the effort to devise an outline for such a science. Instead he simply argues that any inquiry into the problems of society and politics must recognize a relationship between theory and practice, and he wants this relationship to be utilized toward empowering and emancipating social actors in light of existing manipulative political practices.

In his later work, Fay scales back his critique of science considerably. A dozen years later, in *Critical Social Science*, Fay self-consciously calls for the development of a critical social *science* and he provides a basic scheme for that science. This science

would provide four theories designed to explain particular aspects of social situations. The first

> explains the causes of the self-(mis)understandings of a group of people [a theory of false consciousness]; the second explains the causes and nature of the crisis in which a social system is caught [a theory of crisis]; the third explains the conditions sufficient for the sort of enlightenment envisioned by the theory [a theory of education]; and the fourth explains the conditions which must be altered if the social crisis is to be resolved in the requisite manner [a theory of transformative action] (1987: 37).

These theories are interrelated and are subject to public, empirical evidence. They generate predictions which are testable, and though none of them are straightforwardly observable in the way physical objects are, "explanations and descriptions of [them] are not thereby uncontrollable because they all relate ultimately to the observation of behavior" (38). This evidence will surely *not* be free from the theoretical commitments of the scientist, but neither is the evidence presented in a positivist science. And since "the whole point of a critical theory is to offer an assessment of a way of life which shows how it is inadequate because [it is] frustrating and unsatisfying to those who suffer it," theory and practice are merged, means and ends come into contact, and empirical and normative social theorists become able to work *together*, all under the rubric of science (38). In addition, critical social scientists work in concert with social actors rather than on their behalf. Such a cooperative effort breaks down the hierarchy inherent in positivist social science and allows for a critical and emancipatory politics.

Fay's science has severe limitations. Critical social science relies on an ontology

of activity. It assumes that humans are essentially active beings who possess four fundamental dispositions of *intelligence, curiosity, reflectiveness,* and *willfulness*. They have the ability to alter their beliefs and behaviors, the disposition to seek out information about their environment, the aptitude to replace their "own desires and beliefs on the basis of...whether they are justified by the evidence, whether they are mutually consistent...or whether they provide the greatest possible satisfaction, all in aid of answering the questions: what is the proper end of my life and thus what sort of person ought I to be," and the willfulness to act on the basis of their own reflections (48-50). The problem is that critical social science has been unable to engender rational social change (212). And this ineffectiveness probably ensues because our rationality is limited.[8] We appear to be unable to arrive at complete understandings of our selves. Our self-understandings always are indeterminate and thus our attempts to free ourselves from our own illusions and the illusions of society must be limited (206-207). Moreover, the fact that we are embodied beings exposes us to physical force and this, too, limits any attempts at liberation. And since our autonomy falls into question as a result of our limited reason and embodiment, our ability to act on our own behalf becomes threatened.

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[8]It must be said, though, that even if our limited rationality can be overcome, we still must contend with the problem of limited motivation. Limited rationality, in other words, does not speak to those who do not *want* to change, or do not want to question the possibility that they are being dominated. When we stop to consider the enormously successful ad campaign "Why ask why?" we see a cultural symptom of this lack of motivation. The critical social science approach suffers from the assumption that most people actually care when there is not clear evidence that they do.

As such, it appears that critical social science cannot help but fail to reach its stated aim of providing "a much-needed impetus for the social and political changes which will have to take place if human life is to continue" (ix). Fay recognizes this, and though he calls for the expansion of the basic scheme of critical social scientific theories to include theories of the body, of tradition, of force, and of reflexivity, his discussion serves only to demonstrate that critical social science must be aware of its limits. In so doing, he actually points to the potential failure of critical social science to liberate humans from domination and control.

Habermas, Fay and Critical Political Science

Habermas and Fay both want to unify theory and practice in a critical and a practical way. They hope that critical theorizing will subvert conformity and quietude, thereby opening up possibilities for critique and allowing for the generation of human deeds that are arrived at by human decisions rather than by some abstract mechanism such as the "state" (Wellmer 1971: 14). The unification of theory and practice as *praxis* is a worthwhile goal since it would motivate political scholars to admit that their theoretical stances have practical importance for the lives of humans. Positivist political science preaches neutrality toward political practice. However, on Fay's view, political scientific theories imply and have an impact on political practice nevertheless. And this impact is necessarily technical. A presidential candidate seeking the nomination of her or his party consults opinion polls, notes which variables are likely to affect the primary vote, and organizes her or his campaign accordingly. In this way, a successful campaign can be run, but at what cost? According to the arguments of Fay and Habermas, the cost includes the sublimation of politics, the manipulation of social actors, and the breakdown of free and open communication and critique. And the blame for this falls, at least in part, on a positivist political science.

A critical political science, while certainly *not* eschewing empirical research, must incorporate a hermeneutic element. After all, we are studying human beings and their idiosyncracies, not inanimate objects and their conformity to physical laws, for example.

This science, then, must somehow be intent on attaining *understanding* rather than mere explanation, just as Weber demanded (but failed to support) roughly a century ago. Political *scientists* seek to explain politics in terms of a loose conception of causation. They attempt to illustrate what it is that caused someone to vote in a particular way, for example, so that they may predict how similar sorts of people might vote in the future. This sort of explanation fails to assess the *meaning* of the vote for a given person or, indeed, for the society or culture itself. A vote cannot be seen merely as a "brute fact." It must also be seen in light of its socio-cultural meaning. Otherwise the scientist runs the risk of imposing her or his own theoretical assumptions onto the fact and failing to appreciate the diverse self-definitions which people hold and the diversity of actions in which people are engaged (Schwartz 1984: 1138-1139). Thus, political scientists must recognize the need for normative political theory. We must assess socio-cultural, intersubjective meanings in political inquiry, and normative theorizing helps us to do that.

Normative theorizing necessarily entails some appreciation of perspective and culture in the formulation of normative consensus. This appreciation, as Fay notes, places boundaries on the knowledge science can generate. With a critical political science we would have to recognize that knowledge has limits, limits placed upon it by language, culture and perspective. A science of politics which is hermeneutically aware needs to incorporate this sort of epistemology. Critical political science will also be oriented toward the good. Namely, it will aim at positively affecting the quality of

human life. Or, in other words, it will seek at every turn to contribute to the wants, needs and purposes of continued life on the planet. It will be a human science about *and for the benefit of* human life. As it stands now, the science of politics finds it to be extraordinarily difficult to comment on the normative issue of what is good for continued human life. Scientists of politics are comfortable only with a narrow sort of explanation aimed at establishing some truth about politics. Any normative implications for political life are left for political philosophers to address. A science of politics sensitive to its normative implications, then, must also address the implications of its knowledge for good living. For instance, one might ask, "How has politics contributed to the basic needs, wants and purposes of humans?" and then go on to address ways in which that might be done (Taylor 1973). Going along with this will be a re-orientation of the notion of progress. The progress of science under positivism aims at the systematic discovery of Truth. Progress, in other words, is measured by the systematic narrowing of the gap between the knowledge generated by science and Truth. Progress in a critical political science will be measured, as John Dryzek notes, by its increasing contribution to the quality of all human life (Dryzek 1990: 190-213).

In addition to the rather abstract points discussed above, Habermas offers some more specific aid to the discipline of political science. First, he treats the two opposing methods of analysis (empirical and normative) quite fairly. That is, he is willing to see the benefits to the two approaches even as he criticizes them. For example, he thinks that

social science must deal with empirical social facts (such as social actions) as well as the social meaning of those facts. Habermas wants to construct a method between the two opposing methods that does not undermine the main goals of either approach. Political scientists can learn from this fairness. Too often, it seems, positivist political analysts work in opposition to normative political analysts. This clearly can be seen at the departmental level where the rift between positivists and normativists (or scientists and theorists) is manifest in faculty appointments (where the group in power--usually positivists in political science--hold a disproportionate number of faculty lines), graduate student funding (where empirically oriented students tend to have more funding opportunities), departmental priorities, etc. An understanding of Habermas' approach might at least lead to tolerance and the recognition that each approach has valuable elements. And perhaps a discourse could develop between the two opposing groups that could lead to a unified method. Such a development would benefit the discipline because political scientists would no longer find it necessary to oppose each other and begin to cooperate instead of avoiding potentially fruitful corroboration. At the very least, empirical political scientists might be willing, ultimately, to admit normative political theory to the science of politics. Habermas makes it clear that normative political theory *can* be seen as a legitimate contributor to the scientific study of politics. Political theory clarifies political language and renders concepts more coherent. Also, since a science of politics cannot be value-free, the admission of normative political theory as an equal

contributor to political *science* would help to alleviate the lack of normativity and value assessments that currently predominates in the discipline.

Second, Habermas' discussion of methodology can benefit the discourse on methodology among political scientists. Political scientists tend to adhere to a broad understanding of methodology. As such, discourses on methodology are detached from epistemological concerns. Habermas openly relates his discussion of methodology to epistemology. Indeed, this relation is a main concern of the philosophy of science. The exclusion of this relation between methodology and epistemology contributes to a general scientific naiveté amongst political scientists (both empiricists and normativists) in which many political scientists (and students of political science) have a difficult time expressing what is scientific about the discipline and criticizing the scientific grounds of the discipline. An understanding of Habermas' argument could benefit the discipline of political science by making it more aware of how it constructs knowledge, and by strengthening its methodological critiques.

Habermas and Fay paint an optimistic picture concerning the possibilities for a critical social science and the issues they raise can certainly benefit the discipline of political science. In particular, they open up the possibility that normative political theory might be accepted in the discipline as an equal partner with empirical political theory.[9] This is especially valuable since the normative/empirical rift contributes greatly

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[9]Examples of this sort of approach abound. Fay mentions Ernest Becker's theory of social evil in *The Denial of Death* and *Escape from Evil*, R. D. Laing's theory of

to a deep and profound tension between colleagues, especially at the departmental level.

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schizophrenia and political life in *The Divided Self* and *The Politics of Experience*, Dorothy Dinnerstein's theory of sexual arrangements and human lassitude in *The Mermaid and the Minotaur*, and John Gaventa's account of the debilitating effects of capitalism in Appalachia in his book *Power and Powerlessness*. We might add to this list Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone's discussion of the effects of capital restructuring on the lives of American workers in *The Deindustrialization of America* and *The Great U-Turn*, Theodore Lowi's account of interest group liberalism in *The End of Liberalism*, Pierre Bourdieu's critique of the roots of class differences in *Distinction*, and many others. Still, the existence of such research is hardly sound evidence for the claim that the *scientific identity* of the discipline has shifted to include normative issues.

Conclusion

Nonetheless, both Habermas' and Fay's arguments suffer from some fairly serious shortcomings. Habermas' arguments entail three significant difficulties. First, Habermas deals heavily with abstractions. He steadfastly refuses to demonstrate how his ideas might be put into practice. For example, we can see how Freud's psychoanalytic approach might be a good model for a critical social theory on an individual level, but Habermas' unwillingness to show how exactly he sees the psychoanalytic approach operating in practice makes it unintelligible as an actual social theory. Are we to believe that the psychoanalytic approach can actually be extended to the social level? Is the social theorist expected to carry on a discussion with those whom she studies? Indeed, as Fay intimates, "one of the great weaknesses of Habermas' work is that it gives no idea at all how what it says about individual psychological transformation can be made appropriate for social reform" (Fay 1987: 109). In this respect it is quite unclear how the discipline of political science can institute a Habermasian conception of critical theory. What is it, after all, that will compel social actors to transform their selves much less social and political practice?

Second, Habermas' contention that a critical theory modeled after Freudian psychoanalysis can predict the future undermines its grounding in hermeneutics. What is particularly central to the hermeneutic perspective, and Habermas seems to realize this, is that the future cannot be predicted. Experience has cultural *and* temporal constraints.

We cannot master those things that are out of our control, and the future is clearly among them (Gadamer 1975: 320-321). To claim that one has the power to predict what will happen in the future is to contend that one can somehow know and understand what will happen in the future, which is tantamount to mastering the future. This is clearly impossible from the hermeneutic standpoint yet Habermas wants to say that critical theory, which he certainly orients around hermeneutics, can do so. This probably helps to explain, by the way, why Habermas, like Fay, is unable to elude the "unity of science argument." In arguing that human action is based in three *universal* knowledge-constitutive interests and that critical theory can predict what will happen in the future, Habermas is making an argument that is not all that dissimilar to the argument that positivists make; namely, that there is one acceptable path to knowledge and no other.[10]

Finally, Habermas faces a broad epistemological attack. For Habermas, as for many critics of science, epistemology is caught up in the project of modernity. And in modernity we have witnessed the use of reason for reprehensible purposes. Habermas recognizes that modernity may result in opprobrious occurrences but argues that the worthwhile aspects of modernity can be retained while the problematic aspects can be discarded (1981: 11). However, as Susan Hekman observes, Habermas "cannot simply pick and choose among the elements of modernism, saving those he likes and discarding

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[10]Some indication that the Institute of Social Research hoped to advance such an argument can be found in a short section of the *Zeitschrift* entitled "Notes on Institute Activities" (1941). For an argument favoring the unity of science, see Karl Popper's "Unity of Method in the Natural and Social Sciences" (1965).

those he does not" (Hekman 1990: 7). The argument here is that modern epistemology is a unitary whole rather than a piecemeal collection (Finn 1982: 151). Tossing out the dichotomy between fact and value, and theory and practice, as Habermas seeks to do, necessarily undermines his own position.[11] It is not possible, according to this argument, to undermine these distinctions and retain a modernist epistemology. And this represents a serious blow to the application of Habermas' critical theory to the discipline of political science.

Fay falls victim to the same problem. He wants to have modernity and critique it, too. His view also suffers from the problem of applying self transformation to social reform, though he recognizes it as a problem and takes steps to counteract it. In this, though, he fails. Critical social science conceives of knowledge principally as self-knowledge, a knowledge which must include knowledge of society since the self is unthinkable without society (Fay 1987: 205). A critical social science "seeks to reveal to its audience its true nature in a scientific manner" (205). However, since our knowledge of ourselves is fundamentally historical, we "must be content with only partial glimpses of who we are, and [we] must accept relative opacity as our lot" (207). But if this is the case, then we can never completely know ourselves and thus limits are placed on our knowledge, on empowerment, on liberation, and on critical social science itself. Again,

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[11]Indeed, the fact-value distinction cannot be eschewed by Habermas if he wishes his own critique to have any weight with other scholars, unless they already share his hermeneutic presuppositions, and most do not.

Fay is aware of these limits and claims that critical social scientists must simply recognize them (213-214). But empowerment and emancipation are difficult goals. They require certain institutional settings, receptive social actors who are able and willing to alter the conditions of their existence, and a sound understanding by critical social scientists *and* social actors of the social crisis at issue. And these are all extraordinarily difficult conditions to ensure, especially when the limits on self-knowledge are taken into account (32, 111, 73-74).

Fay also appears to contradict himself in a significant way. One of the ways in which critical social science is distinguished from positivist social science revolves around the notion of hierarchy and domination. Critical social science, Fay argues, seeks to break down structures of hierarchy which are inherent in policy science and to provide the means for social actors to emerge from the oppressive mechanisms of policy science and modern, technological society. Critical social science accomplishes this task, on Fay's account, by having its theories validated in the self-understandings of social actors themselves. Social actors, in other words, must consent to the knowledge generated by critical social science in order for that knowledge to be legitimate. Fay is apparently attempting to prevent social scientists from foisting their own understandings of social actors onto those actors. As such, critical social science purportedly attempts to subvert this possibility by demanding consent from social actors. However, there are reasons for believing that critical social science will be unable to accomplish this goal.

Fay's explanation of the operation of a critical social science raises doubts as to his confidence in critical social science's ability to break down hierarchy. Fay assumes that social actors are ignorant of the social order and about their needs and wants (1975: 107; 1987: 28). But this immediately empowers the critical social scientist. She knows something that the social actor does not, and if the social actor pays attention he may just learn something about his situation and be able to alter it for his benefit. Critical social science seeks to "disclose" to social actors "how an aspect of their social life, which they did not know was a determining element of their social experience, had been an element of that life all along, and it thereby provides the means by which these actors can become clear to themselves" (1975: 104). But how does critical social science *disclose* this? How, in other words, do critical social scientists come to *know* determining elements in the lives of social actors such that they become able to clarify their self-understandings? Fay's approach seems to undercut the critical interchange that is supposedly necessary in a critical social science. If the critical social scientist *knows* something about the social actors selves that the social actors themselves do not know, then how are social actors able to disagree with the assessments of the critical social scientist? Moreover, what prevents the critical social scientist from using her position of power to mislead the public? Why could she not lie in order to manipulate social actors to fall in line with her "knowledge"? The fact is, Fay's conception of critical social science cannot avert such possibilities, and thus it seems as if his science rests on an instrumentalist conception of

knowledge with technical control and domination at its disposal. This means that Fay's conception of social science may not differ very much from positivist social science in terms of the use of manipulative practices and the role of hierarchy in that science. Indeed, Habermas seems to be subject to the same critique. Both he and Fay are unable to elude the unity of science argument. That is, they want to replace one metatheoretical approach to science with another, namely, critical social science. Here, Horkheimer and Adorno's analysis of reason is extremely informative. It would be difficult to sustain the proposition that science since the Enlightenment has been practiced with the overt aim of domination (with some notable and infamous exceptions, of course). "Emancipation" has been the stated aim of science all along, but its practice has lent itself to domination. It is in this way that the emancipatory intentions of Habermas and Fay do not differ from those of their positivist predecessors. Though their method is different, it is still prone to the same potential transformation into a tool of domination.

I conclude, then, on the basis of such considerations, that the benefits of applying critical theory and critical social science to the discipline of political science must be limited. We cannot hope, for example, that a critical political science will liberate political actors from oppression and provide the conditions for human flourishing, as Fay hopes. Indeed, given the view that Habermas' self-transformative science seems to have limited impact on the possibilities for social reform, we must be very skeptical of the extent to which critical theorizing will contribute to good human living. Yet, critical

theorizing does offer some aid to the discipline's pressing concerns, namely, how do we resolve the existing tension between empirical and normative theorists? And it seems to me that critical theory and critical social science suggest some significant proposals for addressing the empirical/normative rift in the discipline of political science with the unity of theory and practice as *praxis*, and with the idea that any empirical science must admit, at least, to its normative presuppositions. In these ways, normative considerations may be seen to be of paramount importance in any empirical science and thus in the science of politics. Merging normative considerations with empirical political science, though, certainly entails profound implications for the philosophy of social science and the practice of science and politics. Chapter Four begins to assess these implications with an examination of postmodernism.

IV.

POSTMODERN POWER/POLITICS

Introduction

In this chapter I do not intend to explain all of what is entailed by postmodernity. Indeed, I hope, at best, simply to highlight the "spirit" of postmodernity and its implications for the social sciences and, in particular, the science of politics. Postmodernity is such a diverse phenomenon/movement that most book length works on the subject merely attempt to consider a slice of it. Thus, we have access to books on the "postmodern condition," the "postmodern situation," "postmodernist culture," and "postmodernism and the social sciences" (Lyotard 1984; Levin 1988; Harvey 1989; Connor 1989; Hollinger 1994). We have still others which assess the role of power in culture, society, knowledge, truth and gender (Foucault 1984; Lawson 1985; Lawson and Appignanesi 1989; Hekman 1990; Agger 1992; Bernstein 1991). And this short list of books that can be classified as having dwelt on the issues surrounding postmodernity does not even begin to scratch the surface of the literature. As such, I will confine my examination to the ways in which postmodernity challenges the Enlightenment conception of knowledge. In particular, postmodernity calls into question a host of dualisms, such as subject/object, fact/value, rational/irrational, optimism/pessimism and so on. This line of inquiry, when taken seriously, damages the foundation on which

Enlightenment thought (and epistemology) rests. This certainly has a serious impact on the science of politics as well.

For the sake of conceptual clarity, we first must sketch the difference between postmodernism and postmodernity, and then proceed to the discussion of the postmodern attack on Enlightenment epistemology. Steven Connor distinguishes postmodernism and postmodernity as separate areas of postmodern theory. On one hand, "there is the compendium of narratives about the emergence of postmodernism in world culture" (1989: 27). Connor calls this cultural postmodern theory "postmodernism." Associated with this debate, "and in many ways serving as its structural support, is a different account, of the emergence of new forms of social, political and economic arrangement" (27). Connor calls this "postmodernity."[1] Though there clearly is some overlap between these two "theories," I will primarily be interested in "postmodernity" in this chapter. Postmodernism is, in some sense, an account of how postmodern sensibilities affect our world, while postmodernity is an account of what postmodern sensibilities are. That the aesthetic of postmodern art tends to be dominated by pastiche, for example, is an issue of postmodernism. That positivism, scientism and technological rationality are thought to be dogmatic and dangerous is an issue of postmodernity.

There is also, it must be said, a difference between modernism and modernity. According to Robert Hollinger, modernity denotes "the type of society that arose in the

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[1]David Harvey (1989) and Philip Cooke (1990) make a similar distinction between postmodernism and postmodernity.

West during the Enlightenment" (1994: xiii). Modern society is characterized by a high level of structural-functional differentiation, the dominance of a state-based capitalist economy with an intricate division of labor, widespread industrialization, urbanization, science and technology, political and ethical individualism, and so on (1994: xiii). Modernism is "a kind of rebellious ethos or attitude toward the modern world. Modernism is a style stressing subjectivity or consciousness over objectivity" and it derives from a "romantic reaction against the Cartesian and Hobbesian idea of the rational self" (1994: xiii-xiv). The postmodern views of such prominent thinkers as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, however, embrace neither of these perspectives, which is certainly not to say that they are "anti-modern." Instead, they seem to want to get in between modernity and modernism in order to cultivate the "ethos of Enlightenment" (Foucault 1984: 42).

Foucault and Derrida urge us away from dualistic and therefore simplistic ways of thinking. One need not, for example, be "for" or "against" the Enlightenment mode of thought. We must not succumb to these "simplistic and authoritarian" alternatives. It is not necessary either to "accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism...or [to] criticize the Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of rationality" (Foucault 1984: 43). Ultimately, a particular view of the world is at stake here. Do we want to simplify the world into a series of dichotomous categories? Or do

we want to embrace the world in all of its complexity?[2] Foucault and Derrida opt for the latter and this decision holds profound implications for social science. These implications are especially acute if there are good reasons for believing that our contemporary society is *post*modern (or other than modern). In this chapter, then, I want to focus on the thought of Foucault and Derrida as it affects the social sciences and, in particular, the science of politics.

In the first section of this chapter I provide a brief account of postmodernity and support the view that our contemporary society is mired in postmodernity. In the next section I briefly explain, with the help of Robert Hollinger's recent work, why the mere existence of a postmodern society necessitates dramatic changes in social scientific inquiry. In the third section I discuss the work of Foucault and Derrida and examine the implications of their thought for the science of politics in a postmodern society. Ultimately, I will argue that Foucault and Derrida more completely portray the hermeneutic consciousness than critical theorists such as Habermas and Fay. This is an important claim for two reasons. First, I argued in Chapter Three that Habermas and Fay

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[2]This issue is nicely illustrated by Robert Pirsig's discussion of the duck-billed platypus. Since the platypus lays eggs but also suckles its offspring it seemed to be a paradoxical creature, given that early classification schemes defined reptiles as egg-bearing and mammals as nursers of their young. The platypus caused quite a stir in the zoological community and was called enigmatic and mysterious by scientists who asked, "How does this paradox of nature exist?" The platypus, of course, is not really a paradox at all. It only seemed to be so because of our epistemological framework. It was our simplistic classification schemes that made the platypus out to be a paradox, not its gestational behavior (Pirsig 1991: 101-106).

are more positivist than hermeneuticist. Second, the discipline of political science, it seems to me, must move beyond the positivist paradigm. Positivism and its attachment to the fact/value and subject/object distinctions, as I argued in Chapter One, are still very much alive in the discipline and this guarantees an inferior status in the discipline for normative questions. Foucault and Derrida, in problematizing the Enlightenment foundation of positivism, align themselves more completely with the hermeneutical consciousness, allow for the sorts of criticism which Habermas and Fay emphasize, and therefore promise a legitimate and powerful role for normative political theory. Indeed, as we will see, normative issues cannot be legitimately avoided if one hopes to construct knowledge that will be valid given postmodern epistemological and ontological presuppositions.

A Portrait of Postmodernity

A vast and growing body of social science literature addresses the existence of a postmodern society. Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone (1982; 1988), Michael Piore and Charles Sabel (1984), and Scott Lash and John Urry (1987) have traced the economic background to this societal change. According to Bluestone and Harrison, today's American economy neglects its social obligations (1982; 1988). The government has increasingly sought to avoid supplying citizens with a social safety net. Instead, it has offered a different plan that purports to be more effective. According to "supply-side economics," stimulating the economy at the top through tax cuts to the wealthy and to corporations will bring about economic growth that will "trickle down" to the bottom in the form of jobs, lower prices and widespread prosperity. This apparent utopia, as the 1980s have demonstrated, failed to materialize and yet the government has been able to mobilize widespread citizen bias with enough effectiveness to blame the economic shortcomings of its policies on actors other than itself, particularly the poor. Under these conditions, the wealthy have become more so while the middle class and the poor have languished.

Piore and Sabel have noted a similar separation between the wealthy and the government ("central actors"), on the one hand, and the rest of society ("peripheral actors"), on the other. They argue that, economically speaking, we face an "industrial divide" which has been spurred by an inability to match production with consumption (a

"regulation crisis") (1984: 4-6). The centralized economic structure has wrought this regulation crisis as central actors have become increasingly detached from peripheral actors. Lash and Urry argue that center-periphery detachment has become international in scope. Not only have national forces become detached from their constituents, as in their example of the Democratic Party's "mass slogans" falling on the deaf ears of a "demassified" society, but international forces have become detached from national forces, as exemplified by the banking system's expansion of the Eurodollar market (1987: 221). The introduction and growth of global corporations have changed the role of nations in the international trade structure. In today's global market, trade is carried out by corporations rather than by nations, though trade regulations remain state centric (208-209). But even this form of "hyper-centralization," Lash and Urry contend, has become outdated. As evidence for this, Lash and Urry point to the emergence of loose coalitions made up of peripheral actors. These coalitions have mobilized against business interests by advocating environmental protection, consumer protection, price controls on energy, and so on (222). For Lash and Urry today's economy is characterized by disorganization which allows the possibility that peripheral groups will be able to have an impact on the economy and, by extension, society. A disorganized capitalism, in other words, provides the possibility that the centers of power will multiply.[3]

Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984) maintains that the multiplication of centers of

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[3]And this shift in the nature of power is what Foucault exposes in his works. Also see Claus Offe (1996, 1992, 1985).

power and activity and the dissolution of totalizing narratives ("metanarratives") constitute the postmodern condition. For Lyotard, scientific knowledge is no longer grounded in a metanarrative. Science emphasizes means rather than ends, performance rather than knowledge. This renders the regulation of science in the name of justice, or the good, difficult, but it also encourages unorthodox leaps out of existing paradigms or governing structures of thought. Lyotard revels in the heterogeneity that he sees springing from this development. Instead of specialized sciences in the university (biology, physics, chemistry, and so on), we see specialties arising within specialties and across specialties (higher education, agronomy, and so on). This carries over into society, according to Lyotard, and as a result we become able to recognize and embrace cultural diversity without recourse to centralized politics. Lyotard, however, offers no formula for consensus in this world of diversity. In a world of "perfect information," where all knowledge is available to everyone, agreement would presumably be unnecessary since hidden knowledge could not intervene to cause fear and cultural conflict. The problem for Lyotard's formulation, however, is that control need not be centralized or direct.

Fredric Jameson (1983) unwittingly provides the beginnings of a model for social control that differs little from the previous centralized (modern) structure. Jameson notices, in postmodern culture, a devotion to pastiche, to a multiplication and collage of styles (1983: 114-123). The "rock [music] industry is the best example of the elastic saleability of the cultural past, with its regular recyclings of its own history in the form of

revivals and remakes, comebacks and cover-versions" (Connor 1989: 186). For Jameson, the key element that brings postmodern society and this schizoid pastiche of postmodern culture together is the fading sense of history. Contemporary society can no longer know its own past. Instead, it lives in "a perpetual present" that lacks depth, definition and a secure identity (Jameson 1983: 125).

This dynamic combines well with Lash and Urry's view that a fundamental shift has occurred in global economic organization toward multinational corporations. In a society, however fragmented, without depth, definition or identity, it is not necessary for the centralized global corporations to "be in touch" with the peripheral consumer. Global corporations can provide the consumer with her or his depth, definition and identity. Theorists such as Jameson, Jean Baudrillard (1988), and Guy Debord (1994, 1990) allege that this is exactly what corporations do through the mobilization of images and signs. Society becomes a "spectacle" where the commodity is the image and not the actual product. Beer companies notoriously "sell" men the possibility of attracting beautiful women rather than selling their beer and its tangible qualities. Automobile advertisements "sell" speed, excitement or "traditional" values instead of selling the automobile. Baudrillard refers to these relations as the "code," or the "economics of affect," and extends them into the social and political world. He envisions a monolithic code operating uniformly through mass culture which incessantly produces images with

no attempt to ground them in reality (1988: 166).[4] All of the contemporary social world, for Baudrillard, has been taken apart and simulated so that reality has become other than real, it has become "hyperreal." The social world can no longer be said to exist because it is simply the simulated effect of producing representations of the masses in order to give them identities, opinions and desires. In this framework, social forces are controlled by the corporations because they, through the manipulation of signs, provide the depthless, ahistorical social forces *qua* consumers with their identities, opinions and desires.

What we see, then, in contemporary society is a different process of control. Control is still exercised from the detached top, but its form is more insidious. Pierre Bourdieu (1984) examines this form of domination from the point of view of "distinction." Bourdieu focuses on class affiliation, class acceptance and, in particular, class domination. For him, the social conditions of postmodernity differ only theoretically from previous social conditions, while their effects are essentially the same. The upper classes have always dominated the lower classes and they continue to do so in contemporary society. Likewise, the dominated classes continue to accept their domination when they accept the inherently unequal stakes offered by the dominant

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[4]For an excellent example of this in American politics, see Bennett's argument (1996) about recent presidential campaigns. Briefly, he argues that because of changes in media strategies, campaigns have produced winners who cannot govern effectively because their campaigns were aimed strictly at winning votes rather than establishing a program for governing. Candidates are marketed like commodities and take positions that "sell" best, but this image-making does not set a policy agenda. Elections, then, have lost their reality *qua* choice of governing people and ideas, and have become a contest of images.

classes. But in postmodern society, domination no longer takes the form of repression, policing, authority or force. Rather, domination is imposed by "substituting seduction for repression, public relations for policing, advertising for authority and the velvet glove for the iron fist" (1984: 154). Indeed, the

> new logic of the economy rejects the ascetic ethic of production and accumulation, based on abstinence, sobriety, saving and calculation, in favour of a hedonistic morality of consumption, based on credit, spending and enjoyment. This economy demands a social world which judges people by their capacity for consumption, their 'standard of living', their life-style (310).

In this economy, the dominated classes are offered distinction as a sort of commodity. They can appear to be distinctive (or similar to the revered classes) by purchasing a stylish automobile, a beautiful house, a manicured lawn, and fashionable clothing. However, according to Bourdieu, such consumption carries no "real" distinction with it since the dominated classes do not possess the cultural capital that must accompany it. "Owning a château, a manor house or a grange is not only a question of money; one must also appropriate the cellar and learn the art of bottling, described as 'an act of deep communion with the wine' which every 'believer' should have performed 'at least once'" (281). The traditionally dominant, and therefore distinctive, classes need not ostentatiously present their culture or possessions. Instead, they appear to be disinterested and comfortable with their position. This is what gives them distinction and makes them dominant. For the dominated classes distinction exists only in appearance because it must be bought on credit. Through the imposition of needs the dominated

classes are destined, even in our diverse postmodern society, to remain in their own social space.

Power in a postmodern society, then, goes "underground." Postmodernity is characterized by illusion. We think we are free but we are always being controlled. We believe that nation-states still prevail in a market that has clearly become global and in which multinational corporations increasingly "call the shots." We contend that we are aware of the diversity that surrounds us thinking we can embrace it as a society even as an intense xenophobia takes hold in the popular imagination (e.g., the immense popularity of California's new immigration statutes). We cling to a traditional notion of society despite the proliferation of hyperreality.[5] Modernity no longer describes our society. We live in a postindustrial, diverse and insidiously oppressive society which is firmly embedded in a global economy. Life in such a society is far more complex than Enlightenment dualistic rationality can comprehend and a social science geared to a modern society fails to adequately assess social phenomena in a postmodern society.[6]

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[5]Suburban housing "developments" are primarily designed and located so that traffic flow through them to metropolitan areas is smooth, yet they are crowned with "unique" names which supposedly establish them as "neighborhoods."

[6] Indeed, one could certainly argue that this sort of rationality has never effectively explained social phenomena, which are, it seems to me, inherently complex.

The Social Sciences in a Postmodern World

The social sciences emerged in the context of modernity and the "Enlightenment Project." This beginning necessarily conditioned their form of inquiry. The social sciences were geared to aid the modernization process. From roughly the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century, society was transformed from a traditional or premodern creation to a modern one. Such a transformation involved a movement away from rural, agriculturally based, authoritarian, small, homogeneous and religious communities to urbanized, capitalist, democratic, large, and culturally, politically and religiously diverse societies. Accompanying this transformation was a radically different understanding of the individual, of society (or community), and of power. The (masculine) individual became capable of autonomous action in a competitive market. Traditional notions of "community" as an organic whole gave way to "societies" made up of free and autonomous individuals. And power increasingly was the domain of the nation-state understood as a unitary actor.

The origin of the social sciences is firmly rooted in the process of modernization as well as in the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment, beginning in France in the late eighteenth century, "broached a set of doctrines stating that the source of all human misery is ignorance, especially superstition. Only knowledge, reason and science can destroy ignorance and superstition and help improve the human condition" (Hollinger 1994: 2). Science, with its emphasis on reason and "objective" knowledge, was justified

by the Enlightenment as crucial for human emancipation from myth, ignorance, authoritarian government, and so on. In other words, science was openly anti-traditional and therefore distinctly modern.

Emerging at roughly the same time as the Enlightenment, though not becoming coherent until the late nineteenth century, the social sciences latched onto the legitimation provided for science by the Enlightenment and aligned themselves with the atomistic method of Newtonian physics. In so doing, they provided the groundwork for the social sciences' emphasis on individual behavior that has become so prominent in the twentieth century. The problem with the modern, Enlightenment version of social science, from the postmodern perspective, is that the categories on which inquiry rests no longer apply, if, indeed, they ever did. Postmodern theorists maintain that not only is the notion of the nation-state problematic, but so is the notion of society, of power, and even of the individual. To draw attention to the problematic nature of these issues we need only recall the discussion in the previous section of postindustrial "society" and its implications for the nation-state as a unitary and sovereign actor in the global scene, for power in a world dominated by the media and advertisement, and for society and the individual given the condition of hyperreality. To explain the anachronistic nature of the individual, society, and power more fully, though, allow me to contrast the position of two theorists from different ages: Machiavelli, from a time in which modern notions of these issues were beginning to detach themselves from premodern notions; and Foucault,

whose work is entirely about problematizing these modern notions in light of more contemporary events.

As Hanna Pitkin convincingly argues, Machiavelli is primarily concerned with the concept of autonomy in his work (1984: 8). The notion of autonomy is a specific characteristic of modernity. "Individualism, liberation, and national self-determination are all modern concerns," and they become apparent for the first time during the Renaissance (8-9). In the premodern world, interconnectedness and dependence were understood to define the human condition. They were neither shameful nor constricting but were instead assumed to be natural and sacred. "In such a world people felt neither an aspiration nor an obligation to be autonomous; mutual dependence was the very nature of the universe" (9-10).

This view of the world is profoundly different from the one that Machiavelli puts forth in *The Prince* (1992) and *The Discourses* (1970). Evidence for this changed world-view abounds and is particularly obvious in Chapter 25 of *The Prince* where Machiavelli says that "if a man *governs himself* with caution and patience, and the times and conditions are turning in such a way that his policy is a good one, he will prosper" (83, emphasis mine). Obviously, society and human self-understanding had changed profoundly. Rather than "being natural and sacred, dependence had now become both contemptible and dangerous; autonomy was the goal" (Pitkin 1984: 10).

> An urban and market society gradually displaced feudal agriculture, leaving men free (but also forced) to make their own way in life. Instead

> of being born into a social station, men might achieve or lose wealth, power, and status in a single generation. Rather than as parts of a universal, "given" social order, men now understood themselves as members of a particular, historically located state and language group...And states, too, like individuals, were understood to be in competitive conflict, their relative positions constantly shifting as a result of skill, boldness, resources, or luck (10).

Accompanying the changing notion of the individual and of society was the emergence of the privatized nuclear family. The altered family organization led to the fragmentation of the traditional idea of the community as an organic whole.

A radically different political order resulted from such social changes. Autonomy and dependence had become primary issues. "Authority was no longer experienced as embedded in a sacred hierarchy, and the rituals that once guaranteed and renewed its legitimacy were increasingly empty and incapable of generating meaning" (11). In place of the premodern sense

> that dependence is natural and that 'someone else is in charge,' the Renaissance substituted a lively consciousness of human self-creation--both the individual shaping his character and career, and the community shaping itself through history. The community and its laws were now understood as human artifacts, the products of choice, and always subject to further action. Individuals increasingly felt required to create order for themselves and for each other, to master themselves and take charge of their communities. In short, authority was becoming internalized (11-12).

For late fourteenth and early fifteenth century thinkers such as Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni the republic of Florence was experienced "as a high ideal but existing in the present and in its own past...affiliated only with other republics and with those moments in past time at which republics had existed...The republic was more

political than it was hierarchical; it was so organized as to assert its sovereignty and autonomy, and therefore its individuality and particularity" (Pocock 1975: 53). By the end of the fifteenth century, though, Florence's international position and economy had become weak, yet Machiavelli still posed autonomy as a goal for states. We see evidence of this throughout *The Prince* and *The Discourses* (*Prince*, chs. 9, 10, 17, 21, 23; *Discourses* I: 1, 3, 9, 18, 49, 58).

Machiavelli is mired in a distinctly modern problem, namely, how does one conceive of autonomous individuals (i.e., separate from political community) and still maintain social order? How, in other words, was an orderly society possible "given the disruptive changes, the uprooting of peoples, the development of new ways of living and producing, and, above all, the projection into economic and social life of the competitive ethic" which are unique to modernity (Cooke 1990: 30)? This same problem concerns postmodern society but it has become more complex. Now we are confronted with a radically autonomous individual in a world where the notion of centralized power is problematic and largely non-existent. Urban decay in light of an extreme commitment to the individual and her or his rights results, in part, in criminal activity. The mandatory dedication to the competitive market, even as it declines, disenfranchises the unemployed, the working poor and a weakening middle class, forcing them outside any political community that might exist. Individuals, insofar as they exist, are inevitably left to their

own devices in postmodern society.[7]

Lest we despair as to the possibilities for social order in such a world, Foucault describes the normalizing practices of contemporary society and their ability to assert control in a world that apparently lacks it. Foucault is primarily concerned with creating a history of the different modes by which humans are made into subjects (Foucault 1983: 208). In *Discipline and Punish* (1979), Foucault studies the objectivizing of the subject in the "dividing practices." The subject is divided inside himself and from others. This objectivizes him. Foucault locates a division between criminals and the "good" people, or *normal* people. And this primary concern with the making of subjects inevitably leads Foucault to a discussion of power. He discusses discipline and punishment to highlight one aspect of a power discourse that permeates society, especially in terms of normalization and the *knowledge* of difference, of why some are abnormal and how to normalize them.

Penalties for criminal activity have been altered over time. Initially, penalty involved public torture of the body. Now, we have a private torture of the soul, and this

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[7]But if Foucault is right, then we are *not* on our own in terms of power relationships (see my discussion of this below). Rather than centrally-defined nexes of power, we find ourselves in capillary networks of power. Yes we are radically afloat from modern heteronomy, but we float in and on currents of power still. So, the political organism is comprised differently, but it is still an organism. And, though the channels of power are less centrally located, less observable, they are more tenacious than ever. This is significantly different than the modern (liberal) notion that we are all discrete individuals bereft of connections to others, and is in some interesting ways similar to Burke's conservatism.

torture extends throughout society. Penalty no longer consists in physical pain of the body. Now there is a "higher" aim, that of liberty--and the denial of it. The guillotine takes life almost without touching the body, just as prison deprives one of liberty or a fine reduces wealth. It is intended to apply the law not so much to a real body capable of feeling pain as to a *juridical subject*. And this is an expression of power. But it is no longer a power that has a definite source. Instead, it is a complex sort of power, a capillary power with no accountable origin. It simply courses through society and its institutions and relations. Public torture and executions had a definable source--the sovereign. But private torture (which is not even recognized as torture) goes underground in a sense. In this, we have a proliferation of authority over the juridical subject. No longer is there a single judge of criminality and sentencing and the carrying out of the sentence. Instead, the subject is being judged all the time--initially by the judge and jury, then by wardens, parole boards, journalists, society, other subjects, and so on. And this ultimately extends to all members of society, not merely criminals. All of these judgements bring with them an assessment of normality and a technical prescription for a possible normalization of the subject. This mode of subjection gives birth to humans as objects of knowledge for a discourse with a *scientific* status. In this way, penalty must be seen merely as an illusion of a crime reducer. Instead, it is an exercise of power over all. An exercise that is consistently reproduced in a more and more generalized sense in society.

Perhaps the best example of this generalized reproduction of power is the "panopticon" (1979: 195-228). Normalizing power requires visibility, it requires that we can all be seen, or at least believe that we can be seen. Bentham's panopticon is *the* technical apparatus for this purpose. Originally conceived as a mechanism for prisons, the panopticon allows one person in a tower to see all inmates at one time and thereby to monitor their behavior. The inmates are unable to see the person in the tower so they must assume they are always being watched. And anyone (or no one) can be in the tower. As such, the panopticon is an apt metaphor for Foucault's normalizing power. We can conceive of society as a panopticon, always seeking normalized behavior. This even goes further than metaphor, it is actual. Prisons (in panopticon form) resemble factories, schools, hospitals, and so on, all of which are oriented around noticing abnormal behavior and seeking to normalize it. As such, we are all made by society into subjects, and we are divided from one another (through difference) even in our multiplicity.[8]

A similar objectivization of the subject is witnessed in the exploded discourse on sexuality (Foucault 1990). In this case, however, the panopticon is, in a sense, turned inward. Here we make ourselves into subjects. That is, we recognize ourselves as

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[8]New "residency disclosure" laws about convicted sexual offenders remove behavior normalization from the legal system and endow society with this power. Some states are now requiring that "neighborhoods" be notified if a convicted sexual offender moves into the area after serving their jail sentence. So rather than state-sponsored torture, we now institute state-sponsored punishment followed up with omnipresent societal monitoring of individuals convicted of crimes. I do not mean to say, by the way, that this is *necessarily* a "bad" thing. Rather, this particular example simply provides an illustration of the differing techniques of power in contemporary society.

subjects of our own sexuality. And this is oriented around normalization as well, a normalization based first on religion and ultimately in science. Sexuality is never about pleasure or aesthetics--instead it gets filtered through religious or scientific discourse. We attach truth claims to sex and sexuality, truths that we seek to discover in ourselves. As such, sexuality is not about our bodies--our bodies are wholly removed from the picture. Instead, sexuality is scientized, it is about truth, and in seeking that truth we construct ourselves as subjects. We enslave ourselves (though we think we are liberated because we can talk about, think about, etc. sex and sexuality) to determining the truth about the secret of sexuality. How are we normal or abnormal with respect to sexuality? How has abnormal sexuality affected us? These are the questions of sexuality as filtered through the knowledge-power nexus.

In postmodern society, then, power is exercised everywhere and by everyone, even by ourselves on ourselves.[9] In modern society power is centralized and exercised by the state. In postmodern society the individual is constructed from within but also always as a result of the generalized reproduction of power from without. The individual in modern society is (presumably) autonomous, able to seek her or his own fortune and livelihood at her or his own behest. And postmodern "society" cannot really be said to exist since power now occupies multiple "centers" and its makeup is radically individualized. Meanwhile, the modern understanding of society assumes that a coherent

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[9]Foucault does not mean to say, however, that power is everywhere exercised equally.

society exists in which individuals can take part. But as I have shown thus far, there are good reasons for believing that the modern understanding of society, power and the individual is outdated.

Given this, we must be wary of a social science that nonetheless seeks to explain postmodern society from a modern perspective. Such a social science must assuredly fail to be accurate. Social science as currently understood is, according to Hollinger, concerned with defending modernity against premodern notions (1994: 21-36). How else do we explain the continued concern with the importance of reason, knowledge and science in opposition to unreason, myth and philosophy? The problem with this opposition is that it is no longer relevant. We now must contrast modernity with postmodernity, which entails exploding these oppositions and finding more complex answers for the issues they purport to address. With this in mind, I will discuss Foucault's and Derrida's perspectives on postmodernity in an effort to explain more fully how their views affect social scientific inquiry. In the concluding section of this chapter, I will contrast the resulting perception of social science with what I take to be the most compelling expression of modern social science--the critical social science of Habermas and Fay. Ultimately, I will argue that postmodern social science has more in common with "hermeneutic consciousness" than critical social science does.

Foucault and Derrida

Aside from a change in socio-political context, postmodernity is also characterized by an epistemological change. In particular, the theory of language games precludes the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth, a theory on which the social sciences presently depend. As Hilary Lawson notes, the idea that subject was separate from object dominated philosophy during the time when the sciences were emerging (1989: xix). As such, scientific "truth" evolved as perceived correspondence between subjective concepts and objective phenomena. In recent years, however, we have begun to recognize that "concepts are immediately linguistic," while Kant, for example, tended to think of concepts as "ideas in the mind" (xix). Kant thought that he had closed the gap between subjective experience and the knowledge of reality. But his account, as well as those of Hume and Locke, operated from the perspective that "language was a transparent medium that enabled us to communicate" (xviii). Words, that is, simply expressed ideas and concepts which emanated from sensation. The idea here was that objects exist in the world independently of our language.

What is overlooked is that neutral observations are impossible. We cannot experience unadulterated sensations because sensations are "always combined with understanding" (xx). Indeed, individual words can mean different things in different contexts, or one might use words to explain the same "objects" in varying detail. To take a famous example for the former condition, one person may look at a rabbit, call it a

rabbit, and see a cute, fuzzy animal, while another may look at a rabbit, call it a rabbit, and see dinner (Quine 1960: 26-79). Lawson gives us a good example for both conditions.

> I see a mug on a desk in a room. But each of these terms carries with them [sic] the weight of the rest of language. They have their meanings only in relation to the meanings of other words. Do I also see, for example, a cup on a table in a space? Or a drink on a working surface? Each of these descriptions shifts the experience slightly. It is not simply a question of which is the correct term to describe the experience. If I was in a fight I might see the mug and the desk as weapons and defenses. If I was a child I might see the cup and table as a hat and a house....[A]ccording to these arguments there is no final resting place of meaning (xxv).

The point is that the linguistic turn in philosophy requires that we (re)assess Truth. Indeed, postmodern thinkers such as Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault do precisely this. The linguistic turn means that we can no longer conceive of Truth in terms of a completely accurate correspondence to "reality." We must re-orient the ways we inquire about social and political "reality." Again, I do not hope to explain the entirety of Derrida's and Foucault's thought and its implications. Rather, I simply want to discuss those aspects of their thought--those in particular that problematize dichotomous thinking--which seem significantly to affect routine social scientific inquiry.

Derrida's writings are notoriously difficult to grasp. While it may be the case that many scholars write in an obscure way simply because they hope that complicated writing indicates a complicated mind, Derrida, it seems, is deliberately obscure because to do otherwise would undermine the force of his "argument." If Derrida wants to say,

for example, that there is no such thing as meaning, then finding the "meaning" of his texts catches him in a reflexive paradox. How, after all, can Derrida *mean* to say that there is no meaning? But this appears to be precisely what he *is* saying, though he never comes out and actually says it. And this, it seems, is why his writing is so elliptical and opaque. For if he came out clearly saying that he meant that there was no meaning, he would obviously be in a difficult position (i.e., according to the principles of logic). But by writing "around" this point and merely intimating that he *might* be saying that meaning does not exist, he avoids the paradox. Consequently, his writing style, and his meaning, are hard to grasp. According to Derrida, no sentence, word, utterance, experience or notion has a single meaning. All of these things are inherently contestable. Indeed, what Derrida seems to say is that the signifiers of language never actually refer to what they apparently signify. Rather, signifiers always refer to other signifiers. So when we say "magnet" what we are really referring to is not the object that attracts metal filings, but the other concepts in our mind which allow us to identify it as the thing which attracts metal filings. There are no transcendental signifieds and there can therefore be no fixed "reality" because it is always necessarily filtered through language. Thus, the "dogmas of the Enlightenment" (positivism, scientism, technological rationality) are falsified not only by the changes wrought by contemporary society, they are also falsified (or even considered to be naïve) by philosophy's linguistic turn.

Derrida continues the attack on metaphysics begun by Nietzsche and Heidegger.

His assault focuses on what he calls the "metaphysics of presence" (1974: 97). He zeroes in on the binary oppositions which, for him, characterize Western metaphysics (which includes ontology, thought *and* language). Western ontology, thought and language depend on a series of dichotomies: good/evil, mind/matter, being/nothingness, truth/falsity, presence/absence, identity/difference, soul/body, male/female, fact/value, subject/object, speech/writing, and so on. Of these dualisms, presence/absence serves as metaphysical model. In every case, the second term in the dichotomy is always considered to be undesirable, corrupt, negative. For Derrida, each of the second terms indicates an absence of the first term. Evil lacks goodness, matter lacks mind, falsity is the absence of truth, and so on. Derrida wants to say that this sort of thinking is naïve. He argues that the dichotomous thinking prevalent in Western metaphysics is misleading because concepts such as good and evil, soul and body, subject and object, and so on are interentailing. It is impossible, in other words, to consider one concept in exclusion from the other. He uses the concepts of "speech" and "writing" to make his point.

Western metaphysics privileges speech over writing because speaking necessitates presence. That is, in speech both speaker and listener are present at the same time. There is a certain immediacy here that "seems to guarantee the notion that in the spoken word we know what we mean, mean what we say, say what we mean, and know what we have said" (1981: viii). In other words, there is a guarantee that the signifiers employed correspond to something signified. The self-presentation of meaning presupposed in

speech ("logocentrism") is at the core of Western metaphysics, according to Derrida. Writing is the negative term in the binary opposition because it indicates absence. We write when we are unable or unwilling to speak. Writing is a representation of speech and therefore at a distance from meaning. In putting her thoughts onto paper, the writer distances her thoughts from herself, and thereby invites misinterpretation. Writing thereby introduces difference. In speech, the speaker's thoughts are presumed to be identical to his words. That is, in speaking he accurately portrays the meaning of his thoughts. In writing, however, the writer distances herself from her thoughts and therefore invites the possibility that the interpretation of her written thoughts will differ from what those thoughts actually mean (for her). But if she had been able to *voice* her thoughts to a listener, she could have been sure to avoid being misunderstood. In Western metaphysics, then, writing is undesirable because the signifier/signified connection is in question.

However, because Derrida denies the possibility of transcendental signifieds, speech is always already writing. Western metaphysics assumes that we can *Know* the "thing-in-itself." Western thought connects presence with Being. When something is present it *is* and when something is absent it *is not*. But as the case of the speech/writing opposition demonstrates, this sort of thinking fails, since even in speech meaning is characterized by difference. In a world where transcendental signifieds cannot exist, meaning is portrayed insofar as signifiers differ from other signifiers. Meaning, then, can

never be said to be "present" in any pure, transcendental sense. Indeed, what is a "magnet"? For Thales of Miletus it was a rock full of gods. For us, it is a polarized piece of iron. Both of these conceptions gain their meaning from their relationships to other signifiers, not to the thing signified. As a result, meaning is necessarily fleeting and indeterminate. It is present and absent at the same time since we can never pin it down. Every time we read a text we face the dynamic possibility that we will find in it new meaning. This is, in fact, the goal of "grammatology" or deconstruction.

Through deconstruction we understand that an object might exist apart from a subject but that once we try to explain, describe, or simply discuss that "object" it can no longer be wholly separate from the "subject(s)" discussing, describing or explaining it. All binary oppositions must fail because they are all necessarily interentailing. We cannot even conceive of objects without subjects. Nor can we conceive of values without facts, male without female, and so on. Mere discussion of facts, for example, includes the idea that facts are also values and therefore necessitates an understanding of the notion of values. Deconstruction begins, then, with the upending of the metaphysics of presence upon which all the other modern binary oppositions rest.

When deconstructing a text we seek to overrule our own "logocentric and inherited ways of viewing a text" (Bressler 1994: 80). Deconstructionists seek to locate the binary oppositions at work in a text and to reverse them (Derrida 1982: 329). The binary oppositions characterizing the metaphysics of presence assume a fixed and biased

interpretation of "reality." Reversing the hierarchies of the dichotomies "present" frees us from the constraints of our typical way of thinking and of interpreting a text.[10] With deconstruction, though, Derrida does not mean to retain the binary oppositions in reversed form. Rather, the reversal of the binary hierarchies is a heuristic device meant to display to us the arbitrary character of the original hierarchies. Through deconstruction we can see that our presuppositions affect our interpretation of a text's meaning(s). So, while scientists attempt to transcend prejudice and tradition, Derrida attempts to deconstruct them (and everything else). In so doing, science simply privileges those things (in binary opposition) that successfully transcend prejudice, while Derrida argues against the privileging of *anything* since *everything* is subject to deconstruction (i.e., to being taken apart and re-interpreted in light of different presuppositions--unrecognized ones, e.g.) (1981: 36).

Derridean deconstruction is remarkably similar to Foucault's practice of genealogy. Genealogy analyzes descent, but it "does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people" (Foucault 1977: 146). Instead, it identifies the accidents, the errors, the faulty calculations and the minute deviations "that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us" (146). Genealogy traces the history of contextual meanings of concepts, ideas, and institutions, and how we came to have them. But this tracing is not an enterprise of a *description of* society aimed

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[10]Texts, by the way, constitute all of reality for Derrida since everything is expressed through language and the difference between signifiers (1974: 158-159).

at enabling a *prescription for* society. Nor is it an eschatological enterprise. For Foucault, "genealogy opposes itself to the search for 'origins,'" since it recognizes that the meanings of words change (140). As such, the patterns of signifiers that generate meanings change as well, rendering "original" meaning non-existent. Furthermore, genealogy realizes that humanity has no *telos*. Humans do not progress from battle to battle until the rule of law replaces war, for example. There is no apotheosis of humanity, there is no perfect society "out there" to be reached. Instead, we simply install our omnipresent violence into a system of rules and then proceed "from domination to domination" without really "progressing" (in a totalizing sense) (151). Genealogy, then, recognizes the world as complex and "shortens its vision to those things nearest to it...and if it chances upon lofty epochs, it is with the [joyous] suspicion...of finding a barbarous and shameful confusion" (155). Finally, genealogy embraces knowledge as perspective. Knowledge claims are perspectival in so far as they are necessarily generated by someone situated within the hermeneutic circle.

When we understand knowledge as perspective, as Foucault does, power emerges. That is, if knowledge actually is perspective, and knowledge is typically understood as Truth (as scientists understand it), then the claim to Truth must be based in power. How else could a scientist support her profession of Truth when it is actually a declaration of perspective? With this in mind, Foucault contends in Kuhnian fashion that the "maturation" of science is not "continuist" (1984: 54). Unlike Kuhn, however, Foucault

goes on to ask what the politics of the scientific sentiment are. As such, he is concerned not with knowing what external power imposes itself on science. Instead he would like to know "what effects of power circulate among scientific statements, what constitutes, as it were, their internal regime of power, and how and why at certain moments that regime undergoes a global modification" (1984: 54-55).

Power, according to Foucault, is all too often thought of merely in its negative sense. Power is not simply an external force telling us "no." It is also a positive force in the sense that "it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse" (1984: 61). Indeed, Foucault claims that in this positive capacity power is most effective. When an occupant of an endowed chair in political science takes a young graduate student aside to impress upon him that the science of politics is *not* the same thing as art, then she is participating in the (re)production of scientific political discourse. There simply are certain acceptable ways of participating in the discourse that is political science and one either enters into that discourse or is marginalized. Foucault wants us to make no mistake: the occupant of the endowed chair is exercising power. She is disqualifying other types of "knowledge." Foucault wonders

> [w]hich speaking, discoursing subjects--which subjects of experience and knowledge--do you then want to 'diminish' when you say: 'I who conduct this discourse am conducting a scientific discourse, and I am a scientist'? Which theoretical-political *avant garde* do you want to enthrone in order to isolate it from all discontinuous forms of knowledge that circulate about it?

By comparison, then, and in contrast to the various projects which aim to

> inscribe knowledges in the hierarchical order of power associated with science, a genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, to render them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse. It is based on a reactivation of local knowledges (1980: 85).

Foucault seeks what he calls "counter science" (1973: 379). Indeed, Foucault urges the human sciences to orient themselves around three interlocking counter sciences: ethnology, psychoanalysis and linguistics. These sciences are counter sciences not in the sense that they are less objective and less rational than the "sciences"; rather they are counter sciences insofar as they "unmake man" (379). The human sciences have set themselves the task of discovering "man," of determining the nature of "man," of capturing the essence of "man." Foucault says that this goal is misguided since we can never know these things. There is no final Truth to, no final understanding of, humankind. Instead, we can only come to "know" anything about humans through an emphasis on context. There are structures which exist at a given time that serve to ground the activities of humans (norms, the unconscious, language). The reason for the profound kinship of ethnology and psychoanalysis

> must not be sought...in some common concern to pierce the profound enigma, the most secret part of human nature; in fact, what illuminates the space of their discourse is much more the historical *a priori* of all the sciences of man - those great caesuras, furrows, and dividing-lines which traced man's outline in the Western *episteme* and made him a possible area of knowledge (378).

Ethnology and psychoanalysis focus upon, and thus make it possible for us to know, "that

which is given to or eludes [human] consciousness" (378).

The point here, it seems to me, is that in focusing upon humans and human behavior we fail to understand what it is that animates humans and human behavior. Foucault is simply calling for the contextualization of human scientific inquiry and in so doing he demands the use of a different method. To actualize Foucault's goals, the humans sciences will need to adopt the archaeological/genealogical method. Systematized observation will not be enough to constitute knowledge since the consciousness of humans does not tell the entire story. Instead, we must probe into the language and the norms of the era we seek to study in order to understand the implications of the power relations which obtained at the time. And this will have to be firmly ensconced in the recognition of human finitude. That is, we will be required to recognize that we can have no final answers to our questions or our problems. The best we can do is to focus upon the context(s) in which we find ourselves and exercise our therapies there. In doing so, we will accomplish two things: first, we will unmask our relationships of power/knowledge which will allow us to problematize the marginalization of some knowledge claims; second, as a result of this, we should have access to more and different perspectives of social explanation.

The thought of Derrida and Foucault regarding truth and knowledge clearly runs counter to that of practicing political scientists. In particular, Derrida and Foucault want

to undermine Enlightenment rationality.[11] The oppositions between reason and unreason, truth and untruth, fact and value, subject and object, and so on are exploded by them. And these are oppositions upon which (at least) the majority of political scientists depends. As such, the methodological and epistemological (and ontological) ramifications of Derrida's and Foucault's work are transformative. A science of politics which hopes to take postmodernity seriously must reorient its perspective. It must see the world as complex and contextual. It must recognize that there are limits to what it can know (i.e., it must recognize its hermeneutic context). And most importantly, it must emphasize the interstices between the dualisms proffered by Enlightenment rationality. Doing so will compel political scientists to admit that every empirical claim of fact necessarily has a normative element as well *and* that this normative element cannot merely be "admitted" *away* as they focus nonetheless on the "facts." Instead, the normative element will have to be admitted *to* the inquiry, contributing to what it is the political scientist claims to know.

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[11]This is the sort of rationality which allows political scientists to claim "expert" status as "authority" figures who "know" something and are therefore useful and essential to the political process.

Conclusion

In Chapter Two I indicated that hermeneutic consciousness is a useful alternative conception for the social sciences and for the discipline of political science. I also explained that hermeneutics has generally been overlooked by the mainstream of the discipline as the positivist/postpositivist perspective has become hegemonic. Critical theorists and critical social scientists, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, have attempted to undercut the positivist/postpositivist method by counterpoising an alternative method based in hermeneutics and psychoanalysis. But, again as demonstrated in Chapter Three, their attempts to ground their method in hermeneutics and psychoanalysis fail on at least four fronts. First, while they claim to overcome the dominance and hierarchy which positivism engenders, they seem unable to do so in actuality since they continue, unwittingly perhaps, to place the scientist above those whom she studies. Second, they emphasize the need to predict future events in spite of the fact that hermeneutic consciousness finds this to be impossible. Third, critical theorists and critical social scientists are unable to specify how social actors will transform social and political practice. Indeed, this does not seem to be likely nor does hermeneutic consciousness allow for this. Finally, critical theory and critical social science are dependent both on a critique of modernity and the maintenance of modernity at the same time. This is surely contradictory.[12] A postmodern political science, as I will illustrate, would elude all of

[12]This point actually highlights, it seems to me, the complex nature of the work of Derrida and Foucault. Ultimately, their work is extremely rational in foundation. They

these problems and would therefore more completely evince the hermeneutic consciousness. This is not to say that a postmodern political science would not suffer from its own shortcomings. Rather, I want to argue that since a postmodern political science would more completely cultivate the hermeneutic consciousness, it is a better alternative to positivist/postpositivist political science than critical political science is, since it would more comprehensively usurp the positivist/postpositivist perspective on science.

The postmodern scientist, it seems, would not be in a position of dominance with respect to those whom she studies. Derrida is particularly clear about this since he ultimately conceives of no essential difference between subject and object or any other of the dualisms of Enlightenment thought. This is perhaps most clearly manifest in his discussions on the author (1974). Derrida never privileges the author over the reader. Indeed, in some sense the reader of a text is also its author, since there is no objective meaning to any text, on Derrida's account. As such, the meanings attached to a text by its

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have seen, in other words, the boundedness of reason by relentlessly thinking rationally about it. As such, their methods *are* "modern" in a way. But this does not necessarily indicate that Derrida and Foucault hope to salvage the project of modernity even as they criticize it. Indeed, for Foucault in particular, one need not either be for or against the Enlightenment. To characterize our options in this way, in fact, is "simplistic" and "authoritarian" (Foucault 1984: 43). The notion that one need be neither for nor against the Enlightenment is simply one of those exploded oppositions that admits of a complex middle ground. The project itself is not realizable, but this does not mean that we therefore must toss out all of its elements. We can use reason, in other words, and highlight its importance *without* necessarily being "for" the Enlightenment version of rationality.

author and its reader(s) are accorded equal weight.[13] All meanings are, in some sense, important. Extending this to the study of politics undermines the hierarchy that "exists" between the scientists and those whom she studies. Foucault's concern about the claim to "science" accomplishes the same thing since it revitalizes subjugated knowledges.

Regarding the second and third shortcomings of a critical political science, both Foucault and Derrida align well with hermeneutic consciousness. Hermeneutic consciousness allows for neither the prediction of future events nor for the radical transformation of social and political practice. The belief that both of these events can

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[13]Derrida is often misunderstood on this front. He does not mean to say that all interpretations are correct, nor does he intend to support the claim that all interpretations are equally good. Rather, Derrida seems to think that we need to take all interpretations seriously and it is in this way that all interpretations are accorded equal weight. Derrida believes that there can be good and bad interpretations. He does not think that one can find anything one wants to find in any text. Deconstruction is necessarily limited by the text. As such, we might understand deconstruction as "reading between the lines" *of the text*. Deconstruction is an intensely close reading of a text and it can lead to different interpretations in different contexts. When I read Plato's *Republic* for the first time many years ago, for example, I had an interpretation that I thought was correct. And every other time I have read it since, I have come to what I think is a better interpretation of Plato's argument. Indeed, we recognize the need to accord equal weight to any interpretation (i.e., take any interpretation seriously) when we grade students' papers. When I read a student's paper on Plato's *Republic* I do not expect her to have the same understanding of his arguments as I have. This would be absurd and unfair. Rather, I expect her to have closely interpreted the text in her way and to have provided evidence from the text in support of her interpretation. When I assign a grade to her paper I do so on the basis of the strength of her interpretation, not on whether or not I think it is correct. This, it seems to me, approaches Derrida's meaning. He does not mean to say that all interpretations ought to be accorded equal *value*; some interpretations are better supported by the textual evidence than others and are therefore *better* interpretations. As such, however, we can never say that there is a *correct* and *final* interpretation, and this leaves us open to learn more.

transpire indicates, from the hermeneutical perspective, that we have much more control over the social and political world than we actually do. Social and political practice is not something over which we can have complete control. We cannot master ourselves nor can we master the future. There are far too many things, in other words, that can happen between now and the future to change our current understanding of the social and political world. No military strategist of the eighteenth century could possibly have predicted that there would one day be nuclear weapons, much less how they might change the face of military conflict. Hermeneutic consciousness goes even further than this since it also denies the possibility that we might radically transform social and political practice. We can certainly learn how to guard against as many of the contingencies of social and political life as possible, but we will ultimately fail to guard against them all. Thus, we might *reform*[14] social and political practice in a slow and measured way, but we will never transform it in a radical and complete way. Both Foucault and Derrida recognize this, placing no emphasis on the future or on final transformation. Society does not appear to be perfectible on their accounts.

Finally, there is no reason to suspect that Derrida and Foucault contradict themselves in the way that critical theorists, such as Habermas, do. Derrida and Foucault clearly critique modernity and its accompanying Enlightenment rationality. We see this most clearly in Derrida's deconstruction of the Enlightenment's metaphysics of presence

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[14]Understood as Edmund Burke understands it (1987).

and in Foucault's attempt to cultivate the "ethos of Enlightenment" (1984: 42).[15] These critiques are used to push us beyond the dualistic and simplistic ways of Enlightenment thought. The social and political world is far more complicated than a series of dichotomies can ever explain, and our attempts to study that world ought to reflect this complexity. Positivist and critical social science are methodologically reductionist insofar as they both seek a single set of unified principles to guide inquiry. The problem with this formulation is that such methodological simplicity cannot account for social complexity. Both Foucault and Derrida, it seems to me, seek to eliminate methodological reductionism and its routinely unexamined essentialism. In so doing, the postmodern perspective provided by Derrida and Foucault can be used to undermine the positivist/postpositivist conception of science and to capture the hermeneutic consciousness of Gadamer and Heidegger.

Ultimately, the postmodern attack on dualisms serves to undermine the empirical/normative divide in the discipline of political science. But this is also a strength of critical theory and critical social science. A postmodern political science would extend the advances of a critical political science, it seems to me, insofar as it would alleviate the four problems discussed above. A postmodern political science would still suffer, however, from at least two distinct shortcomings. First, a postmodern political science would lack a strong sense of progress. Postmodernity lacks a concern

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[15]Derrida and Foucault are, in other words, using rationality to expose its limits, and then agreeing to live by them.

for the future and therefore does not lend itself well to the emphasis on prediction and the development of "progressive" scientific theories. Moreover, the postmodern views expressed by Foucault and Derrida also appear to ignore the relevance of political practice. Foucault and Derrida, in other words, do not seem to think that their perspectives can be used to change political practice for the better. Feminists, in particular, take them to task on this account. As to the second shortcoming of postmodern theory, feminists are by far the strongest, if not the only, voice. Foucault and, to a lesser extent, Derrida are both accused of ignoring women, of failing to recognize the importance of the male/female and the masculine/feminine dichotomies. In response to these shortcomings of postmodernity, some thinkers have turned to postmodern feminism, an approach I will examine in the next chapter.

V.

FEMINIST INSIGHTS:

HELPING US UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Introduction

Feminist theories are extremely diverse, encompassing numerous incommensurable strands. Each of these strands, however, can be said to share, on some level, a fundamental interest in political practice and, in particular, in alleviating the oppression experienced by "others" at the hands of masculinized politics. Accordingly, there are "liberal feminists" who seek to integrate women more fully as citizens in liberal political systems (Friedan 1974, 1981; Eisenstein 1984, 1981; Steinem 1995; Dietz 1985; Pateman 1989); "radical feminists" who highlight the "socio(onto)logical" and "bio(onto)logical" difference of women from men (Agger 1993: 57-82; Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982; Lacan 1982; Belenky et al. 1986) and use it to support a "neoliberal" feminist political theory valorizing the cultural and domestic realm in distinction from the conventional political realm (Elshtain 1981; Cixous 1986, 1988; Irigary 1985); and "Marxist feminists" (or "socialist feminists") who call for an expanded understanding of labor, to include what has been called "women's work" in the domestic sphere, and the incorporation of this conception of labor in attempts at transformative politics (Hartsock

1983; MacKinnon 1982, 1983; Balbo 1982; Burstyn 1983a, 1983b).[1]

Feminists have also become involved in philosophical critiques of science (Flax 1990a, 1990b; Harding 1986, 1991; Haraway 1986, 1989, 1991; Keller 1983, 1985). Many of these feminists see the dominant philosophy of science as rooted in the Enlightenment mode of thought. In particular, they highlight the fact that during the period when science was gaining legitimacy, women were clearly marginalized in politics, society, the economy, and so on. Women were not accorded citizenship rights nor was it possible for them to be "free" in spite of the Enlightenment claims to freedom. Women were excluded and dominated, and their status carried over into science as well. Not only could they not take part in scientific practice, science was not being undertaken for their liberation. In criticizing the modern exclusion of women from society, politics and science, all feminists are in some sense postmodern.[2] Sandra Harding (1990), though

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[1]One of the dangers of such labeling techniques is the misunderstanding that the categories constructed are somehow mutually exclusive. While it should be clear from my arguments in this chapter, I want to voice the claim that I think it is impossible to locate any particular feminist thinker into a separate category. As such, with the rough typology I have set up here, I do not mean to say that certain feminists are situated in one "liberal" camp while other feminists radically oppose them in a "Marxist" camp. Instead, I seek merely to highlight some of the many *facets* of feminist thought as a means to introducing the topic of this chapter.

[2]This is not to say that in premodernity women were included since they clearly were not. Indeed, as we all ought to know by now, the history of Western woman is characterized by exclusion, domination and confinement to the domestic sphere. My point is that the denial to women of Enlightenment goals is coded into modern Western political, social and scientific theories. As such, the mere introduction of women into modern political, social and scientific theories necessarily runs counter to modernity. See Okin (1979: chs. 7, 10 and 11), Pateman (1989) and Coole (1988) for particularly good

critical of postmodernism, echoes this claim with her contention that even "feminist empiricists" sustain some postmodern elements in their inquiries. In this chapter, though, I want to focus on those feminist critiques of science that are, in some sense, consciously postmodern. I will discuss, in other words, those feminist critiques of science that admit affinities to postmodernist theory. Such critiques, after all, will align well with the material presented in Chapter Four and contribute, I argue, to the alternative science of politics that I am considering in this dissertation.

Linda Nicholson argues that feminism and postmodernism are "natural allies" (1990b: 5). Postmodernists have extended earlier claims concerning the "situatedness" of human thought in culture "to focus on the very criteria by which claims to knowledge are legitimized" (3). They contend that the criteria distinguishing the true and the false, science and myth, and fact and value are internal to the traditions of modernity and cannot be legitimated outside of those traditions (4). Going along with this is the claim that the development of these criteria "had to be described as representing the growth and development of specific 'regimes of power'" (4). According to postmodernists, science has become the master discourse, exercising its authority in various ways (e.g., subtle domination, discipline), through various means (e.g., the media, the disciplines), and on various objects (e.g., the psyche, the body). For them, power is no longer simply exercised in the state and the economy, it is also exercised on terrains of sexuality, mental

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accounts of the problems that the introduction of women into these theories would cause.

health, scholarship, and so on. As such, "the postmodern critique has come to focus on philosophy and the very idea of a possible theory of knowledge, justice or beauty. The claim is that the pursuit itself of such theories rests upon the modernist conception of a transcendent reason, a reason able to separate itself from the body and from historical time and place" (4). Postmodernists deny the possibility of such transcendent reason. Accordingly, they advise us to acknowledge the embeddedness of science, justice and the like in modern ideals and in the political agendas associated with those promoting such ideals.

According to Nicholson, feminists have also "uncovered the political power of the academy and of knowledge claims" (5). Indeed, this political power, for feminists, carries with it an intrinsically masculine quality, "valid only for men of a particular culture, class, and race" (5). Even distinctively modern notions of objectivity and reason reflect this sort of male dominance. But feminists should not be understood as merely supporting a postmodernist theory already in place. On the contrary, feminists have important conceptual modifications to offer. From a feminist perspective, one problem with postmodernist theory is that it begins its critiques with the condition of philosophy rather than with the nature of the social object to be criticized (Fraser and Nicholson 1990: 26). This leads it to manifest internal tensions which cause problems for a postmodernist analysis. For example, the strongly antifoundationalist nature of the postmodern critique of metaphysics means that the postmodernist *must* throw out the

grand metanarratives as he attempts social and political analysis. As such, Lyotard[3] "goes too quickly from the premise that Philosophy cannot ground social criticism to the conclusion that criticism itself must be local, *ad hoc*, and untheoretical" (25). He takes up, in other words, a position that is diametrically opposed to foundational philosophical inquiry. This creates obvious problems since it reinforces dichotomous thinking in its *anti*foundationalism, even while antifoundationalism itself seeks to do away with dichotomies, and it disavows "the social-theoretical analysis of large-scale inequalities" (25). In so doing, it limits the socio-political critical effectiveness of social and political inquiry.

Feminism, on Fraser and Nicholson's account, can avoid the problems of postmodernist critique by getting "in between" the foundational/antifoundational divide created by postmodernism. Masculine dominance is pervasive and multifaceted, which is not to say that it is everywhere manifested in the same way. Such a pervasive phenomenon could not be adequately addressed in the limited way that postmodernist antifoundationalism requires. Nor would a mono-causal foundationalist mode of inquiry be adequate since masculine dominance is not always manifested in the same way. As such, a postmodernist feminist theory would attempt to exist between the foundationalist/antifoundationalist divide by eschewing large historical narratives and analyses of societal macrostructures without denying the importance of (contextualized)

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[3]It should be noted that Derrida falls victim to a similar critique for his privileging of art over ordinary life and history (see Huyssen 1990: 234ff.).

narratives and theories (34). Masculine dominance has a long history and is deeply implanted in contemporary societies, so it is imperative that feminists not do away with large theoretical tools. These tools would have to be historical, "attuned to the cultural specificity of different societies and periods and to that of different groups within societies and periods" (34). In short, a postmodern feminist theory would be nonuniversalist, pragmatic and fallibilistic. It would substitute "unitary notions of woman and feminine gender identity with plural and complexly constructed conceptions of social identity, treating gender as one relevant strand among others, attending also to class, race, ethnicity, age, and sexual orientation" (34-35). Ultimately, this sort of theory is crucial to the continued feminist interest in actual political practice. Such practice is increasingly oriented toward alliances, toward the recognition that "the diversity of women's needs and experiences means that no single solution, on issues like child care, social security, and housing, can be adequate for all" (35). Such a postmodern feminist theory, then, embraces the complexity that postmodernist theory espouses without sacrificing the possibilities for the political transformation of disadvantaged groups.

In the present chapter I want to focus on this sort of postmodern feminism. In particular, I want to emphasize the fact that feminism can be utilized to complicate postmodern theory. We cannot confine ourselves to the sort of "either-or" reasoning in which Lyotard would sequester us. We cannot conclude that postmodernity is radically opposed to all aspects of modernity. Rather, we must recognize that, given the conditions

of postmodernity, our social and political inquiries must necessarily become more complex. Foucault, as I argued in Chapter Four, certainly helps us recognize this, but he significantly excludes women from his conceptions and he lacks the normative criteria essential for political practice (Fraser 1981: 286). The postmodern feminist theory I will discuss in some detail in this chapter addresses these problems. I have divided this chapter into three parts. In the first section I discuss the ways in which postmodernist and feminist theories can be allied more thoroughly. Here I focus on the work of Susan Hekman and Jane Flax. In the second section I comment on some specific attempts to re-conceptualize science in an (ostensibly?) more antifoundationalist/foundationalist way from the perspectives of feminist standpoint epistemology and situated knowledges, concluding that situated knowledges more completely espouse a postmodern feminist theory. Finally, I connect the concept of situated knowledges to the science of politics and show how it has more to offer the discipline than postmodernism does.

Feminism and Postmodernity

I have claimed that in some sense virtually all feminists are postmodernist since they begin their analyses with the idea that masculine dominance characterizes contemporary politics. That is, because masculinism is coded into modernity, any critique of it has the potential, on some level, to be a critique of modernity. More importantly, postmodernism entails a radical epistemological break with modernity in which the correspondence theory of Truth and the notion of "reality" are rendered problematic. Accordingly, I think that feminism not only *ought* to be self-consciously postmodernist but that it *needs* to be so. As Hekman notes, the "rational, autonomous subject of modernity is not only constitutive of modernist epistemology, it is also constitutive of the sexism that epistemology has fostered" (1990: 188). The "Cartesian, constituting subject that is the centerpiece of modernist epistemology is inherently masculine" (188). As such, liberal feminist attempts to find space for women in the political sphere and Marxist feminist efforts to include "women's work" in the Marxist category of labor entail the renunciation of "the 'feminine' values that excluded them from this realm in the first place" (188). Similarly, the radical (or difference) feminist's interest in valorizing the "feminine" simply (re)produces the dichotomous thinking of modernity and the hierarchy that it commands. The feminist connection to postmodernism, as I will discuss in this section, evades these problems.

Christine Di Stefano (1990) claims that a connection between postmodernist

theory and feminism cannot possibly be fruitful. She argues that the decentered notion of knowledge that postmodernist theory gives to us is "epistemologically attractive" since "it bears little resemblance to current conceptions of knowledge and rationality which, as we now appreciate, have been intimately bound up with modes of domination and illicit power" (1990: 76). This attractiveness, however, carries with it a political liability since the plausibility of a postmodern politics appears to be inconceivable (75-76). Di Stefano indicates that to "the extent that feminist politics is bound up with a specific constituency or subject, namely, women, the postmodernist prohibition against subject-centered inquiry and theory undermines the legitimacy of a broad-based organized movement dedicated to articulating and implementing the goals of such a constituency" (76). When we combine with this the postmodern insensitivity to questions of gender, we can see, Di Stefano asserts, that postmodernism entails the end to feminism. As such, the postmodern/feminist combination would necessarily run counter to the interests of women.

Jane Flax (1990a, 1990b) disagrees. Indeed, Di Stefano seems to assume that for feminism to be combined with postmodernism, feminism must be consumed by postmodernism. Flax thinks that the two (or more?) views can be synthesized without the disintegration of feminist goals. She believes that Western culture and society are currently experiencing a fundamental transformation akin to the shift from premodern to modern society. This transformation is radical and gradual. She argues that certain

twentieth century events have necessarily altered our modern fascination with reason and its positive and liberatory effects. Hiroshima (and Nagasaki), the Holocaust, and the possibility of global environmental catastrophe have all highlighted the fact that the Enlightenment connections "between science, progress, and happiness appear [to be] disturbingly ironic" (1990b: 8). Furthermore, economic development may not only provide freedom from want, it may also undermine our "humanity" by trapping us in an "iron cage" of reason. The development of technology, for example, increasingly makes us *dependent* on that technology. In short, the emphasis on reason seems to have taken us far afield from the original goals of enlightenment and "freedom from tutelage" that it promised.

Flax claims that our current transitional condition with respect to science, progress and economic development excludes certain forms of thought and enables others. Indeed, she contends that these new modes of thought are not only possible, they are also necessary (1990a: 39). Our emerging world "generates problems that some philosophies seem to acknowledge and confront better than others" (39). Flax discusses three such philosophies: psychoanalysis, feminist theory, and postmodern philosophy. She claims that psychoanalysis, feminism and postmodernism by themselves are inadequate as critiques of the Enlightenment and as theories for effecting social and political change, in spite of the fact that they all are, on some level, critiques of the Enlightenment and hope to bring about social and political change. As such, Flax wants

to combine these three approaches since, together, they offer a more powerful critique of the Enlightenment as well as better options for social and political change (1990b).

> Each of these ways of thinking takes as its object of investigation at least one facet of what has become most problematic in our transitional state: how to understand and (re)constitute the self, gender, knowledge, social relations, and culture without resorting to linear, teleological, hierarchical, holistic, or binary ways of thinking and being (1990a: 39).

I will focus on the connections that Flax finds between feminist theory and postmodern philosophy since these best suit my goals in this chapter.

Flax maintains that feminist theory, in all of its variations, has two fundamental aims: the analysis of gender relations and the establishment of a critical distance to "help clear a space in which reevaluating and altering our existing gender arrangements may become more possible" (40). To accomplish the latter goal, feminism requires postmodern philosophy. In particular, the development of feminist theory "depends upon locating our theorizing within and drawing more self-consciously upon the wider philosophical contents of which it is both a part and a critique. In other words, we need to think more about how we think about gender relations" and postmodern philosophy helps us to do that (40). Feminists join postmodern philosophers "in raising important metatheoretical questions about the possible nature and status of theorizing itself" (41). Postmodern philosophers problematize Enlightenment beliefs still popular in American culture. These include the following:

> 1. The existence of a stable, coherent self. Distinctive properties of this Enlightenment self include a form of reason capable of privileged insight

into its own processes and into the 'laws of nature.'

2. Reason and its 'science'--philosophy--can provide an objective, reliable, and universal foundation for knowledge.

3. The knowledge acquired from the right use of reason will be 'true'--for example, such knowledge will represent something real and unchanging (universal) about our minds and the structure of the natural world.

4. Reason itself has transcendental and universal qualities. It exists independently of the self's contingent existence (e.g., bodily, historical, and social experiences do not affect reason's structure or its capacity to produce atemporal knowledge).

5. There are complex connections between reason, autonomy, and freedom. All claims to truth and rightful authority are to be submitted to the tribunal of reason. Freedom consists of obedience to laws that conform to the necessary results of the right use of reason. (The rules that are right for me as a rational being will necessarily be right for all other such beings.) In obeying such laws, I am obeying my own best transhistorical part (reason) and hence am exercising my own autonomy and ratifying my existence as a free being. In such acts, I escape a determined or merely contingent existence.

6. By grounding claims to authority in reason, the conflicts between truth, knowledge, and power can be overcome. Truth can serve power without distortion; in turn, by utilizing knowledge in the service of power, both freedom and progress will be assured. Knowledge can be both neutral (e.g., grounded in universal reason, not particular 'interests') and also socially beneficial.

7. Science, as the exemplar of the right use of reason, is also the paradigm for all true knowledge. Science is neutral in its methods and contents but socially beneficial in its results. Through its process of discovery we can utilize the laws of nature for the benefit of society. However, in order for science to progress, scientists must be free to follow the rules of reason rather than pander to the interests arising from outside rational discourse.

8. Language is in some sense transparent. Just as the right use of reason can result in knowledge that represents the real, so, too, language is merely

> the medium in and through which such representation occurs. There is a correspondence between word and thing (as between a correct truth claim and the real). Objects are not linguistically (or socially) constructed; they are merely made present to consciousness by naming and the right use of language (Flax 1990a: 41-42).

Postmodern philosophers intend to deconstruct all of these beliefs and, in so doing, they contend that the universe is decentered and unstable. In such a universe, according to Flax, the notion of gender as a simple, natural fact can no longer be supported. Indeed, feminist theory has problematized gender in recent years through a focus on "gender relations."

Thinking of gender as gender relations "entails at least two levels of analysis: of gender as a thought construct or category that helps us to make sense out of particular social worlds and histories, and of gender as a social relation that enters into and partially constitutes all other social relations and activities" (45-46). Ultimately, since it recognizes that the meanings and practices of gender vary by culture, age, class, race and time,[4] the concept of gender relations complicates social and political analysis. Because the social and political world is complex, in other words, good analytical tools will reflect that complexity. According to Flax, the postmodern sensitivity to the complex nature of

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[4]Each of which has its own set of social relations and particular practices associated with it. We cannot say, in other words, that simply because we classify someone by class, race or gender (or any other classification, for that matter), we can know with certainty how they experience the world. At best, we can have a fairly good idea (or guess) as to how "such and such" a person might experience the world, and we can only do so by contextualizing one's experiences in a set of interrelated social relations. Social and political analysis becomes very complicated and highly problematic when we cultivate this postmodern feminist perspective.

social relations undermines traditional feminist attempts to locate the root of gender relations in labor and production (socialist feminism), in "the structure of child-rearing practices" ("maternal" feminism), in "the transformation of raw biological sex into gender" (Freudian or Lacanian feminism), or in "chains of signification, signs, and symbols" (French feminism) (46-47). All of these attempts to find the root of gender relations want to claim "(1) that the mind, the self, and knowledge are socially constituted and that what we can know depends upon our social practices and contexts and (2) that feminist theory can uncover the truth of the whole once and for all" (48). Flax argues that accomplishing this would require the existence of an Archimedean point outside of our experiences of the world--a point that is simply not accessible by such socially, politically constituted beings as humans.

Foucault's knowledge/power nexus helps to strengthen this point. The search for an Archimedean point obscures and conceals "our entanglement in an episteme in which truth claims may take only certain forms and not others. Any episteme requires the suppression of discourses that threaten to differ with or undermine the authority of the dominant one" (48). As such, the search within feminist theory for the definition of the whole or for a feminist standpoint might necessitate suppressing "the important and discomforting voices of persons with experiences unlike our own" (48). According to Flax, then, feminist theorists

> are faced with a fourfold task. We need to (1) articulate feminist viewpoints of/within the social worlds in which we live; (2) think about

> how we are affected by these worlds; (3) consider the ways in which *how* we think about them may be implicated in existing power/knowledge relationships; and (4) imagine ways in which these worlds ought to and can be transformed (Flax 1990a: 55, emphasis mine).

In the end, postmodern philosophy is important for feminist theory, on Flax's account, because it indicates why feminists who seek to locate the root of gender relations will fail and, more importantly, why such feminists will contradict the goals of feminism. One of the qualms that feminist theory in general has with the male dominated Enlightenment world is that it shuts out the "important and discomforting" voices of women in its construction of women as inferior. Feminists who seek to find the root of gender relations seek to attain the same universalizable position that was used to support their exclusion and their inferiority in the modern epoch. As such, they shut out "important and discomforting" voices in the way that their voices were shut out by Enlightenment rationality. Given this, Flax believes that feminist theories, like postmodernism, "should encourage us to tolerate and interpret ambivalence, ambiguity, and multiplicity" and that, as a result, "reality will appear even more unstable, complex, and disorderly than it does now" (56-57).

One problem with the combination of postmodern philosophy with feminist theories that is often noted, however, concerns the apparently depoliticized nature of postmodern philosophy. The problem with this, so the argument goes, is that feminism is oriented toward social and political transformation. Indeed, this is one of the major reasons for its existence. As such, how can a postmodern feminism exist since allying

with postmodernism seems to entail giving up (or at least curtailing) the feminist interest in social and political change? Given this, Flax's argument is radical indeed. But, Susan Hekman (1990) makes the still more radical claim that the postmodern view does not necessarily result in a depoliticized theory.

Hekman recognizes that it is difficult even to *define* a relationship between feminism and postmodernism, much less actually to formulate a coherent postmodern feminist position (1990: 6). Feminists have become interested in attacking the dichotomy in Enlightenment thought that privileges the rational (associated with males) over the irrational (associated with females). One approach to this attack has been to devise a feminist epistemology in which the virtues of "female nature" (nurturing, relatedness, community) are exalted over "the 'male' values of domination, rationality and abstraction" (5). According to Hekman, however, this attempt to ally the postmodern critique of dualisms with the feminist assault on masculine domination simply "reifies the Enlightenment epistemology that it seeks to overcome" (5-6). Another problem with a postmodern-feminist alliance "lies in the difficulty of applying the postmodern rejection of absolutism to the feminist movement. The charge that postmodernism, because it rejects absolute values, cannot provide a viable political program is one that feminism must take seriously" (6). Furthermore, postmodern "anti-essentialism" runs counter to those feminists who want to discuss the "essentially feminine." The main problem here

> revolves around the fact that, on one hand, feminism has much in common with postmodernism's attack on Enlightenment epistemology because it is

> an epistemology that places women in an inferior position. On the other hand, however, feminism is also tied to that Enlightenment epistemology, both because of its modernist legacy and because even radical feminists adhere to dichotomies and absolutes (6).

According to Hekman, feminists understand that they are in a difficult position with respect to postmodernism and have formulated three positions in response to it. The first "is that feminism should retain the 'good' aspects of modernity while at the same time rejecting its problematic features" (6). The problem with this position is that since the epistemology of modernism is a unitary whole, feminists cannot simply "pick and choose the elements of modernism that they like, the emancipatory impulse of liberalism and Marxism, for example, and discard those they do not like, such as sexism" (7). The second position "is the attempt by some feminists simply to avoid the issue of where to place feminism in the modernism/postmodernism debate. One way of doing this is to reject the 'feminist' label altogether" as the socialist "feminists" and French "feminists" have done (7). The idea here is that the doctrines of male theorists "taint" feminism. But, as Hekman notes, these "feminists" perpetuate Enlightenment dichotomies with such male/female talk and are therefore actually taking sides in the debate. Moreover, rejecting "the feminist label or claiming to be non-aligned will not advance the cause of feminism in the present intellectual climate" (7).

The third position, a postmodern approach to feminism, has numerous advantages over the other two positions. Hekman indicates that the history of methodological disputes in the social sciences illustrates that "anything short of outright rejection of the

dualism and rationalism of Enlightenment thought will not be a successful strategy" for feminism or for the social sciences (7-8). It was, after all, Enlightenment epistemology that characterized the social sciences as inferior to the "hard" sciences. Similarly, "feminists cannot overcome the privileging of the male and the devaluing of the female until they reject the epistemology that created these categories" (8). The postmodern position also exposes the hopelessness of the attempts "to define an essential female nature or to replace the masculinist epistemology with a feminist epistemology" as radical feminists hope to do (8). Furthermore, the postmodernist rejection of the subject/object dichotomy and support for the claim that all knowledge is interpretive adds, in Hekman's words, "depth and substance to the feminist critique" (8). Feminism is also a constitutive corrective to postmodernism. The "postmodern critique of Enlightenment dualism and the privileging it entails...is incomplete without the feminist contribution to that critique. The postmoderns see the error of Enlightenment dualism but the feminists complete this critique by defining those dualisms as gendered" (8). Postmodernism and feminism, then, are complementary approaches: feminists "see the gendered basis of Enlightenment thought but postmodern thought expands and concretizes that vision" (8).

The bulk of Hekman's book is taken up with her understanding of how the postmodern critique of certain dualisms (rational/irrational, subject/object, and nature/culture) can contribute to feminism. Hekman argues, for example, that with

respect to the subject/object dichotomy, Gadamer (whom she, I think rightly, characterizes as a postmodern thinker) renders the gendered connotations of the Enlightenment conception of science problematic.

> At the heart of the Enlightenment conception of science is the notion of objectivity, that is, the ability of the scientific observer to remove himself from what is being observed and to analyze rationally the data that he gathers. Gadamer attacks this notion by arguing that *all* human understanding, in the natural sciences, the human sciences, art, and every other sphere of human knowledge, is always hermeneutic. He argues that the ideal of abstract, objective knowledge and the notion of the Archimedean point that is definitive of the Enlightenment conception of science is a false ideal. It is not only unattainable but also undesirable. Against this he argues that all human understanding is rooted in prejudice, in the preconceptions that order human life and make human understanding possible. His thesis that all human understanding is contextual, perspectival, prejudiced, that is, hermeneutic, fundamentally challenges the conception of science as it has been articulated since the Enlightenment (107).

Since, on the Enlightenment view, women are unable to abstract from their particular situation, they cannot reach the Archimedean point necessary for "truly" scientific thought. As such, Gadamer's position "undermines the conception of science that provides the justification for the exclusion of women from the realm of rationality and, hence, science" (107). Another example of how postmodernism can augment feminism can be found in Derrida's relevance to feminist discussions of woman's "nature." Derrida, like Foucault and Gadamer, rejects essentialism and therefore opposes attempts to define an essential female nature. With his concept of *différance*, Derrida "encourages us to think of the differences between men and women not in terms of absolute

hierarchies but in terms of chains of signification expressed in language, subtleties and shadings rather than absolute oppositions" (110). *Différance* offers a way to talk about sexual difference that displaces the oppositions of Enlightenment thought "without denying the differences between the sexes. It offers a way of talking about sexual difference in terms of multiplicity and plurality rather than [in terms of] hierarchy" (110). This is an extremely important position for feminism. It allows feminists to herald the differences between women and men without being accused of reproducing Enlightenment thought. In the formulations of *différance*, the differences between women and men do not lead to the exercise of power; rather, they are merely differences, facts of life in a diverse and pluralistic world.

Feminists, Hekman argues, can use these and other postmodern conceptions as they revamp epistemology. However, since the Enlightenment defined "'epistemology' as the study of knowledge acquisition that was accomplished through the opposition of a knowing subject and a known object," neither feminists nor postmodernists can be understood as engaging in "'epistemology' as the Enlightenment defined it" (9). Both feminists and postmodernists reject "the notion that knowledge is the product of the opposition of subjects and objects and that there is only one way in which knowledge can be constituted" (9). Postmodernists and feminists, then, must be understood as formulating "an explanation of the discursive processes by which human beings gain understanding of their common world" (9). Going along with this must be suspicion of

those who want to found a "feminist epistemology." A "postmodern feminism would reject the masculinist bias of rationalism but would not attempt to replace it with a feminist bias. Rather it would take the position that there is not one (masculine) truth but, rather, many truths, none of which is privileged along gendered lines" (9).

For feminism and postmodernism to be aligned, however, the argument that postmodern inquiry is necessarily apolitical (Di Stefano 1990) must be overcome. Hekman argues that postmodern philosophy is not apolitical. Derrida, for example, may not propose a program for political revolution, but he does define "'woman' as a revolutionary force. For Derrida 'woman,' along with 'writing,' serve as the means by which the binary logic of western thought can be displaced" (174). Derrida's

> efforts to displace the binary logic of western thought, a logic that he identifies as rooted in the masculine/feminist opposition, reveals that what we have defined as opposites invade and inhabit each other. Masculine and feminine are not opposites, but elements that represent multiple differences, pluralities of characteristics that cross and recross the alleged boundary between the two (174-175).

Derrida contributes to feminism, then, the displacement of binary logic and a new understanding of difference, an understanding that allows feminists to (re)conceptualize difference as they continue their political action.

Foucault has also been accused by feminists of taking up a relativist, nihilistic and politically inadequate philosophical position. Critics of Foucault "charge that no program of political action flows from his position and, specifically, that it precludes the possibility of any coherent resistance to repressive political regimes" (175). They claim

that his approach "precludes principled political action because the logic of his analysis denies the possibility of anything but a relative conception of truth" (175). Foucault certainly does reject an absolute grounding for truth and knowledge that would be able to serve as a basis for political action. Also, the critical connection that he sees between truth and power definitely undermines the Enlightenment conception that the Truth can play an emancipatory political role. And if "it is assumed that any coherent program of political action must be grounded in absolute truth and knowledge then the unavoidable conclusion of the analyses of Foucault's critics and his defenders is that he does not offer the possibility of such a program. It would seem to follow from this that those who accuse Foucault of political inadequacy must be declared correct" (179-180).

According to Hekman, this is incorrect because Foucault is challenging the claim that the only valid political actions are those actions grounded in absolute values. Foucault proposes a "critical ontology of ourselves" conceived of "as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them" (Foucault 1984: 50). All critiques are, in other words, historically situated and, as such, Foucault's discursive conception of knowledge/power cannot "claim the status of a metanarrative. Nor can it claim to eradicate power. It can, however, claim to alleviate the oppression of the discourse it opposes." Therefore, "Foucault's postmodern theory of political opposition is a position that is directly

applicable to the challenge of formulating feminist political practice" (Hekman 1990: 187). Feminism, after all, has always been concerned with criticizing "the discourses of male domination that constitute women as inferior" (187). Foucault's position and the position of postmodernism in general, on Hekman's account, provide us with a means of formulating a "feminist discourse that displaces and explodes the repressive discourses of patriarchal society" and articulates "a feminist political practice" by providing "a strategy that deconstructs masculinist discourse/power without attempting to resurrect the Enlightenment project of metanarratives and liberation" (188).

Hekman's argument usefully emphasizes the importance of a feminist/postmodernist alliance. She understands that these two approaches are not identical, but insofar as they both attack the modern episteme at its roots they are similar. Hekman's account is especially useful because it consistently avoids conceiving of postmodernism or feminism in oppositional terms. Indeed, Hekman understands the complexity of both accounts. This is of particular importance, it seems to me, with respect to feminism since it has modernist roots and still emphasizes the modernist goal of emancipatory political action. Postmodernism forces feminists to limit their goals while still allowing them to seek those goals. That is, feminists "can use the discourse theory of postmodernism to increase our understanding of the constitution of gender in various societies" (189). In so doing, feminists "have attempted to fashion new discourses about the feminine, discourses that resist the hegemony of male domination,

that utilize the contradictions in these hegemonic discourses in order to effect their transformation" (190). As such, postmodern feminists are able to "get in between" modernism and postmodernism by embracing the complexity that postmodern critiques generate *and* still seeking socio-political transformation, albeit in a limited sense.

I now turn to how this conversation between feminism and postmodernism and, indeed, between modernism and postmodernism, manifests itself in Donna Haraway's philosophy of science. Ultimately, it seems to me, Haraway provides the most thorough discussion of what a postmodern feminist philosophy of science might look like.

The Feminist Standpoint and Situated Knowledges

The sort of postmodern feminism that I have discussed thus far makes "epistemological" claims that seek to undercut the goals and presuppositions of the Enlightenment (masculinist) conception of science. This project is ultimately political, though, since the hegemony of the masculinist view of science and "reality" is legitimated through power. In order to succeed with their project, then, it seems to me that feminists must appeal on some level to the Enlightenment project. At the same time, however, feminists must do so without compromising the postmodern feminist position. This is precisely what Hekman (1995) hopes to do with her conception of a "feminist ideal type."

> The challenge for feminist methodology is to articulate a theory that acknowledges the discursive construction of both the feminist researcher's categories and that of the 'world' that she studies. It must acknowledge that no knowledge is 'value-free' and that all knowledge, particularly the knowledge of feminists, is politically motivated. And, most importantly, it must clarify how feminists can argue for the validity of this knowledge in a masculinist world hostile to feminist goals (Hekman 1995: 7).

In the end, feminist theories must "construct arguments that will dismantle the master's house from within" (18). Utilizing Weber's ideal types, a common practice among (masculinist) social scientists, from a feminist perspective can do just this.

> Feminist ideal types are political and engaged. They carve up the social world differently than do the ideal types of masculinist theory. In defense of these ideal types we can do nothing but argue that our perspective reveals oppressions that society should work to eradicate. The 'validity' of an ideal type, as Weber noted, lies not in its 'truth' but in whether it helps us *understand* the social phenomenon we are studying. By

> employing ideal types that 'see' the world differently feminists undermine the structures that constitute that world and work to transform it. And this, ultimately, is what feminism is all about (18).

Donna Haraway makes what is essentially the same argument as Hekman's, but she does so in a way that I find to be far more fruitful. In particular, Haraway seeks to isolate oppressions and to work to eradicate them through the use of metaphor and myth. I find this approach to be more compelling than Hekman's for two reasons.

First, utilizing metaphors and myths allows Haraway to avoid being undermined by the "reflexive paradox."[5] Indeed, Haraway seems to be comfortable with the possibility of the reflexive paradox. According to Hilary Lawson (1985), when "we regard the enterprise of knowledge, the dream of the Age of Enlightenment, as intact," arriving at paradoxical self-awareness "is an indication of [having committed] a fundamental error" (28). However, if "we are led to question the possibility of accomplishing such a project...we will need in some form to come to terms with reflexivity" (28-29). Thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, who clearly deny the possible success of the Enlightenment project, must come to terms with the

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[5]A reflexive paradox occurs when a particular statement or idea contradicts itself. For example, when I say, "There is no truth!" my claim cannot be true. I, of course, mean to say that it is indeed true and am therefore caught in a reflexive paradox: if there is no truth then the truth of my claim is undermined. Reflexive paradoxes are commonplace and apparently unavoidable. Even the positivist is caught in a reflexive paradox since she cannot possibly protect the scientific method from falsification since its support rests on *normative* ground. People like Haraway, as I will demonstrate, suggest that we become comfortable with reflexive paradoxes. The "cost" of such comfort is an embrace of complexity and the contestability of knowledge.

reflexive paradox. According to Lawson, for Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida,

> the position of the theory or the text in relation to what it proclaims is always in question. Indeed, what it proclaims is also a function of that tension. Thus what is said in the text is always said in the light of the limitations of the text. The text is, therefore, never a given, static object which can be examined as one would examine a statue. Instead there is a movement, a tension, between what can be said and what cannot be said...No section of the text can therefore be taken at face value. No assertion is simply an assertion, for it carries within it the unsaid awareness that it cannot be asserted. In this sense reflexivity is no longer a form of self-reference, a paradoxical puzzle, or a philosophical argument, but an inescapable movement which is still present in the moments of apparent stillness. It is as if...we are caught in the metaphors of language and there is no way to halt their shifting character (28).

Nietzsche's reliance on metaphor, then, makes his writing nearly impossible to interpret. That is, it is difficult to come to a single understanding of Nietzsche's work. His writings support multiple interpretations. This is indeed necessary since Nietzsche seems to claim that untruth is a condition of life (a reflexive paradox). As such, there must be no Truth to Nietzsche. In denying the success of the "great enterprise," his work "is also the beginning of a search to provide an alternative which is not simply another great project" (29). Haraway, it seems to me, is seeking to do the same thing. Her constant and self-conscious search for better metaphors and myths to describe her alternative conception(s) of society, politics and science exemplifies this attitude.

Second, the use of metaphor and myth in the construction of a sound and consistent argument is a decidedly postmodern approach. Indeed, it seems even to evince a distinctively feminist perspective. The modernist, Enlightenment, masculinist,

scientific operating procedure has been characterized by, among other things, its lack of humor, its facticity, and its virile sterility. The language of science is supposed to be straightforward and systematic. It repels narrative and invites a dispassionate, neutral reporting of the facts. It does not seek to provoke independent (or creative) thought among those who might read it; rather, it expects a simple and singular interpretation of what is written. To write in any other way would be to invite misinterpretation and, therefore, a misunderstanding of what is being explained (or what has been "discovered"). Haraway's reliance on metaphor and myth, then, is a decidedly non-modern approach. Her richly provocative language is artistic, passionate, convoluted, and filled with humor. It invites a multitude of interpretations, one of which is mine.

To understand what Haraway is doing, it helps to begin with a discussion of Nancy Hartsock's and Sandra Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology. Feminist standpoint epistemology provides the context for Haraway's conception of "situated knowledges," but it suffers from a few shortcomings which Haraway seeks to avoid. Feminist standpoint epistemology is rooted in Marx's historical materialism and it seeks to develop a specifically feminist historical materialist method. A feminist historical materialism enables "us to expand the Marxian account to include all human activity rather than focussing on activity more characteristic of males in capitalism" (Hartsock 1983: 283). For Hartsock, the Marxian distinctions between appearance and essence, circulation and production, and abstract and concrete take on different theoretical forms

when viewed from the feminist standpoint rather than from the proletarian standpoint. In particular, since the Marxian category of labor includes "both interaction with other humans and with the natural world," it "can help to cut through the dichotomy of nature and culture, and, for feminists, can help to avoid the false choice of characterizing the situation of women as either 'purely natural' or 'purely social'" (283). In this way, Hartsock and Harding problematize the dualisms of Enlightenment thought (Hartsock 1983: 297; Harding 1990: 94-101).

For Marx, the proletariat is in a special position to be able to understand the horrors of class society. In a similar way, women have "a particular and privileged vantage point on male supremacy, a vantage point which can ground a powerful critique of the phallocratic institutions and ideology which constitute the capitalist form of patriarchy" (Hartsock 1983: 284). Ultimately, Hartsock is not primarily interested in the critique of capitalism that emanates from this claim. Rather, she highlights its epistemological consequences. For her, the sexual division of labor forms the basis for the feminist standpoint and the resulting structures of women's activity can be used to construct an epistemological tool. That is, "a feminist standpoint can allow us to understand patriarchal institutions and ideologies as perverse inversions of more humane social relations" and can point us toward the actualization of these more humane social relations (284-285).

The feminist standpoint, then, is similar to the proletarian standpoint and, at the

same time, deeper. Women and workers live in a world where

> the emphasis is on change rather than stasis, a world characterized by interaction with natural substances rather than separation from nature, a world in which quality is more important than quantity, a world in which the unification of mind and body is inherent in the activities performed. Yet, there are some important differences, differences marked by the fact that the proletarian (if male) is immersed in this world only during the time his labor power is being used by the capitalist. If, to paraphrase Marx, we follow the worker home from the factory, we can once again perceive a change in the *dramatis personae*. He who before followed behind as the worker, timid and holding back, with nothing to expect but a hiding, now strides in front while a third person, not specifically present in Marx's account of the transaction between capitalist and worker (both of whom are male) follows timidly behind, carrying groceries, baby and diapers (290-291).

Women and (male) workers, then, experience domination but women feel this domination more completely than do men. Women, whether or not they work outside of the home, suffer the control of (socially constructed) male supremacy while men can escape class domination when they come home to rule.[6] Ultimately, Hartsock emphasizes the

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[6]I find this characterization of men to be a bit blunt. The charitable reading of Hartsock, though, understands her point to be a structural one. That is, in patriarchal capitalist society it is structurally the case that men rule over women in the home and that women carry out most (if not all) of the domestic duties. While this state of domestic affairs may not always be the case, it does seem that the capitalist form of patriarchy supports it. There does not seem to be any institutional or legal framework in place to undermine this sort of patriarchy (though this *may* be changing). Furthermore, since men generally are unable to overcome their own dominant perspective they fail to understand the impact of the domination of women on women, society, and themselves. This, though, is the *charitable* reading of Hartsock since she does not play these issues out very clearly. Indeed, she appears to be arguing, in this piece, that men simply dominate women and that no man can appreciate the effects of male domination and the sexual division of labor on women and society. She also assumes that women experience male domination in the same way *and* that women will (naturally?) recognize and comprehend their domination. This is a serious shortcoming of her work, and it probably helps to

differing character of male and female experience. The sexual division of labor in child rearing, as well as how it has been constructed and codified, she argues, brings about differences in the male and female experience of the self and these differences lead, in turn, to abstract masculinity and a feminist standpoint, respectively.

Masculinity, for Hartsock, is characterized by the duality of concrete versus abstract. The material reality of the family "is unimportant in the attainment of masculinity" (297). Masculinity is

> attained by means of opposition to the concrete world of daily life, by escaping from contact with the female world of the household into the masculine world of public life. This experience of two worlds, one valuable, if abstract and deeply unattainable, the other useless and demeaning, if concrete and necessary, lies at the heart of a series of dualisms - abstract/concrete, mind/body, culture/nature, ideal/real, stasis/change. And these dualisms are overlaid by gender: only the first of each pair is associated with the male (297).

According to Hartsock, the feminist standpoint offers a possibility for overcoming these destructive dualisms. For if material life structures consciousness, "women's relationally defined existence, bodily experience of boundary challenges, and activity of transforming both physical objects and human beings must be expected to result in a world view to which dichotomies are foreign" (298). Cultivating the feminist standpoint would allow us to generalize the activity of women to the social system, thereby raising, "for the first time in human history, the possibility of a fully human community, a community structured by connection rather than separation and opposition" (305). In other words, if

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explain why she has been accused of essentialism (Flax 1990: 56).

we can come to the understanding that "women's work" is "the real, material activity of concrete human beings," then we have a "basis for an analysis of the real structures of women's oppression" and, indeed, we have a basis for an analysis of our own alienation from each other and from our selves (304).

The feminist standpoint perspective has two profound epistemological implications. First, it clearly characterizes knowledge as perspectival and power-laden. The "knowledge" generated from the masculinist perspective of the world differs markedly from the "knowledge" generated from the feminist standpoint. Indeed, the practice of generating knowledge itself differs in each account. From the masculinist perspective, we "know" that the world is ordered and that human reason renders it controllable and knowable in a universal sense. Material, bodily and non-rational forces do not aid this project of knowledge. Indeed, they interfere. From the feminist standpoint, on the other hand, we "know" that material, bodily and non-rational forces are eminently important to the project of knowledge. We also recognize that our attempts to know and to control the world are necessarily contestable and problematic. In the world of materiality, embodiedness and unreason, complexity reigns. Who can say definitively, after all, what effects our actions have on our relationships, our societies, our psyches?

Second, the feminist standpoint renders epistemology praxological. Positivist epistemology separates theory from practice. That is, the positivist cannot comprehend any necessary practical implications for knowledge. Knowledge is sought simply for the

sake of knowledge. Knowledge, on the positivist account, is in some sense considered to be "pure." The behavioral political scientist studies voting behavior in order to *explain* it, to *know* it. He does not seek to alter that behavior; this he leaves to the practitioner. The feminist standpoint sees a necessary connection between theory and practice.[7] As Hartsock explains:

> the ability to go beneath the surface of appearances to reveal the real but concealed social relations requires both theoretical and political activity. Feminist theorists must demand that feminist theorizing be grounded in women's material activity and must as well be a part of the political struggle necessary to develop areas of social life modeled on this activity. The outcome could be the development of a political economy which included women's activity as well as men's, and could as well be a step toward the redefining and restructuring of society as a whole on the basis of women's activity (Hartsock 1983: 304).

Donna Haraway's epistemological view aligns rather well with feminist standpoint epistemology. Haraway is clearly interested in looking at knowledge from the perspective of women and she also emphasizes the importance of complexity and of praxis. This said, she does challenge aspects of feminist standpoint epistemology. For one, Haraway believes that the notion of "white capitalist patriarchy" as a model of power in contemporary society has been replaced by the "informatics of domination" (Haraway 1991: 161-165). According to Haraway, "we are living through a movement from an organic, industrial society to a polymorphous, information system" which entails

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[7]So does Marx, though this is not always easy to see. Indeed, by the time he wrote *Das Kapital* Marx seems to have believed that his dialectical method was scientific in the strongest sense: it functioned on the basis of laws and it pointed to the truth of the world-historical transition to the classless society. See Wellmer 1971: 67-119.

"transitions from the comfortable old hierarchical dominations to the scary new networks...called the informatics of domination" (161). To explain, Haraway devises a chart describing the objects of interest before and after the transition. What we notice when we peruse her chart is that the objects in the "informatics of domination" schema require us to think in radically different ways. For example, under white capitalist patriarchy we thought in terms of "organisms" while under the informatics of domination we think in terms of "biotic components." With regard "to objects like biotic components, one must think not in terms of essential properties, but in terms of design, boundary constraints, rates of flows, systems logic, costs of lowering constraints" (162). Similarly, at the level of ideology,

> we see translations of racism and colonialism into languages of development and under-development, rates and constraints of modernization. Any objects or persons can be reasonably thought of in terms of disassembly and reassembly; no 'natural' architectures constrain system design. The financial districts in all the world's cities, as well as the export-processing and free-trade zones, proclaim this elementary fact of 'late capitalism'. The entire universe of objects that can be known scientifically must be formulated as problems in communications engineering (for the managers) or theories of the text (for those who would resist) (162-163).

In a world that is increasingly dominated by microelectronics and biotechnology, one must expect inquiry to change dramatically. Techno-rationality has consumed and digested the dichotomies between mind and body, animal and human, organism and machine, public and private, nature and culture, men and women, primitive and civilized, and so on (163). As such, any feminism that proceeds as if the organic, hierarchical

dualisms ordering discourse in "the West" since Aristotle still rule makes a serious mistake.

> The *actual* situation of women is their integration/exploitation into a world system of production/reproduction and communication called the informatics of domination. The home, workplace, market, public arena, the body itself - all can be dispersed and interfaced in nearly infinite, polymorphous ways, with large consequences for women and others - consequences that themselves are very different for different people and which make potent oppositional international movements difficult to imagine and essential for survival. One important route for reconstructing socialist-feminist politics is through theory and practice addressed to the social relations of science and technology, including crucially the systems of myth and meanings structuring our imaginations (163, emphasis added).

To appeal to this project of reconstruction Haraway offers the cyborg. She claims that we are all cyborgs.[8] "The cyborg gives us our ontology; it gives us our politics" (150). The cyborg metaphor confuses the border between organism and machine and, in so doing, obfuscates all other human-centered distinctions, including gender distinctions.[9] As such, Haraway is doing two things that differ radically from feminist standpoint

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[8]Haraway means this both metaphorically and literally. Given the "advances" in medical technology, any of us can become part machine temporarily (we have artificial hearts, hearing aids, eyeglasses and contact lenses) or permanently (we have prosthetic limbs). Through genetic engineering we are garnering the capability to alter artificially our genetic structure. As such, the possibility that we can create a being without defects (capable of transcending death?) is apparently becoming more real. In this sense, the human being is thought of as machine that can be adjusted, fine-tuned to display the best of what it can offer. When we capture the critical possibilities of being (and being thought of as) cybernetic organisms, a dynamic and *potentially* liberatory new field of inquiry opens up.

[9]Consider the advertisement that indicates to us that when we link up with our computers and access the Internet "there is no age; there are no genders; there are no infirmities" (an amazing choice of words!).

epistemologists. First, she is decidedly shifting the feminist terrain away from the organic, hierarchical dualisms that have ruled "the West" for millennia, something Hartsock arguably fails to do, especially if we take seriously those who have accused her of essentializing women and men. Second, Haraway utilizes metaphor to shift the feminist terrain. When we contemplate ourselves as cyborgs we recognize that organic, hierarchical dualisms no longer have the same meaning that they once did and that we need not think in dichotomous ways. Haraway's approach, then, is decisively postmodernist *and* feminist.

The second problem that Haraway has with feminist standpoint epistemology revolves around its feminist version of objectivity. On Haraway's account, feminist standpoint epistemologists have approached the problem of radical historical contingency in the face of the strong constructionist argument that all forms of knowledge claims (especially scientific ones) are power moves, not moves towards truth with their "own doctrines of objective vision" (184, 186). The feminist standpoint, in other words, re-invigorates "legitimate meanings of objectivity" and "remains leery of a radical constructivism conjugated with semiology and narratology" (186-187). On this account, the feminist standpoint move is simply a response to the radical constructivist's deconstruction of truth claims and the rhetorical nature of truth that emerges. For in a world characterized by rhetorical truths, by truths based in power, the notion of "reality" slips from view. Feminist standpoint epistemologists, then, attempt to recapture the

"real," but they do so, on Haraway's account, by falling back on the standard Enlightenment view of objectivity.

Haraway wants to conceive of objectivity in a radically new way. She wants to redefine objectivity. She seeks to locate

> *simultaneously* an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own 'semiotic technologies' for making meanings, *and* a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a 'real' world, one that can be partially shared and friendly to earth-wide projects of finite freedom, adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and limited happiness...Feminists don't need a doctrine of objectivity that promises transcendence, a story that loses track of its mediations just where someone might be held responsible for something, and unlimited instrumental power. We don't want a theory of innocent powers to represent the world, where language and bodies both fall in the bliss of organic symbiosis. We also don't want to theorize the world, much less act within it, in terms of Global Systems, but we do need an earth-wide network of connections, including the ability partially to translate knowledges among very different - and power-differentiated - communities. We need the power of modern critical theories of how meanings and bodies get made, not in order to deny meaning and bodies, but in order to live in meanings and bodies that have a chance for a future (187).

Haraway contends that the sciences "have always been implicated in hopes like these" (187). On her account, science has always

> been about a search for translation, convertibility, mobility of meanings, and universality[10] - which I call reductionism, when one language (guess whose) must be enforced as the standard for all the translations and conversions. What money does in the exchange orders of capitalism,

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[10]This is, by the way, similar to Taylor's discussion of the hermeneutical circle and attempts to break out of it (1977). See my consideration of this in Chapter Two and in the conclusion to the current chapter.

> reductionism does in the powerful mental orders of global sciences: there is finally only one equation. That is the deadly fantasy that feminists and others have identified in some versions of objectivity doctrines in the service of hierarchical and positivist orderings of what can count as knowledge. That is one of the reasons the debates about objectivity matter, metaphorically and otherwise...[W]e could use some enforceable, reliable accounts of things not reducible to power moves and agonistic, high status games of rhetoric or to scientistic, positivist arrogance (187-188).

Toward this end, Haraway argues for objectivity as "positioned rationality" (196). To do so, she adopts a metaphor of vision.

Vision can be used to avoid binary oppositions. It has typically been used in modernity "to signify a leap out of the marked body and into a conquering gaze from nowhere," but Haraway wants to place it back in the body (188). The "conquering gaze from nowhere" turns out to be vision from the "unmarked positions of Man and White" (188). Objectivity, then, has always been embodied and partial, and Haraway simply aspires to a new "doctrine of embodied objectivity that accommodates paradoxical and critical feminist science projects: feminist objectivity means quite simply *situated knowledges*" (188). Vision has been used "to distance the knowing subject from everybody and everything in the interests of unfettered power" (188). Masculinist science wants us to believe that we can observe the world from without, that our vision is infinite (a frightening proposition with dangerous implications). On this view, only by stepping outside of our bodies are we able to "know" the world. This, of course, is a myth since we cannot escape our bodies and since this version of science has been used to

subjugate women through neglecting them. That is, infinite vision is a myth because it has tended to support the "White" and "Male" claim to power. Objectivity, then, "turns out to be about particular and specific embodiment, and definitely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all limits and responsibility" (190).

> The moral is simple: only partial perspective promises objective vision. This is an objective vision that initiates, rather than closes off, the problem of responsibility for the generativity of all visual practices. Partial perspective can be held accountable for both its promising and its destructive monsters. All Western cultural narratives about objectivity are allegories of the ideologies of the relations of what we call mind and body, of distance and responsibility, embedded in the science question in feminism. Feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of subject and object. In this way we might become answerable for what we learn how to see (190).

Haraway argues *for* situated and embodied knowledges and *against* various forms of unlocatable and therefore irresponsible knowledge claims (191).

In this way, Haraway aligns herself with Harding's plea for a "successor science" (Harding 1986; Haraway 1991: 192). Indeed, she emphasizes the need for "science." Science, after all, "has been utopian and visionary from the start...[and] that is one reason 'we' need it" (Haraway 1991: 192). She seeks, however, a specifically feminist science, a science oriented around situated knowledges and partial perspective. The positions of "women," as subjugated,

> are preferred because in principle they are least likely to allow denial of the critical and interpretative core of all knowledge. They are savvy to modes of denial through repression, forgetting, and disappearing acts - ways of being nowhere while claiming to see comprehensively. The subjugated have a decent chance to be on to the god-trick and all its

> dazzling - and, therefore, blinding - illuminations. 'Subjugated' standpoints are preferred because they seem to promise more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming accounts of the world (191).

Positioning grounds knowledge that is organized around the imagery of vision (193). It follows from this "that politics and ethics ground struggles for the contests over what may count as rational knowledge. That is, admitted or not, politics and ethics ground struggles over knowledge projects in the exact, natural, social, and human sciences. Otherwise, rationality is simply impossible, an optical illusion projected from nowhere comprehensively" (193-194). Reason must be exercised *by* someone, by an embodied knower. As such, objectivity construed as a "conquering gaze from nowhere" is necessarily an illusion and a *failure* to exercise reason. A rational sense of objectivity, then, is more accurately construed as partial connection (193). We can situate our knowledges in time, place, gender, race, nation, class, and so on, adopt the partial perspective of the subjugated positions within that context, and seek partial connections with others from within and without that context. To be objective, in other words, we must avoid the fixed vision of the totalizing perspective and seek to "see" with another's "eyes."

> There is no unmediated photograph or passive camera obscura in scientific accounts of bodies and machines; there are only highly specific visual possibilities, each with a wonderfully detailed, active, partial way of organizing worlds. All these pictures of the world should not be allegories of infinite mobility and interchangeability, *but of elaborate specificity and difference and the loving care people might take to learn how to see faithfully from another's point of view* [emphasis mine] even when the other is our own machine. That's not alienating distance; that's a *possible*

> allegory for feminist versions of objectivity. Understanding how these visual systems work, technically, socially, and psychically ought to be a way of embodying feminist objectivity (190).

According to Haraway, science has always been about the connections that we seek to make with others. Scientists have always sought to communicate with others, to render the world understandable, to translate "reality" into a universal language. Doing so, they believe, requires objectivity understood as a disembodied and "conquering gaze from nowhere." This has led to a reductionism in which the unity of method reigns. Haraway finds this to be an unacceptable solution to the desire to make connections with others because it amounts "to power moves and agonistic, high status games of rhetoric...[and] scientistic, positivist arrogance" (188). Her attempt to avoid such power moves and still connect with others comes to us through her association of science with situated knowledges and partial perspective. For her, and in her words, this sort of science is "the paradigmatic model not of closure, but of that which is contestable and contested. Science becomes the myth not of what escapes human agency and responsibility in a realm above the fray, but rather of accountability and responsibility for translations and solidarities linking the cacophonous visions and visionary voices that characterize the knowledges of the subjugated" (196). She goes on to explain that we

> seek not the knowledges ruled by phallogocentrism (nostalgia for the presence of the one true Word) and disembodied vision, but those ruled by partial sight and limited voice. We do not seek partiality for its own sake, but for the sake of the connections and unexpected openings situated knowledges make possible. The only way to find a larger vision is to be somewhere in particular. The science question in feminism is about

> objectivity as positioned rationality. Its images are not the products of escape and transcendence of limits, i.e., the view from above, but the joining of partial views and halting voices into a collective subject position that promises a vision of the means of ongoing finite embodiment, of living within limits and contradictions, i.e., of views from somewhere (196).

Here we see one more important difference between situated knowledges and feminist standpoint epistemology. Hartsock argues that society ought to be redefined and restructured on the basis of women's activity. This claim, it seems to me, invites an opposition between "women's activity" and "men's activity." Haraway makes no such claim. Rather, she contends that society ought to be redefined and restructured on the basis of what we have in common (as humans) and that the subjugated positions of women (and of others) provide a useful, and partial, perspective from which to establish a broader vision of the "connections and unexpected openings" that situated knowledges make available.

Conclusion

My peregrinations through positivism/postpositivism, hermeneutical consciousness, critical theory, postmodernism and postmodern feminism have culminated in Haraway's feminist science oriented around situated knowledges and partial perspective. It seems to me that Haraway's conception of science has at least three important contributions to make to my discussion of the science of politics. First, and perhaps most importantly, Haraway's feminist science (and, indeed, feminisms in general) provides a valuable feminist perspective on politics. Being on the receiving end of masculine dominance allows women (in general) to appreciate the existence of partial perspective and the situated nature of knowledge. After all, what typically matter as political issues are things such as war, controversy and conflict, and electoral behavior, all of which are usually connected with the concerns of men, while "human needs for food, clothing and shelter, adherence to consistent moral principles, the pre-emption of national by human concerns, [and] a rejection of war as rational," the supposed concerns of women, are rarely considered to be political (Bourque and Grossholt 1974: 258). In fact, not only do these concerns infrequently garner the attention of political scientists, but they also often experience popular ridicule and Congressional neglect. Feminisms and situated knowledges place emphasis squarely on the slighted political issue of how to live *together* well. Compassion, concern and caring for others seem to be disappearing

from our political society and our political science.[11] Feminists generally want to reinject these components. This is certainly no easy task, but it is fairly clear that the discipline of political science and the condition of political society could be transformed from such a shift in its discursive domain (Ferguson 1987: 219).

Second, Haraway provides us with a useful alternative conception of science and a rational sense of objectivity. Attacks against critics of science tend to charge them with relativism. That is, anyone who dares to question the hallowed tenets of objectivity and scientific knowledge must be a methodological nihilist and/or a cognitive relativist. But Haraway recognizes relativism as "the perfect mirror twin of totalization in the ideologies of objectivity; both deny the stakes of location, embodiment, and partial perspective; both make it difficult to see well" (1991: 191). She understands relativism and totalization (the traditionally scientific take on objectivity) as "god-tricks" that promise vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully (191). For Haraway, there is a middle ground between relativism and totalization and it is taken up by "partial, locatable, critical knowledges sustaining the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology" (191). We need not think of scientific

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[11]I cannot stress enough how important I think these issues are for society. The standard dismissal of caring, compassion and concern for others is that they are "soft" and therefore not suitable political considerations. This is precisely the sort of thinking that we need to avoid, which would hopefully be one of the results of cultivating the more expansive political theorizing that situated knowledges allow. To understand how important these "soft" issues are for contemporary politics we need only pay attention to budget priorities. When five times more money is spent on "Star Wars" than on helping poor mothers find jobs something is seriously wrong.

knowledge as final. In fact, such final knowledge as (masculinist) science seeks is impossible to attain since we cannot separate from ourselves as it requires (201). Haraway understands the masculinist view of knowledge as an attempt to connect and to converse with other scientists through the imposition of a unified method. However, since this method is ultimately irrational, Haraway urges us to connect and to converse with one another in more rational ways. Each of us sees the world through different eyes and, as such, none of us can ever completely identify with another's view of the world. Objectivity in science has been misunderstood as identity. Identity of perspective is impossible. We can, however, make "partial connections" with virtually anyone else. We can build webs of connections with other scientists and other citizens; we can celebrate solidarity in politics and shared conversations in knowledge and use these to work toward improving the world in which we are situated. Political *scientists* fail to do this. They want merely to explain the world definitively without polluting their inquiry with prescriptions for reform. And they are doomed to disagree because they can never attain the identity of viewpoint that the traditionally scientific idea of objectivity requires. Haraway, if taken seriously, can aid the discipline of political science immeasurably on this front.

Third, Haraway's science is not only grounded by hermeneutic consciousness, it also deepens it. In alliance with hermeneutic consciousness, Haraway adamantly opposes dominance and hierarchy in scientific practice and insists that we must relinquish our

attempts to exert control over the world. Objects of knowledge, she argues, are *not* passive and inert things inviting our complete knowledge of them. Feminists have tended to be wary of science and of scientific objectivity insofar as science and scientific objectivity think of objects of knowledge as passive, inert and, therefore, eminently knowable. This presents significant problems for social constructivist and critical knowledges.

> For example, 'sex' as an object of biological knowledge appears regularly in the guise of biological determinism, threatening the fragile space for social constructionism and critical theory, with their attendant possibilities for active and transformative intervention, called into being by feminist concepts of gender as socially, historically, and semiotically positioned difference. And yet, to lose authoritative biological accounts of sex, which set up productive tensions with its binary pair, gender, seems to be to lose too much; it seems to be to lose not just analytic power within a particular Western tradition, but the body itself as anything but a blank page for social inscriptions, including those of biological discourse. The same problem of loss attends a radical 'reduction' of the objects of physics or of any other sciences to the ephemera of discursive production and social construction (1991: 197).

Such difficulty and loss, on Haraway's account, are unnecessary. They "derive partly from the analytic tradition...that turns everything into a resource for appropriation, in which an object of knowledge is finally only matter for the seminal power, the act, of the knower" (197). In this formulation, the world must be objectified as a thing, rather than as an agent. Indeed, the social *sciences* must also deny agency to their "objects" of knowledge, namely, agents.

> Situated knowledges require that the object of knowledge be pictured as an actor and agent, not a screen or a ground or a resource, never finally as

> slave to the master that closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and authorship of 'objective' knowledge. The point is paradigmatically clear in critical approaches to the social and human sciences, where the agency of people studied itself transforms the entire project of producing social theory. Indeed, coming to terms with the agency of the 'objects' studied is the only way to avoid gross error and false knowledge of many kinds in these sciences...Accounts of a 'real' world do not, then, depend on a logic of 'discovery', but on a power-charged social relation of 'conversation'. The world neither speaks itself nor disappears in favour of a master decoder. The codes of the world are not still, waiting only to be read. The world is not raw material for humanization (198).

When we acknowledge the agency of the world in knowledge we make room available "for some unsettling possibilities, including a sense of the world's independent sense of humour" (199). In the end, Haraway's hermeneutic conception of knowledge allows for feminist visualizations of the world as witty agent and her appeal to the myth of the world as Coyote or Trickster (199). The world as Coyote and Haraway's feminist objectivity make "room for surprises and ironies at the heart of all knowledge production; we are not in charge of the world. We just live here and try to strike up non-innocent conversations by means of our prosthetic devices" (199). Clearly, Haraway is cultivating hermeneutic consciousness as I described it in Chapter Two. But she also deepens it. The notion of the hermeneutical circle has its problems, problems that Gadamer and Taylor overlook. Taylor, in particular, is quick to point out that since attempts to break out of the hermeneutical circle must fail, we need to become comfortable living within the hermeneutical circle. What he neglects to consider is how, or indeed, whether, we can make connections with others. That is, in Taylor's world will there be any ground for

agreement between individuals and concepts? Does becoming comfortable with the existence of incommensurable hermeneutical circles of understanding entail incommensurable concepts and views of the world? Haraway would answer these questions in the negative. We can, she argues, make partial connections with one another and we can use these to build webs of connections. We can develop webbed accounts of the world and of our actions therein, and we can do so in a scientific way if we understand objectivity as partial perspective and knowledge as situated.

Finally, Haraway, it seems to me, makes a particularly interesting argument regarding the importance of philosophy with respect to practice. Haraway contends that science actually operates in the way she thinks it should. That is, scientific knowledge is always already situated, contestable, embodied, and so on. We understand it, though, in a different way, in a totalizing way, and we use it in a different way, too; we use it to stake a claim on a totalizing Truth (1991: 196). As such, a critique of the philosophy of science, of the way we think about science, use science, and are initiated into our scientific disciplines, is imperative. This is the project I have undertaken in my dissertation. Scientists of politics might claim that there are no normative implications (or presuppositions) of their work, but there are. Or they might say that there are normative presuppositions at work in their inquiries and that they can admit to them and thereby render them moot, but they cannot. Political knowledge is already situated, contestable, and embodied. Now, we need only construct the philosophy of the science

of politics to reflect that. Haraway's feminist conception of science helps us to do that in a responsible and useful way.[12]

[12]I do not mean to say that Haraway deserves all of the credit for such a reconstruction of science. She is clearly working in a postmodern feminist tradition and thus implicates the wealth of these critiques. Her position is, I have tried to show, the most advanced and the most useful of those I have discussed in this chapter.

VI.

SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS

The *science* of politics, I have argued, was constructed in a way meant to unify it with the natural sciences, emphasizing facts, laws and general theories of explanation. In this formulation, questions of value and of meaning inevitably are considered to be problematic and are thus avoided. This dissertation began as an attempt to highlight the inferior status of normative theory in this scientific identity of the discipline of political science and to suggest ways that normative considerations might be accorded equal weight by the discipline. But this dissertation ultimately aims at much more than that. In the present chapter I will explain how my point has expanded through summarizing the preceding chapters. I have demonstrated that becoming sensitive to normative issues requires that we alter political inquiry in significant ways. We need to be able to recognize, for example, how our inquiries themselves have normative implications. This is something growing numbers of political scholars appear to understand, especially in the field of International Relations. I will briefly discuss two such scholars in this chapter: Jim George and Arturo Escobar. Finally, I will address some of the shortcomings of my approach and suggest some areas for future research into the state of the discipline of political science.

In Chapter One I argued that, given the positivist scientific identity that has taken

hold in the discipline of political science, normative theorizing has been excluded from the "normal" activities of the discipline. The typical political scientist looks at herself as a scientist, as someone who is concerned wholly with political facts and with the explication of those facts. For this person, systematic observation and rigorous explanation yield political knowledge. Questions of value are meaningless in this formulation and cannot contribute to the pursuit of "real" knowledge because they do not generate "facts." Normative issues are, at best, interesting theoretical problems that have essentially no importance for actual political practice. I went on to argue, in Chapter One, that despite the shift to "postpositivism," the empirical/normative divide remained. Normative political theory simply is not a legitimate approach in the discipline of political science; there is copious evidence to support this claim. However, as I argued in the ensuing chapters, it is clear now that the philosophy of science discussed in Chapter One cannot be accepted at face value.

I maintained, in Chapter One, that a formal method grounds scientific inquiry, a method that combines deductive reasoning with inductive reasoning in the construction of knowledge, and that the science of politics roughly follows this model. I also claimed that despite the changes brought to the formal model of scientific inquiry by "postpositivists," the philosophy of social scientific inquiry has not been fundamentally altered. Aspiring political scientists are still initiated into the discipline with at least one "methods" course supporting the positivist view of scientific inquiry, especially the idea

that empirical and normative political inquiry are fundamentally different endeavors. We are taught to believe, in other words, that scientific inquiry generates a knowledge that progresses toward a transcendental and pervasive truth. In the face of the critiques I have raised in the later chapters, however, we are forced, I believe, to consider (at least) an alternative view of science, especially since scientific inquiry does not appear to have ever followed positivist tenets.

In Chapters Two through Five I discussed various alternative views of science, ultimately settling on situated knowledges as the most compelling. In Chapter Two I offered the Gadamerian notion of hermeneutics as a good model for an alternative onto-epistemological approach to science. Positivist objections to the contrary, human inquiry is necessarily hermeneutical. The idea that we can reach some Archimedean point in our pursuit of knowledge is incomprehensible, something that most contemporary scientists would probably admit.[1] Social scientists consistently approach their inquiries from a particular theoretical and cultural context and their knowledge is situated in that context. Indeed, many social scientists probably recognize the situated nature of their inquiries. The problem here is that the practice of social and political scientists does not align well

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[1]It seems that even Heinz Eulau would have agreed with this point as early as the 1960s since he admits that researchers necessarily approach their inquiries with certain biases. However, he did claim that these biases must be treated as "errors" and discounted or isolated in the interest of neutrality (1963: 95, 137; 1969e: 366-369). I contend that biases ought not to be treated as errors, but rather, they should be incorporated into social and political research since they have important contributions to make to that inquiry. Such an incorporation of bias is impossible in a positivist science; for a positivist, biases must be discounted.

with the philosophical perspective of their science. There is a significant gap, in other words, between scientific practice and scientific theory and cultivating hermeneutic consciousness, I argued, begins the process of bridging that gap.

In Chapter Three, I approached the critical theory and critical social science perspectives of Habermas and Fay, respectively. Habermas and Fay, I claimed, envision a science that is far too similar to positivism to represent a significant break with it. This, of course, does not render Habermas and Fay useless for political science. Both Habermas and Fay are extremely sensitive to the problems that hierarchy in the positivist method presents for scientific inquiry. It leads, in particular, to an ill-advised disconnection from those whom one studies and it is a recipe for domination. In a discipline that has clearly presented democracy as *the* most advanced form of political organization, we might expect considerable concern for the potentially detrimental effects of such an approach. Thus, while critical theory and critical social science may not provide us with the best way to overcome hierarchy and domination, they do make us aware of how the positivist mood that still prevails in the discipline's mainstream might result in hierarchy and domination. There is also a more conservative point that we can harvest from Habermas and Fay. I call for some fairly major changes in the way we, as political scientists, think of our scientific identity. If we recognize that these major changes are not likely to occur (expeditiously, *at least*), we can still reap benefits from Habermas and Fay. Both, after all, seek to develop a connection or a conversation

between empirical approaches and normative approaches to the study of society. This is valuable, I think, for a discipline as divided as ours. It is even more valuable when we consider that empirical and normative approaches are, in actuality, impossible to separate and that any form of inquiry which seeks to do so is necessarily feeble. As Terence Ball intimates, the empirical/normative division of labor

> suggests that there are two quite separate domains, one of thought or 'theory' and the other of action or 'behaviour', each of which can be characterized without reference to the other. But this picture is patently false. The agent who holds certain beliefs is not separable from the agent who acts. In fact, his or her actions are not even describable without reference to his or her beliefs, and vice versa. Thus the hope of devising a science of political 'behaviour' was every bit as misbegotten as was a detached 'history of political thought' (1995: 59).

Chapter Four considered the dividing practices of Enlightenment thought through a discussion of Foucault and Derrida. Enlightenment thought, what Derrida calls the "metaphysics of presence," is outdated. Not only is the social and political world arguably more complicated than it has been in the past, but we can no longer profitably think in dualistic terms, if, indeed, we ever could. In denying the existence of transcendental signifieds, Derrida understands the binary oppositions of Enlightenment thought to be necessarily connected. Derridean deconstruction involves reading a text with the interentailing nature of traditional binary oppositions in mind. This leads the deconstructionist to question the privileging of anything over anything else. With deconstruction, every interpretation is in doubt. The same is true for Foucault's genealogical approach. This is not to say, however, that all interpretations have the same

value. That is, we might say that interpretations from all quarters ought initially to be accorded equal weight since any interpretation is *possible*. But this does not mean that all interpretations are equally good (i.e., insightful, illuminating, descriptive, and so on). We can still weigh interpretations by the evidence to determine which ones are more plausible than others. In that regard, some interpretations will be preferable. We might all be able to agree that slavery is wrong in all cases, for example, but this does not mean that slavery will not exist or will not be accorded some value by those who have the power to do so. Through deconstruction and genealogy, then, Derrida and Foucault emphasize the power inherent in language and in knowledge. In the end, the postmodernism of Derrida and Foucault highlights two important issues for an alternative science of politics. First, the social and political world is complex (i.e., not reducible to a simple series of interactions between independent and dependent variables), and it is even more so if we seek accountability. Our modes of inquiry ought to reflect this complexity. Second, power is an integral component of any human interaction and in studying human interactions we need to be aware of this fact. We need to be aware, in other words, that power is exercised throughout society, even within our modes of inquiry.

The feminisms discussed in Chapter Five take this notion even further. Feminists of all stripes are consistently concerned with the exercise of power, especially as it is manifested in masculinism. Some, such as feminist standpoint epistemologists, claim that this exercise of power can be best understood from the perspective of those who are

subjugated, namely, women. They go on to argue that a knowledge that rejects hierarchy and domination must be a feminist knowledge. Ultimately, though, this understanding of knowledge is a bit too narrow. That is, while feminist standpoint epistemologists may have located the root of hierarchy and domination in the sexual division of labor, their approach does not allow them easily to extrapolate from the domination of women to the domination of others in society. Haraway's conception of situated knowledges is more sophisticated in the sense that it uses what women tend to value (or are taught to value), namely, connection to others, embodiedness, and so on, to (re)construct science. Science, she argues, has always been about connection, about communicating to others *the* understanding of the universe. The problem is that science has tried to do this through separation and through the imposition of power. That is, science has insisted that knowledge comes about through mind only, in separation from the body, and that knowledge can only be conveyed through a particular language. Haraway argues that knowledge through separation is impossible and that a standardized language for science is dangerous. Knowledge has always been situated in particular contexts (minds, bodies, cultures, etc.) and expressed in various ways (narratives, metaphors, myths, etc.). Knowledge itself has consistently been partial and perspectival. Furthermore, practicing scientists understand this, but they work within a rhetorical system that allows them to believe that their partial perspectives are building blocks to a transcendental Knowledge. As such, scientists are able to avoid claiming responsibility for how their knowledge is

used. The scientist of the 1930s and 1940s was simply concerned, for example, with the physical properties of hydrogen atom fission. How that knowledge might be used to exterminate people did not enter his purview, until it was too late.

Haraway's notion of situated knowledges makes a radical claim for restructuring the way we think about science. It seeks a complicated web of connections. Not only must we think of science in terms of bringing ourselves together to work *together*, but we must also understand that our inquiries have implications. We are connected to the world (natural, cultural, cosmological, and so on) as well as to each other and what we study as well as how we study it has an impact on the world and on us. For the discipline of political science, this might only be "a plea for tolerance in matters epistemological" (Feyerabend 1963), but it might also be an appeal to rationality in matters political. That is, from Haraway we might take away the notion that normative political theory has something of value to offer scientific political inquiry, namely, a sensitivity to the normative implications of our scientific inquiries. Or we might understand Haraway as offering something more, namely, a sensitivity to the political implications of our inquiries. That is, we might realize that what we study can be used. The political scientist studying voting behavior simply wants to be able to explain the dynamics of voting practices and voting decisions (and, in so doing, advance her career). She is not concerned with the fact that this knowledge might be used by the practitioner of politics for manipulative ends.

This dissertation, as I have indicated, began with the promise of integrating normative political theory into the scientific identity of the discipline. Haraway and other feminists, postmodernists such as Derrida and Foucault, critical theorists such as Habermas and Fay, and hermeneuticists such as Taylor, Schwartz and Gadamer provide us with powerful arguments in favor of such an integration. One of the things that normative political theory does for us is to make us aware that all knowledge claims are contestable. For the political theorist, final answers are illusions. This is true for the "knowledge" we claim to generate, and just as importantly, for the method we use to generate it. A science of politics that incorporates normative political theory would have to recognize this. It would orient itself around seeking *better* answers to our political problems without believing that any particular answer is necessarily the *correct* one. As such, the science of politics would truly become more open, not simply in terms of allowing political theorists to continue to hold university faculty lines despite the weakness of their "knowledge" claims, but in terms of embracing normative political theory and valuing its importance, in spite of the fact that it does not follow the tenets of positivist science. Indeed, "positivist" political science has arguably never abided by the positivist creed either.

As Haraway helps to make clear, however, the inclusion of normative political theorists has other implications. When we include normative concerns in the science of politics, we become accountable for the effects of our studies. We stop to consider the

implications of our inquiries and we accept responsibility for those implications. The fact that normative political theory provides us with knowledge that is contestable and partial reinforces the idea that we are not in control. We humans do not hold the reins of the universe. Social, political and cultural phenomena are far too complex for us ever to understand them in any total sense. This does not mean, however, that our only option in the face of this reality is to give up and cultivate a nihilist perspective of the world. Rather, it means that we need to be careful how we construct our knowledges. We need to recognize that the totalizing perspective we have become so good at animating misunderstands the complexity of the world in a dangerous way. The totalizing perspective allows us to claim that the Western way is the only way and it relieves us of the burden of responsibility for any failures that might result due to "poor" understandings of "the way." Escaping this sort of thinking is crucial if we really hope to support the existence of democratic institutions as we claim to do. In the end, *how* we study politics, societies, cultures, and so on, affects *what* we come to "know."

What we need, then, is a balanced approach, one that recognizes complexity in the world; a "science" that recognizes the role of power in knowledge and in human relationships; a "science" that acknowledges the agency of those it studies, that seeks to learn from its "objects" of study and that invites and embraces the contestability of its knowledge. Lest we despair at the seemingly Herculean shift in political scholarship necessary to realize this goal, I offer two contemporary examples of this sort of approach.

While these may not perfectly capture what I have been talking about in this dissertation, they do indicate steps in what I consider to be the right direction. I think it is important that we briefly consider some examples. It is not very helpful, I believe, simply to talk about a particular scientific identity for the discipline, as I have done thus far, without also providing some insight as to what sort of research this identity might sustain. Toward this end, I will briefly consider the arguments of Jim George in *Discourses of Global Politics* and Arturo Escobar in *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World.*

George and Escobar both point to a lingering positivism in International Relations scholarship. George labels the (sub)discipline of International Relations "backward" in this respect. Indeed, he sees the "orthodox" International Relations perspective on the world as "an increasingly inadequate reference point for understanding a complex and changing global environment" (1994: 2). The dominant "Realist" perspective[2] is positivistic and "represents its knowledge of the world in terms of generalized, universalized, and irreducible patterns of human behavior" (4). This allows Realist scholars to reduce "global politics to the incessant, anarchical power struggle among states and 'rational' interstate activity to the simple utilitarian pursuit of self-interest" (4). In this way, the United States (and Ronald Reagan) can take credit for the demise of the

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[2]George sees no difference, by the way, between the "Realist" position and the "neo-Realist" position in terms of basic approach. Both are "incapable of understanding political behavior other than in the reductionist terms associated with the transplanted methodological individualism of structuralist state-centric anarchy" (15).

Soviet Union since "there can be no 'rational' explanation for Soviet behavior in peacefully relinquishing its power status and systemic authority other than in Traditional power politics terms" (4). George contends that the world is far more complex than the "Traditional power politics" perspective understands it to be. This is particularly true in the post-Cold War era where "patterns of thought and behavior identified as corresponding with an enduring, universal 'essence' of global existence are coming under increasing scrutiny as old ideological commitments and alliances are reformulated" (1).

In light of the complicated nature of post-Cold War global existence, George sees the need for a new understanding of political theory. He insists that we must understand "theory as practice." In theorizing the world, he argues, we are also "making" that world. Related to this is the idea that we can also *unmake* worlds. As such, we can understand "theory *as* everyday political practice" (3). Realist theory makes the world. It constructs the world as "universalized" and "generalized," populated by individuals (individual humans and individual states) seeking their own self-interest. In short, Realists see the world as operating according to certain omnipresent, natural rules. Such a simplistic construction of the world allows them to interpret every human and state interaction in terms of "Traditional power politics." On George's account, this construction of the world removes from the realm of possibility all sorts of capacities (tolerance, imagination, flexibility, etc.) crucial for the post-Cold War world *and* for a world oriented around care and concern for others.

Ultimately, the explanation for the existence of this limited world view is found in the discipline's commitment to science and, in particular, to its positivist conception of science. In his book, George seeks

> to readdress some of the most important themes in modern philosophy--the quest for a positivist science of human society; questions of rationality, sovereignty, objectivity, and truth; relations of subject and object, fact and value, knowledge and power, theory and reality--in order that we might understand more profoundly the way we think and act in human society in the late twentieth century (10).

He argues that

> contrary to any Realist doctrine, reality is never a complete, entirely coherent 'thing,' accessible to universalized, essentialist, or totalized understandings of it. Nor can the question of reality be exhausted by reference to the facts of the world or any simple aggregation of them, because reality is always characterized by ambiguity, disunity, discrepancy, contradiction, and difference. An adequate political realism, consequently, is one that above all recognizes its limitations in this regard and acknowledges its partial, problematic, and always contestable nature (11).

Realist doctrine posits a world "out there," a world accessible to us through sensory information, a world resistant to human purposes. The normative implication of this construction is our attempt to control the world, which includes our attempt to control people. This implication is particularly evident in Escobar's notion of the "discourse of development."

Escobar is perplexed by the fact that North American and European industrialized countries have for decades now been considered the models for Asian, Latin American and African societies. The idea is that these "backward" countries must become

"developed" (i.e., "catch up" with industrialized countries) and even become like the industrialized countries of the West. To explain this perspective, Escobar discusses a "discourse of development" that was formed following World War II. For Escobar, the West has come to live as though the world were divided

> into a realm of mere representations and a realm of the "real"; into exhibitions and an external reality; into an order of mere models, descriptions or copies, and an order of the original' (Mitchell 1988: 32). This regime of order and truth is a quintessential aspect of modernity and has been deepened by economics and development. It is reflected in an objectivist and empiricist stand that dictates that the Third World and its peoples exist 'out there,' to be known through theories and intervened upon from the outside (1995: 7-8).

This perspective universalizes and homogenizes Third World cultures in an ahistorical way, constructing the "underdeveloped subjectivity" as powerless, passive, poor, ignorant, dark, hungry, illiterate, needy, without agency, and "oppressed by its own stubbornness, lack of initiative, and traditions" (8). The existence of such a perspective of the Third World is, on Escobar's account, more a sign of power over it than a truth about it.[3]

The discourse of development, then, "entails specific constructions of the colonial/Third World subject...in ways that allow the exercise of power over it" (9). At work in, for example, the Truman Doctrine is far more than compassion. Masked by the international beneficence of the Truman Doctrine is an attempt to guarantee intellectual supremacy for the West and for the emerging "scientific" social sciences. "Behind the

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[3]Also see Herbert Marcuse's *An Essay on Liberation* (1969).

humanitarian concern and the positive outlook of the new strategy, new forms of power and control, more subtle and refined, were put in operation" (39). Escobar goes so far as to claim that the emphasis on "development" actually caused the massive poverty that the Third World now experiences "when the spread of the market economy broke down community ties and deprived millions of people from access to land, water, and other resources. With the consolidation of capitalism, systematic pauperization became inevitable" (22). And in the end, the discourse of development is pervasive, especially in the West where many people either have not experienced the Third World or *cannot experience it from outside the development discourse* (12).

This pervasiveness, of course, does not necessarily mean that the peoples of the Third World have simply bowed to the power of the development discourse. On the contrary, as Escobar is at pains to emphasize, there are examples of Third World peoples resisting "development interventions and [struggling] to create alternative ways of being and doing" (11). The problem is that these "local knowledges" are necessarily overlooked by the development discourse since Third World peoples are constructed by Western social scientists in such a way as to have no agency. In response to this, Escobar seeks to deconstruct the discourse of development and, in so doing, (re)invigorate local knowledges. In these knowledge systems, "researchers and activists might find alternative rationalities to guide social action away from economistic and reductionistic ways of thinking" (13). But these alternatives cannot be grand or universal (19, 222).

The "investigation of alternative representations and practices" must take place "in concrete local settings" (19). Intellectuals must learn to cease looking at the Third World from the "outside," thinking that they have all the answers because they approach the problems "scientifically." Indeed, Escobar's deconstruction of the development discourse "calls for new theories and research strategies...[for] the reconstruction of the connection between truth and reality, between words and things" (223). We need "new practices of seeing, knowing, and being," practices that are grounded in local knowledges (223).

Both George and Escobar recognize that we need to (re)consider the ways we view the world. We must do this not simply because the post-Cold War world is a complicated place, but because the ways we view the world ultimately have effects on it. As such, George and Escobar are emphasizing precisely the issues I have emphasized in this dissertation. They take a normative approach to empirical problems and thereby adopt a critical stance. I think that this innovation is crucial if we really hope to have a positive effect on our world. Political *scientists* must recognize that their inquiries often have unintended consequences, that their research necessarily has normative implications, and that, as such, knowledge systems are complex, partial, situated and contestable. The sooner we can incorporate this sort of thinking into the discipline's scientific identity, the sooner we can construct a world in which we work *together* for positive change. A major step in that direction, as I have argued in this dissertation, is to have political scientists of

all orientations work *together*, a requirement that is simply not possible given the current scientific identity of the discipline and the divisions it engenders.[4]

This said, I want to close with some potential shortcomings of my arguments and suggest areas where they might be expanded. I will mention two. First, in spite of my argument (particularly in Chapter Five) that the way we think about science is important, I have been unable to elude the problem of philosophy and practice. That is, I have emphasized the philosophies of science lurking behind the discipline's scientific identity but have intentionally slighted the actual practice of political *science*. Here is an area for further research. I have approached the science of politics from the philosophical angle and have concluded that this necessarily has important implications for the practice of that science. What is needed now is a more specific look at political scientific research to determine how it does (or does not) reflect the philosophical perspective I have highlighted here. George's and Escobar's work provides us with a good start, but certainly still more could be done.

Second, the discussion of science undertaken in this dissertation may be deemed to be irrelevant since it is possible that issues of methodology mean relatively little

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[4]This notion of working together might, indeed, extend to the social sciences in general and perhaps to every discipline. In this sense, I believe that responsible and appropriate "scientific" research must be interdisciplinary. The political scientist's view on the world can be expanded by the psychologist's view, the philosopher's perspective, the sociologist's position, and so on. Such people are not likely ever to agree as to what is "known," but they may lead us to more elaborate (and contestable) knowledges. What else can we expect, after all, in the infinite game that is life?

compared to issues of "professional correctness." Tim Luke (1993) has argued that symbolic economies are at work in the contemporary academy in which faculty members seek to distinguish themselves through publication in the "right" journals and with the "right" publishers. As such, while it *is* important what method one uses to study any particular issue, since the "proper" method breeds legitimacy among one's peers, in the broader scheme issues of method may be meaningless in one's attempt to succeed in the symbolic market. This symbolic market that Luke addresses at the macro level ought to be discussed (in much greater detail than can be done here) at the level of the discipline of political science. This is of particular importance to the discipline because Luke's argument suggests that "professional correctness" impedes education. In particular, the effort to succeed in the symbolic market of academe undermines good teaching since teaching means very little in such a market.[5] The discipline ought to take notice of this potentiality. There are important political and cultural ramifications of students who are ill-prepared for everyday life in an ostensibly democratic political system.

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[5]See Wilshire (1990) and Smith (1990) for more detailed discussions of similar issues.

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